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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines fertility decline in the context of planned socioeconomic 
changes in rural China, with special reference to rural Anhui. The period from 1949 
to 1972 was basically one of tightening central control of the economy and society, 
and there was no systematic family planning program in rural China. Fertility 
changes were indirectly influenced by other planned socioeconomic changes. 
During this period, ideological reform and class struggle were emphasized and 
people were forced to submerge their own interests in favour of the collective's and 
state interests. The bureaucratic system became increasingly entrenched and ready to 
carry out the full range of centrally planned policies. It was in these circumstances 
that the family planning program was introduced to rural China in the early 1970s. 
During the 1970s, the family planning program developed rapidly from the 'Wan Xi 
Shao' campaign (Later-longer-fewer: later start, longer intervals and fewer children) 
to the One-child Family policy adopted in 1979. China experienced a dramatic 
fertility decline in the 1970s despite the absence of much progress in socioeconomic 
development. 
From 1979 to 1989 a period of economic reforms was accompanied by the loosening 
of central government control and command economics. In rural China land was 
redistributed to the peasants under a policy known as the production responsibility 
system. 
The social structure quickly adapted to this changed situation. Peasants found that 
their interests were served by larger family sizes to take advantage of new fanning 
systems. Their resistance to rigid central population policy grew stronger in the 
1980s. This resulted in a period of conflict and modification of population policy. 
While fertility remains relatively low, these events suggest that future fertility 
vi 
declines in China are unlikely to be easy or smooth unless economic development 
reaches the stage where people's economic interests are consistent with low fertility 
and the whole community internalizes a small family norm. 
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1.1 Problems 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
China's dramatic fertility decline since the early 1970s has been well documented. 
Studies have found that the marriage pattern of China has changed from early and 
universal marriage to later but still universal marriage. The overall fertility decline 
was largely attributable to a decline in marital fertility and was due almost entirely to 
decrease of third and higher order births. The family planning program, utilizing 
both contraception and induced abortion, played an important role in fertility decline 
(Tien, 1983; Coale, 1984; Coale and Chen, 1987; China Population Information 
Centre, 1984; Lavely, 1986; Feeney and Yu, 1987; Yang, 1987). Still other studies 
have applied the Bongaarts model (1983) to identify the major proximate 
determinants of fertility decline ill China, and the changes in marriage, 
contraception and post-partum infecundability are found to be the main fertility-
inhibiting factors of China (Gu, 1986; Wang et al., 1987; Chen, 1989). 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between socioeconomic 
development, family planning programs and fertility decline in China. Some of 
these show that the level of socioeconomic development and the performance of 
family planning programs are interrelated, and both played an important role in 
fertility decline (Tien, 1984; Jiang, 1986; Wu, 1986; Poston and Gu, 1987; Wang, 
1988). Others argue that socioeconomic factors in China, not necessarily like the 
kinds of socioeconomic factors shown to be instrumental in fertility declines of most 
developed and developing countries, may have played only a minor role in China's 
fertility transition (Mauldin, 1982; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985; Wolf, 19886). 
Still other studies explain the family planning policies and fertility changes of China 
in a broad socioeconomic context; these studies have stressed the culture and 
normative context in which reproduction occurrs (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Chen and 
Kols, 1982; Aird, 1972, 1982, 1985; Mosher, 1983; Chen, 1984; Croll et al., 1985; 
Pasternak, 1986; Lin, 1986; Kane, 1987). 
It has been almost two decades since China started its authoritarian family planning 
program for controlling population growth. During the 1970s, the family planning 
program developed rapidly from the 'Wan Xi Shao' campaign (later-longer-fewer: 
later start, longer intervals and fewer children) in the early 1970s to the One-child 
Family policy adopted in 1979. During the 1980s, the family planning program 
experienced a series of conflicts and periods of adjustment All these changes in 
family planning must be understood in the context of contemporary socioeconomic 
development in China. During the 1970s, China was under tight central planning, 
and the family planning program was designed and implemented from the centre to 
bring down national population growth. There was little consideration of whether or 
not people in different regions would accept the population policy. After the 
· announcement of economic reforms (in the late 1970s), the structures of the central 
economic and political control and planning in China were loosened at the grass-
roots level. Popular resistance to the rigid population policy (One-child Family 
policy) grew stronger and stronger, especially in rural areas. The two most important 
factors impeding the successful enforcement of the One-child Family policy were the 
decentralized nature of policy administration and the inability of enforcement 
mechanisms to adjust to the rapid change in the economy. These led to a 
modification of centrally formulated population policy in the mid 1980s (Bongaarts 
and Greenhalgh, 1985; Greenhalgh, 1986). Towards the end of the 1980s, there 
appeared a tendency to tighten up the family planning program (Hardee-Cleaveland 
and Banister, 1988). Some studies concluded that there are cycles-of-coercion in 
family planning implementation in China (Aird, 1988). Other studies disputed the 
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validity of the cyclical model and suggested linear population policy changes and 
learning progress in family planning in China (Greenhalgh, 1989a). 
Table 1.1 Changes in Per Capita GDP and Other Demographic Indicators of China 
and Some Selected Asian Countries 
GDP($) Average % Contraceptive FPE 
per capita growth% TFR Decline users % Increase % Score 
Country 1970 1980 70-80 1970 1980 70-80 1970 1980 70-80 1983 
China 161 310 5.6 5.8 2.3 60.3 69 100.9 
India 170 260 3.6 5.7 4.8 15.6 12 28 16 74.7 
Indonesia 238 580 7.7 5.6 4.3 22.8 40 87.1 
Thailand 347 790 7.1 6.1 3.6 41.4 15 59 44 70.5 
Korea 710 1910 8.6 4.5 2.7 40.0 25 54 29 96.9 
· Hong Kong 1720 5340 9.9 4.0 2.1 47.S 42 72 30 82.6 
Sources: 1. World Banlc, 1987; United Nations, 1986; Lapham and Mauldin, 1984. *FPE=Family 
planning effort. 
Table 1 gives the changes in per capita GDP and other demographic indicators of 
China and some selected Asian countries during 1970-1982. It shows that the 
growth rate of GDP in China from 1970 to 1982 was at a moderate speed, 5.6 per 
cent on average, but fertility was dramatically reduced, from 5.8 to 2.3 in terms of 
TFR, a 60.3 percent decline. China is the only country with per capita GDP less than 
$400 in the early 1980s where the reproduction rate is approaching the long term 
replacement level (World Bank, 1987: 269). Moreover, in 1982 China had the 
highest score of 'family planning effort' among developing countries (Lapham and 
Mauldin, 1985), and probably the fastest increase in the percentage of contraceptive 
users from 1970 to 1982. However, when the whole development of Chinese society 
since 1949 is considered, it is evident that the more recent dramatic fertility decline 
in China has followed and continues to accompany a series of dramatic ideological, 
social structural and socioeconomic changes planned by the government, such as 
land reform (1950s), anti-rightists campaign (1957), Great Leap Forward (later 
1950s), Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), One-child Family campaign (1979-) and 
3 
the major economic reforms (1979-1989). The understanding of Chinese fertility 
changes should not be separated from the examination of this sequence of drastic 
fertility interventions. Fertility decline is only one aspect of planned societal change 
in China. 
In brief, some features of fertility transition in China may be described thus: 1. It has 
taken place in a volatile society in terms of political and socioeconomic 
development, where the government is constantly involved in explicit attempts to 
control that development. 2. Although the course of socioeconomic development has 
significant effects on people's thinking and behaviour in general, it is unlikely to 
have been responsible for the dramatic fertility decline in the relatively short period. 
3. The successful implementation of the Chinese family planning program is 
remarkable in comparison with other developing countries. The present study 
-examines fertility decline in China in the context of other institutional changes, 
explores the major changes which may affect fertility and explains why the 'planned 
birth campaign' (family planning program) has been so successful. Since China is 
mainly an agricultural country (according to the 1982 national census about 80 per 
cent of the population live in rural areas, and agriculture also forms the fundamental 
base of China's socioeconomic development), the present study concentrates on 
fertility decline in rural areas. To supplement the national level analysis, this study is 
focused on the experience of one province, Anhui, a 'ricebowl' province of the 
southeast. 
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1.2 Review of Some Fertility Theories 
Classical demographic transition theory argues that the prime responsibility for 
fertility decline lies in the development of industrial and urban societies which 
undermined the traditional values supporting high fertility. Socioeconomic 
development or the changes in the environment improved living standards, provided 
more opportunities for women and increased the cost of children; mortality, 
especially infant mortality, declined, and these changes gradually altered people's 
attitudes towards children, and the demand for children. After a certain period of 
mortality reduction, fertility started to fall, resulting in a change from a high fertility 
and high mortality pattern to a low-low pattern (Thompson, 1929, Davis, 1945, 
Notestein, 1945). The classical transition theory developed by the mid-20th century 
mainly argues in 'macro' terms. In this theory, specific 'population policies' did not 
play a role in fertility reduction, since they had not been prominent in the historical 
record to that point 
The Chicago School approach or the new household economics proposed by Becker 
(1960) and others offered a micro-economic approach to explain fertility changes. 
The theory assumes that rational and self-interested people will choose to consume 
the goods that give them the greatest satisfaction. Children are considered as one 
kind of goods. Time itself is also considered as a valuable commodity, and women 
must make choices to allocate their time among competing alternatives, children and 
outside work. As more opportunities become available and with the increasing cost 
of children, fertility declines. 
More recently, Leibenstein (1974, 1975) and ·Easterlin (1975, 1983) combined the 
economic decision-making processes with the social and biological constraints to 
which they are subject Easterlin proposed a more flexible fertility model which 
takes into account supply of children, such as mortality and marriage, as well as 
demand for children. The basic theme of this model was adopted by the United 
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States National Academy of Science as the analysis framework for a project studying 
the determinants of fertility decline in developing countries (Bulatao and Lee, 1983). 
For those theories, the central thesis is that the reduced demand for children is the 
fundamental driving force of fertility transition. 
Other authors have challenged the economic demand theories (Knodel, 1979; Jones, 
1982; Cleland and Wilson, 1987). After analysis of the WFS (World Fertility 
Survey) data of the developing countries, Cleland and Wilson (1987) concluded that 
the WFS findings showed weak links between economic structure and fertility and 
stronger links with culture and education. They suggested that the ideational rather 
than the socioeconomic changes are more important in the fertility transition of 
developing countries. 
Caldwell's theory of inter-generation wealth flows combines the economic and 
sociological approaches to fertility change. It unites the concepts of demand for 
children with cultural transmission of Western ideas and values which ultimately 
undermine that demand. In the societies of mainly family mode of production, the 
net veneration flow is from children to parents. 
The reversal of this flow is the driving force of the fertility decline; the main cause of 
the reverse is the emergence and cultural transmission of ideas of the child-centred 
nuclear family. The locus of fertility decision-making shifted from the extended 
family to the conjugal couple who are free to lavish emotional and financial care on 
their children in the modern Western mode. As such care is expensive, family size 
falls (Caldwell, 1982). Caldwell's theory is essentially an ideational theory of 
change, consistent with the findings of WFS surveys of developing countries and 
many other studies (Cleland, 1985; Cleland and Wilson, 1987). 
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Structural theories of fertility change emphasize the importance of social and 
administrative organization as intermediate factors which shape the course of the 
fertility transition in different settings. This approach has sought the determinants of 
fertility in deep-rooted institutional factors (McNicoll, 1980; Potter, 1983; 
ffirschman, 1985; Hull, 1987; Freedman, 1987). 
Some sociological fertility theories have argued that the decision-making couple 
have little real choice of family size because they are constrained by norms and 
customs (Jones, 1982); but the demand theories of fertility change, the ideational 
theory and most other fertility theories commonly assume that the couple or family is 
increasingly the locus of reproductive decision-making, and socioeconomic 
development or modernization may alter the surroundings and attitudes of decision-
makers who adjust their fertility behaviour accordingly. This process may be 
influenced by the government or other organizations, such as family planning 
programs, but the couple or family has the freedom to accept or reject the programs, 
and the ultimate power of reproductive decision-making mainly lies in the 
individual. This assumption may not be taken for granted in China: there the 
underlying political assumptions are that individuals should subordinate their 
interests to the collective, that collectives should in tum subordinate their interests to 
the state, and that the Communist Party should have a monopoly on national 
decision-making I. The government is assumed to represent all individuals' interests, 
so, logically, it assumes the responsibility of making major decisions for the state 
and ordinary people. The government endeavours to make individuals subordinate 
their preferences to the party's or state's goals defined by the government (Aird, 
1985; Mosher, 1983). The restricted freedom of individuals to make fertility 
decisions in China marks a fundamental difference in the social system between 
China and most other countries, even most other socialist courtries. 
1 In China, the government and party are the same in tenns of power control; the Communist Party is 
the leading force everywhere in China, and the top echelon of government consists of a group of top 
party leaders. There is no distinction between these two in the present study unless specified. 
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This political context has important implications in studying fertility decline in 
China. If the fertility transitions of the developed countries, described by the 
classical transition theory, represented a 'natural' transition in which socioeconomic 
development was the driving force in fertility decline, and external interventions 
such as family planning programs played a minor role, most of the on-going fertility 
transitions in the currently developing countries represent a 'modified' fertility 
transition influenced by family planning programs, global networks of 
communications, Western ideas, etc. The case of China stands at the extreme of 
modified fertility transition, it represents a large 'planned or ordered' fertility 
transition. On one hand, it means that the government directly or indirectly interferes 
in or plans individual fertility behaviour. On the other, it implies that socioeconomic 
development in China has not yet reached the stage where the majority of individuals 
would spontaneously accept the very low fertility implicit in the One-child Family 
policy. The 'planned' fertility transition of China is distinctive. The 'natural' and 
most 'modified' fertility transitions elsewhere are mainly 'passive' with regard to 
intervention in fertility behaviour --- family planning programs are introduced in 
response to community demands for them, or potential demands. In China's 
'planned' fertility transition, the government makes the major decisions and plans 
socioeconomic development and fertility behaviour, and family planning programs 
are seen as one aspect in the whole planning process. Once the government has 
justified the decision to bring down population growth, it is not necessary to 
consider whether or not ordinary people accept the decision, although it is easier if 
they do. 
This is not to say that socioeconomic development and other influences have played 
no role in fertility decline in China. However, China as a centrally controlled and 
planned society provides an example of very successful planned fertility decline in a 
relatively short period of time. Regardless of socioeconomic trends, the centrally 
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planned society through its bureaucratic system has the potential to effectively 
change human fertility. 
The present study does not intend to develop a fertility theory: 
·rt is widely agreed that we do not have an adequate theory of fertility, if by theory 
we mean a coherent body of analyses linking a characterization of society and 
economy, aggregate or local, to individual fertility decisions and outcomes, able to 
withstand scrutiny against the empirical record (McNicoll, 1980: 44). 
It is hoped that the present study of fertility decline in China will provide 
supplementary evidence to enrich existing fertility theories. 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
The level of fertility in a society falls below its maximum potential level through the 
direct operation of various factors limiting exposure to intercourse and exposure to 
conception and through factors affecting pregnancy outcomes and length of the post-
partum infecundity. Davis and Blake (1956) first outlined a group of eleven such 
direct fertility determinants. Bongaarts (1978) developed a model in which the main 
immediate or 'proximate' fertility determinants could be measured and their relative 
effects on fertility quantified. By definition socioeconomic factors have to operate 
through the 'proximate' determinants to affect fertility. Bongaarts showed that most 
fertility differences among societies could be explained by four 'proximate' 
variables. Those are (1) proportion of married women among females of 
reproductive age, (2) proportion of fecund women using effective contraception, (3) 
prevalence of induced abortion, and (4) duration of post-partum infertility. Some 
studies have tried to link proximate variables to more remote influences, such as 
education, socioeconomic development, socio-political system and cultural 
background --- factors which influence fertility indirectly, through one or more 
proximate variables (Cleland, 1985, Rouyer, 1987, Hull, 1987). 
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Hull (1987) has proposed a general conceptual framework for the study of planned 
fertility reduction using the institutional approach. The framework attempts to link 
proximate variables to institutional changes in society; it assumes that fertility 
behaviour is the outcome of both institutional influences and individuals' decision-
making processes, and a large number of interrelating institutions in society shape 
the environment in which fertility decisions are made. This framework identified 
three institutions which directly affect 'proximate' determinants: family system, 
economic system and technology of birth control. The next level of institutions 
consists of the structure of governance and the pattern of socialization, and at the 
apex of the framework is ideology (Figure 1.1 ). Changes in ideology result in 
changing structures of social control, which in turn, lead to change of environment in 
which people make their fertility decisions. As that environment changes, so does the 
behaviour with regard to the proximate variables and the fertility level itself. 
The institutional approach provides a basis and general guidance for study of 
planned fertility decline in China. It should be emphasized that the official guiding 
ideology in China is Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; the Communist Party or the 
government is the leading force in building socialism. Since 1949 the government 
has constantly managed Chinese society, and established a huge bureaucratic system 
to carry out planned or purposive social changes. This system reaches every corner 
of Chinese society. The basic method of planned social change in China is as 
follows: the start of the change process is initiation of government policy in favour 
of a certain change. This initiation can be translated into ei¥ter indirect or direct 
attempts to change social life and people's behaviour. Indirect attempts are pursued 
by structural transformations. Tne government can use some or all of its resources to 
bring about change in the social structure. The assumption behind this mechanism is 
that once the structure has changed, people will adapt their behaviour to it. There are, 
however, two major types of more direct change mechanisms: administrative 
sanctions and normative influences. The government can make clear what kinds of 
IO 
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Figure 1.1 General Conceptual Framework for the Study of Planned Fertility Reduction 
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behaviour and attitudes are allowed and forbidden, and then use the party, police and 
other organizations to punish those who do not comply (Parish and Whyte, 1978). 
The practice of government intervention in society is based largely on Marxist 
doctrine, which holds that the economic base in a society determines its 
superstructure, and the superstructure can in turn influence economic development. 
In a socialist country, those influences are believed to advance the society. Mao 
Zedong (Tse-Tung), former chairman of the Communist Party of China (1949-1976), 
stated it more clearly: 'Our goal is not only to know the society, but more 
importantly to reform the society' (Mao, 1963:227). Marxism-Leninism and Mao's 
application of these doctrines to the Chinese case are the fundamental theories 
guiding the Communist Party and the party is the leading force of the planned 
economy. 
Within the Central Party Committee, a group of top leaders are the principal power 
holders. They are the key persons in determining the nation's future. One of the most 
important features of this elite political system is its periodic changes in controlling 
the society. It periodically swings between the tightening and loosening of central 
control and planning over the society (Pye, 1988: 38). Generally speaking, during a 
period of tightening control, ideological changes of people and class struggles in 
society will be emphasized, and during a loosening period, socioeconomic 
development will be emphasized. Because a detailed discussion of the political 
system in China is beyond the scope of the present study, I will rely on a number of 
recent studies of Chinese politics for an understanding of the key institution of 
control in Chinese society. 
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1.4 Objectives Of Study 
From a political point of view, the last forty years development (1949-1989) in 
China can be broadly divided into three periods. 1. From 1949 to 1979: although 
there were a few times of relatively tighter or looser control, this period was 
basically one of tightening central control. 2. From 1979 to 1989, this was a period of 
economic reform and loosening central control. 3. Since the second half of 1989, 
there has been another period of tightening central control. The implication of this 
classification is that any specified planned socioeconomic changes and campaigns in 
China are influenced by whether they are undertaken in periods of tightening or 
loosening central control. 
In more detail, the Communist Party began its rule of the country in 1949, after 
which there were a series of mass campaigns in China: land reform (1950s), the anti-
rightist campaign (1957), the Great Leap Forward (later 1950s), the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), the One-child Family campaign (1979-), the economic 
reform (late 1970s) and Anti-bourgeois Liberalization (1986). Dramatic fertility 
decline was only one of the outcomes and closely related to other changes. The main 
stages of socioeconomic development and development of population policies in 
China since 1949 are defined as follows: 
1949-1952. Recovery from the war, and establishing a 'new democratic economic 
system'. 
1953-1957. Transitional period and first Five Year Plan. Government guided 
economy to transfer from 'new democratic' to socialist economy and land reform in 
rural areas. As a result of rapid expansion of socioeconomic development, there was 
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a great increase in female labour and a demand for birth control, but the government 
remained at the stage of general propaganda on birth control with no specific policy. 
1958-1965. Rapid expansion of socioeconomic development. For the first time the 
government was seeking the 'Chinese socialist road' which led to 'the Great Leap 
Forward', resulting in three years of famine. After the anti-rightist campaign (1957), 
1958-1962 marked a period of total rejection of demographic knowledge. Following 
the failure of economic planning, there was a short period of economic reform. 
During the reform, in 1962, the state family planning office was established and 
some offices were also set up in the main cities. The government planned to 
introduce birth control in cities and gradually extend it to rural areas, but this was 
soon interrupted by the Cultural Revolution. 
1966-1976. Cultural Revolution. The economy almost collapsed. During the later 
years of the cultural revolution, population growth placed more and more pressure on 
society. In 1972, population growth became part of national development planning 
and the government started producing contraceptives in mass quantity and free of 
charge. The 'Wan Xi Shao' birth control campaign (later-longer-fewer) was in effect 
until 1979. 
1977-1979. The government was seeking the 'Chinese socialist road' again and 
making preparations for a new economic reform. The One-child Family policy was 
announced in 1979. 
1978-. The 'Production Responsibility system' was introduced to rural areas and 
later expanded to cities as the 'contract system' in the early 1980s. For the first four 
years of the One-child Family policy, there was an increasingly rigid implementation 
of the policy; since the mid-1980s, the state family planning commission has 
adjusted the policy in a more rational and flexible way. At the beginning of 1988, the 
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'reproduction responsibility system' was officially introduced and there has since 
been a tendency to tighten up the implementation of population policy. 
On the basis of the earlier discussion of the conceptual framework and stages of 
development, the following hypotheses about fertility changes in China and Anhui 
are proposed: 
1. Before 1970, the Chinese government did not regard population growth as one of 
the principal contradictions in building the socialist China. The principal 
'contradictions' were the ideological reforms, class struggles and socioeconomic 
changes, and the government devoted its main attention and resources to these 
matters. Population growth was basically a 'neglected comer' in planning. 
Presumably, during this period socioeconomic development or socioeconomic 
factors played an important role in fertility change and differentials. As an result of a 
series of ill-planned changes, population growth gradually became recognized as a 
principal contradiction in society (early 1970s), then the government started paying 
attention to population growth, and made use of the existing political and 
administrative system to control the population. In a broad sense, the 'planned birth' 
campaign (1972-), Great Leap Forward (1958) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76), 
have common characteristics: government planned changes. In this case, the 
importance of socioeconomic development in determining fertility gradually 
diminished while the importance of administrative forces gradually increased as the 
implementation of population policies became more and more rigourous. 
2. During the 1970s, the family planning program in China achieved remarkable 
success in controlling population growth despite the absence of much progress in 
socioeconomic development. The success of the program was largely due to the fact 
that during the 1970s under tightening central control and planning, the bureaucratic 
system was capable of changing people's reproductive behaviour. It is assumed that 
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not only can the population policy bring down the fertility of women, it can also 
change to some extent people's attitudes towards children (Whyte and Gu, 1987). 
However, people's demand is unlikely to be as low as one or two children per 
couple, so the present situation of fertility transition in China is unlikely to be a 
stable one. 
3. The economic reform of China (1979-1989) essentially meant adoption of the 
capitalist mode of production with some minor modifications. The socioeconomic 
structures and the ideology of the society gradually changed during the reform. More 
and more people gradually realized the importance of their own economic interests 
and wanted the right to make their own decisions. The planned birth campaign 
marked an end of the high tide of government planned, dramatic changes in China. 
But the struggles between the government planned birth policies and the demand for 
more children will exist until economic development reaches the stage where people 
have internalized a small-family norm, and this will release the pressures. Finally, a 
relatively stable equilibrium will have been reached. 
In this thesis, fertility decline in rural China, particularly in rural Anhui is analysed 
in the context of planned socioeconomic changes. The changing patterns and trends 
of reproductive behaviour in rural Anhui since 1949 are also used to signal the 
influences of political and planned socioeconomic changes. 
1.5 Data 
The main sources of quantitative demographic data are from the 1953, 1964 and 
1982 censuses of China and Anhui; China's National One-per-Thousand-Population 
Fertility Sampling Survey (1/1000 Fertility Survey. See Appendix for the 
Questionnaire) and the 1987 One Percent National Population Survey. 
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Qualitative demographic data have been collected from documents about the 
population policies in China and Anhui since the 1950s. The findings of some 
qualitative analysis of Chinese fertility changes, for both China and Anhui, are also 
cited. 
The quantitative socioeconomic data are mainly derived from the Statistical Year-
Book of China and Anhui (1980-1987) and the Economic Year-Book of China and 
Anhui (1982-1988). 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
In the next chapter, the setting of the study, Anhui province, is compared with China 
in terms of the soci06Conomic development, and rural development since 1949. The 
structures and functions of local governments, and their ·ability to influence the 
planned changes and people's behaviour are analysed. The levels and trends of rural 
fertility in Anhui and China are also examined. 
Chapter 3 analyses in detail the planned societal changes in rural Anhui since 1949. 
It provides a basis for analysing the dramatic planned fertility decline since the early 
1970s. The interactions between planned societal changes and people's fertility 
behaviour are also analysed. 
Chapter 4 describes the development of the family planning program in Anhui, and 
its development is viewed as one of the series of planned socioeconomic changes. 
The structure and function of family planning activity is an extension of the existing 
bureaucratic system. The basic methods of family planning activity are essentially 
the same as other planned changes. 
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Chapter 5 analyses the changing age-pattern of first marriage and its impacts on 
fertility in rural China and Anhui since 1949. Its change is used as an indicator to 
signal the planned socioeconomic changes. The computer program NUPTIAL 
(Rodriguez and Trussell, 1984) is modified and used. 
In Chapter 6, the technique of life table analysis is used to examine the fertility 
change by birth order in rural China and Anhui. Those changes are analysed in the 
context of planned socioeconomic changes since 1949. The computer program 
BIRTH (Rodriguez and Menken, 1984) is used and modified to read Chinese data. 
Family planning in China is one of the planned changes, and it is mainly responsible 
for the dramatic fertility decline since the early 1970s. Chapter 7 examines how 
family planning affects all married women in term of contraceptive use (including 
induced abortion). 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
The Setting of Anhui 
2.1 Anhui in Comparative Perspective 
Anhui province is situated in the southeastern part of China, and is bounded by 
Jiangsu and Zejiang provinces to the east, Henan and Hubei provinces to the west, 
Jiangxi province to the south and Shangdong province to the north. It is about 450.km 
wide and 570.km long forming a total area of 139.6 thousand km.2, which accounts 
for about 1.4 per cent of all China. In 1987, it had a population of 52.7 million. 
Figure 2.1 is the map of Anhui province. 
2.1.1 Natural Conditions of Anhui 
Anhui has a varied topography: the areas along the Huai, Y angzi river and the north 
are mainly plains, comprising 49.6 per cent of Anhui's total area. The south and 
southwestern parts of Anhui are mainly mountain areas, accounting for 15.2 per cent 
of total area; there is about 27 per cent of hilly land and 8.2 per cent of water. 
Anhui province is in the subtropical zone and has rich water resources, but the 
irrigation system has not yet been properly developed; the available water of the 
Y angzi River valley per mu is as much as five times more than that of the Huai River 
valley. The lack of irrigation networks between these two valleys often results in 
flood in one place and drought in the other. On average about two thirds of Anhui's 
total disaster areas are actually hit by disasters every year, 18 per cent more than the 
national average. Coal is the main energy resource in Anhui; the proved reserves are 
the fifth biggest in China. There are two main coal mines, Huainan and Huaibei, 
Figure 2.1 Map of Anhui Province 
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both situated in northern Anhui. Anhui is also rich in other mineral resources: of 51 
kinds of proved reserves, 18 are within a tenth of national proved reserves in 
quantity. 
Geographically, Anhui can be divided into four areas: 
1. Northern Anhui (Huaibei Plain) is mainly a plain area, containing 95 per cent of 
Anhui's coal reserve deposits; apart from the coal mining industries, it is an 
agricultural area which accounts for 47 .8 per cent of the total cultivated land. More 
than 70 per cent of Anhui's grain products come from this area, but unfortunately, it 
is often hit by droughts and floods, so the per mu yield is about 30 per cent lower 
than the provincial average. 
2. Middle Anhui is mainly a hilly area. The provincial capital, Hefei city, is in the 
middle of the area, and is also the political, cultural and industrial centre of Anhui. In 
the west, there is a forest which accounts for 31.7 per cent of Anhui's total forest 
areas. 
3. The Yangzi River valley is the richest agricultural area of Anhui with the highest 
per mu yields in rice, wheat and cotton. The main agricultural products are rice, rape 
and cotton. More than half the fishing products are from this area, which is also 
Anhui's metallurgical industrial base, accounting for 85 per cent of its metallurgical 
products. 
4. Southern Anhui is mainly a mountainous area, where more than 70 per cent of 
Anhui' s forestry products and teas are produced; but communications and 
transportation are poorly developed. 
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2.1.2 Socioeconomic Development of Anhui 
Table 2.1 shows some indices of social and economic development of China and 
Anhui for some selected years since 1952. There are two basic features in Anhui's 
social and economic development: wealth in both natural and human resources. In 
1985, Anhui had a labour force of about 26.3 million, 5 per cent of the national 
labour force and the eighth biggest labour market among the 28 provinces and 
autonomous regions in China. As it is an agricultural province, more than 80 per cent 
of its labour force has been engaged in agricultural production since the 1950s. 
Anhui's agricultural product constituted more than 80 per cent of total provincial 
product during the 1950s but this was reduced to about 70 per cent during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, and further reduced to about 45 per cent in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Anhui's light industries have mainly processed agricultural products; since 
1950, on average, 80 per cent of the raw materials used by the light industries have 
been agricultural products. Obviously, agriculture is the key sector of Anhui's social 
and economic development, but the speed of its agricultural development has lagged 
behind the national average in the last few decades, as has the development of the 
industrial sector which mainly depends on agricultural products. 
There are some shortcomings in Anhui' s social and economic development: first of 
all, although Anhui had a labour force of more than 22 million according to the 1982 
census, about half of them were illiterate or semi-literate, 14 per cent more than the 
national level, and 75 per cent of the female labour force were illiterate or semi-
literate, 30 per cent more than the national average. Second, the development of 
science and technology in Anhui is far below the national average. During the 1950s, 
Anhui had a few scientific research institutes and a small number of scientific 
workers, but until 1978 the number of scientific workers per thousand population 
was still as low as 1.9, less than half of the national average. Third, per capita fiscal 
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Table 2.1 Comparative Indicators of Social and Economic Development: China and 
Anhui 
1952 1965 1978 1980 1983 
Economic indicators 
Per capita GNP(yuan) 
China 104 194 315 376 464 
Anhui 77 146 298 275 357 
Per capita fiscal revenue 
China 32.0 65.3 116.5 109.9 118.2 
Anhui 9.1 23.1 47.7 41.5 44.3 
Total industrial production index 
China 100 453 1601 1889 2340 
Anhui 100 375 1257 1477 1930 
Total agricultural production index 
China 100 137 230 259 336 
Anhui 100 125 183 198 269 
Agriculture products as 
% of total products 
China 57 37 28 31 34 
Anhui 85 66 45 45 44 
Labour force in agriculture % 
China 88 82 76 75 75 
Anhui 85 83 82 
Education indicators 
Population aged 12 and over who are 
illiterate or semi-literate% 
China 55(1964) 32(1982) 
Anhui 68(1964) 46(1982) 
Primary school enrolment 
(as % of age group) 
China 94 93 93 
Anhui 90 89 90 
Scientific workers per 1,000 
population 
China 0.8 4.6 5.4 6.7 
Anhui 0.1 1.9 2.2 3.2 
Population per physician and 
health worker 
China 833 474 351 313 
Anhui 2272 541 467 429 
Life expectancy 
China 57(1957) 68 69 68 
Anhui 69 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau, 1985; Provincial government of Anhui, 1985; China Population 
Information Centre, 1986b. 
revenue of Anhui has been substantially lower than that of China as a whole. 
Actually, it has been less than half the national average since the 1950s, which is 
why the Anhui government has always complained of the shortage of money in 
23 
Anhui's development. Clearly, the lower educational level of Anhui's labour force 
indicates that this labour force is less advanced; the lower level of science and 
technology development suggests that Anhui's future development is constrained 
and the shortage of fiscal revenue would limit the prospects of provincial 
development. In view of these disadvantages, Anhui province stands currently at the 
lower middle level of socioeconomic development in China and its future 
development will be restricted by these disadvantages. 
2.1.3 Population of Anhui 
Figure 2.2 gives the birth and death rates of China and Anhui since 1949. The 
population growth of Anhui has some distinguishing features in comparison with 
China as a whole. The birth rates experienced two peak periods, one low peak period 
and two relatively stable periods. The lower rates of growth in Anhui during the 
early 1950s were probably due to under-reporting rather than being the real figures. 
The first peak period was 1954-1957 with average birth rates of 33.3 per thousand 
and a peak at 43.3 per thousand in 1954. The second peak was 1962-1972, when on 
average, the birth rates were 41 per thousand; in 1962 the peak was 53.3 per 
thousand, 26 per cent higher than the national average. The period 1960-1961 was 
marked by lower birth rates: the average birth rate was 45 per cent lower than the 
national level. From 1976 to 1984 was a relatively stable period: on average the birth 
rates were close to the national level and since the early 1980s they have been lower 
than the national level. For the death rates, from 1954 to 1960, there were two peak 
periods: the first was 1954 with a death rate of 16.6 per thousand, which was mainly 
due to the severe floods of that year. The second peak was during the three years of 
famine, 1959-1961; the death rate reached 68.6 per thousand in 1960, more than 
twice as high as the national average, and it was the highest among 28 provinces and 
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autonomous regions of China in 1960, reflecting the severe effects of famine on 
mortality in Anhui. 
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Figure 2.2 Birth and Death Rates of China and Anhui, 1950-1987 
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According to the 1964 population census, the population density of Anhui was 224 
per km.2; it increased to 357 per km2 in 1982. Population is unevenly distributed; in 
northern Anhui (Huaibei plain), the population density increased from 309 per km.2 
in 1964 to 509 in 1982; in middle Anhui from 224 per km.2 in 1964 to 356 in 1982; 
in the Y angzi River valley from 277 to 432 per km2 and in southern Anhui from 111 
to 165 per km2. From north to south, Anhui ranges geographically from plains 
through hills to mountain areas, and the population distribution and growth range 
from a higher to a lower level accordingly. 
Table 2.2 shows some demographic indices of China and Anhui, 1952-1983. For the 
last few decades, Anhui has accounted for around 5 per cent of the national 
population and the sex ratio has been higher than that of China. The 1982 census 
25 
showed that Anhui was the eighth biggest province of China in terms of population. 
According to the 1953 census, the broad age structure of Anhui was very close to 
that of China; considerable changes occurred. in the 1964 census: the percentages of 
the young group (age 0-14) and the old group (65+) in Anhui were lower and the 
percentage of the 15-64 age group was higher than that of China. This may suggest 
Table 2.2 Selected. Demographic Indices of China and Anhui 
1953 1964 1982 
China Anhui China Anhui China Anhui 
•-
Population by sex 
Total (000) 580,600 30,660 694,580 31,241 1,008,180 49,666 
Male 300,820 160,96 356,520 16293 519,430 25,764 
Female 279,780 145,64 338,000 14948 488,750 23,902 
Sex ratio 107 110 105 109 106 108 
Population by age group(%) 
Age 0-14 36.3 36.1 40.4 38.4 33.6 36.2 
Age 15-64 59.3 60.2 56.0 59.2 61.5 59.8 
Age 65+ 4.4 3.7 3.6 2.4 4.9 4.1 
Women 15-49 23.5 22.9 22.0 23.7 24.7 23.2 
Age indicators 
Median age 23.1 21.0 22.9 20.2 
Dependency 0-14 61.2 60.0 72.2 64.9 54.6 60.6 
Dependency 65+ 7.4 6.1 6.3 4.1 7.9 6.9 
Total 68.6 66.1 78.5 68.9 62.5 67.4 
Urban-Rural population(%) 
Urban 13.3 7.6 18.4 12.5 20.8 14.4 
Rural 86.7 92.4 81.6 87.5 79.2 85.6 
Population density (per K.m2) 
62 215 74 223 107 355 
Sources: Anhui Statistical Bureau, 1984; Tian (Ed), 1985; Provincial Government of Anhui, 1985 
greater losses of younger and older people dUring the famine (1959-1961) in Anhui. 
In 1982, the age structure of Anhui returned to the 1953 pattern while the national 
pattern changed away from it. Anhui had a younger 1982 age structure than China, 
which indicates that Anhui had experienced faster population growth since 1964. 
The same trends are true for the changes in dependency ratios, which in Anhui in 
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1964 were considerably lower than those of China; they were considerably higher for 
the 0-14 age group and lower for the 65+ age group in 1982. Urbanization in Anhui 
has always been lower than in China: more than 80 per cent of Anhui's population 
were farmers until 1985. 
2.2 Local Party and Administrative Structure 
Anhui province is divided into eight administrative regions; among these regions, 
there are 67 counties. Below the county level, there are 149 towns and 3,410 
townships (communes before 1983). There are also nine cities under the jurisdiction 
of the provincial government and six cities under the jurisdiction of the 
administrative regions. Under the 1982 Constitution, the administrative regions are 
not a level of government, but rather they are executive bodies of provincial 
government. The basic structures, functions and relationships between local party 
and government organizations are briefly explained as follows. 
The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 as a vanguard to lead the 
revolution. In 1949, the Party took power and has ruled China since then. The 
provincial Party committees were officially established after 1949. In December of 
1952, Anhui Province held the first Party members' representive assembly. In July of 
1956, the first Provincial Congress of the Communist Party of Anhui was held, the 
second Party Congress was held in 1963 and the latest one was in 1971, representing 
944,237 Party members, accounting for 2.3 per cent of total provincial population. 
The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows the basic structure of local Party leadership. From 
the macro point of view. the key organs of Party leadership are the central standing 
committees, especially that of the Political Bureau, which meet regularly, carry out 
day-to-day business, and prepare the agendas and decisions which the larger bodies 
(such as the Central Committee and the Party Congress) adopt at their infrequent 
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meetings. The provincial and county level of the Party are mainly the executing 
organs which carry out the centrally decided policies and campaigns, sometimes with 
some modifications to suit local conditions. From the micro point of view, the 
township (commune before 1983) Party committees, which are the lowest level of 
government, deal with the concrete implementations of policies, campaigns and 
production plans. Implementation of decentralized policies is finally realized at this 
level. Below the township, it is the Party Branch in village committee (production 
brigade before 1983). At the end of 1983, there were 3,410 townships and 31,305 
village committees in rural Anhui. Usually, there is a secretary and a deputy 
secretary with three to five Party committee members at the township level, and 
there is a secretary and deputy secretary with one to three committee members at the 
village committee level. In total, there were 18,000 to 20,000 Party leaders at 
township level and 100,000 to 150,000 Party leaders at the village committee level in 
rural Anhui. 
The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the simplified basic structure of the Chinese 
government under the 1982 Constitution. The supreme organ of government remains 
the National People's Congress (NPC) which is a large body comprising 
representatives of provincial assemblies (which in turn are elected by the counties 
and municipalities below them). It is reconstructed every five years or so except that 
during the Cultural Revolution a full decade elapsed. In theory, the party and the 
people's congress jointly rule the country. In reality, the NPC serves little in the way 
of a genuinely representative or legislative function, mainly rubber-stamping policies 
made by the Party and imparting to them the legitimacy and formal status of 'laws' 
(Blecher, 1986). 
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Figure 2.3 Simplified Structures of the Chinese Communist Party and Government 
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The first Provincial People's Congress of Anhui was held in August 1954 and the 
subsequent Congresses were held in 1958, 1964, 1978 and 1983. The NPCs at 
different levels are not the administration bodies; the State Council and the different 
levels' governments are the administrative bodies. The State Council consists of the 
Premier, vice-premier and the heads of different ministries and commissions 
whichform the Chinese government's administrative apparatus. At the provincial 
level, there are the corresponding departments in accordance with the State Council. 
The township is the lowest level of government, usually consisting of a director, one 
or more deputy directors and the heads of public security, finance sections, family 
planning office and other sections. At the village committee level, there is a leader, 
an accountant and a head of militia who are in charge of the administrative affairs of 
the villages. 
The relationship between the Party and the Government has experienced phases of 
separation-emergence-separation. In the early 1950s, the pressing tasks of China 
were administrative and institutional rather than political. The Government 
organizations had to be established and began to function throughout the country. 
The functions of Party and Government were distinct during the early 1950s. Since 
the late 1950s, the Party has gradually directed the country towards the line of 
ideological changes, class struggles and political campaigns. The powers of the Party 
committees at different levels were strengthened. During the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) the revolutionary committees were established consisting of 
representatives of the party, the government and mass organizations; actually the 
Party committees monopolized everything and the distinction between the Party and 
government practically disappeared. Since the early 1980s, the separation of the 
functions of the Party and Government have become part of the economic reform. As 
Deng Xiaoping pointed out, 'the excessive centralized Party leadership in the past is 
the root cause of many problems, it created serious bureaucratic style of work .... the 
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Party must not exercise leadership in everything' (Deng, 1987: 288). These reforms 
have also taken place in Anhui: at the end of 1983, the Anhui government started 
rural administrative reform and changed the commune into the township and 
production brigade into village committee. The functions of the Party and 
Government were separated again (Provincial government of Anhui, 1985). 
2.3 Rural Development of Anhui 
Anhui is mainly an agricultural province. During the 1950s the farmers constituted 
more than 90 per cent of the total provincial population, and in 1985 the proportion 
was still as high as 83 per cent, 6 per cent higher than the national average. From 
1949 to 1983, the rural development of Anhui can be divided into five stages: 
1. Economic recovery and first Five Year Plan (1949-1957). The land reform of the 
early 1950s mobilized the enthusiasm of the farmers and agricultural production 
developed rapidly. In 1952, total agricultural output value reached 4,727 million 
yuan, 25.6 per cent higher than in 1949, and the average growth rate was 8.0 per 
cent It continued to grow to 6,092 million yuan in 1957 and the average growth rate 
for 1949-1957 was 7.4 per cent. 
In 1955, Anhui started the movement of agricultural co-operative transformation. By 
the end of that year, 92,686 co-operatives were established, and 5,777,000 
households, 85 per cent of total households, had joined the co-operatives. The 
farmers' living standards gradually increased, and per capita grain consumption of 
farmers reached 308 kg in 1957, a 34.2 per cent increase from 1949. This suggested a 
bright future for agricultural development 
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2. Great Leap Forward and second Five Year Plan (1958-1962). Late in 1958, rural 
Anhui rapidly introduced people's communes. Under the pressure of 'jump into 
communism', the economy was overheated. There was a movement towards extreme 
boasting and exaggeration of the agricultural production of China. Anhui was not an 
exception; many communes claimed that the grain yields per mu were well over 
5,000 kg, an impossible achievement at that time. The Great Leap Forward soon led 
to complete failure in rural development and three years of famine, 1959-1961. In 
1962, the total agricultural output value of Anhui was reduced to 3,870 million yuan, 
36.5 per cent lower than in 1957; from 1958 to 1962 the annual rate of reduction was 
8.7 per cent. Per capita grain was reduced from 308 kg in 1957 to 210 kg in 1961. 
Rural Anhui was seriously affected by famine. For example, the survey of Liyuan 
commune of Fengyang county showed that the commune's cultivated land was 
reduced from 23,400 mu in 1955 to 14,800 mu in 1961. Beside the lack of seed grain, 
reductions in land use were probably the result of declines in numbers of draught 
animals (Kane, 1988: 78). The total grain production of the commune was reduced 
from 2.9 million kg in 1957 to half a million kg in 1961, a 77 per cent reduction. 
Most of the villagers had to flee from the famine, but the conditions in other counties 
were no better than in their own, so more than half of them died of famine or famine-
related diseases. Later statistics showed that Liyuan commune was by no means the 
worst hit by the famine. 
3. The economic reform (1963-1965). Shortly after the famine, there was an 
economic reform. Rural development gradually recovered from the famine; from 
1962 to 1965 the total agricultural output increased by 52.4 per cent and grain 
production increased by 44.2 per cent. Again there appeared a picture of prosperity. 
4. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Anhui rural development was seriously affected 
by that political campaign. At that time, the Dazhai brigade in Shanxi province was 
lauded as the national model of agricultural development, and the Guozhuang 
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brigade in Anhui province as the provincial model, with the basic principle that poor 
conditions lead to revolution and revolution makes richness. In agricultural 
production, only grain production was emphasized as the key link and other 
agricultural products and family side-products were regarded as leading to ·the 
capitalist road. Those products were discouraged and family side-productions were 
prohibited. Although grain production increased during the Cultural Revolution, 
from 9.8 billion kg in 1966 to 14.0 billion kg in 1976, other agricultural production 
made slow progress: the value of animal husbandry increased at an average rate of 4 
per cent a year, the value of fisheries 1.5 per cent and cotton production was almost 
constant for 10 years. During that time, the agricultural population increased by 11.5 
million, a 33 per cent increase from 1966. So the farmers' living standard could 
hardly be increased; for about 10 years, the per capita income of farmers was around 
60yuan. 
5. Production responsibility system (1978-). In 1978, Anhui was afflicted with a 
severe drought, in response to which the Anhui government first tried out the 
'responsibility system' in some counties which were seriously affected by the 
drought; later the responsibility system was ratified by the central government of 
China and extended to the whole province and China. The responsibility system 
brought about the rapid rural development of Anhui. Although Anhui was hit by 
severe floods in 1983, the total agricultural output increased by 47.5 per cent 
compared with 1978 and forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and 
fisheries all increased substantially. There were about 1.4 million 'specialized' 
households in 1983, comprising 15 per cent of total Anhui rural households; they are 
the people who became richer first in the economic reform and continue to lead the 
trend of Anhui rural development. 
Table 2.3 shows some agriculture indices of China and Anhui. From 1952 to 1983, 
the total cultivated land of Anhui decreased by 20 million mu while the agricultural 
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population increased by 16.5 million, consequently per farmer cultivated land in 
1983 was reduced to half of that in 1952, from 3.1 mu to 1.5 mu. The average annual 
rate of reduction of cultivated land and rate of increase of population are 23.7 per 
thousand and 8.6 per thousand respectively. 
Table 2.3 Selected Agricultural Indices of China and Anhui 
1952 1965 1978 1980 1983 
Total cultivated land (000 mu) 
China 
Anhui 867,27 72,764 67,037 66,693 66,518 
Per capita cultivated land (mu) 
China 
Anhui 3.1 2.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Total value of agric. output (1980 price level) 
China 100 100 100 100 100 
Grain production 83.1 75.8 67.8 63.7 62.0 
Forestry 0.7 2.0 3.0 4.2 4.1 
Animal husbandry 11.5 14.0 13.2 15.3 14.7 
Sidelines 4.4 6.5 14.6 15.1 17.5 
Fisheries 0.3 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.7 
Anhui 
Grain production 71.1 73.9 74.3 72.5 74.3 
Forestry 0.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Animal husbandry 16.0 16.1 15.5 15.8 13.0 
Sideline 10.6 6.3 6.9 8.3 9.3 
Fisheries 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Grain yields per mu 
China 88 109 169 183 227 
Anhui 74 100 160 161 220 
Per capita grain (kg) 
China 288 272 319 327 380 
Anhui 300 294 315 297 390 
Per capita income of farmers 
China 107 134 191 310 
Anhui 108 102 185 305 
Bicycles per household 
China 0.31 0.37 0.63 
Anhui 0.11 0.16 0.39 
Sources: State Statistical Bureau, 1985a; Provincial Government of Anhui, 1985; China Population 
Infonnation Centre, 1986b. 
Since the 1950s in China the structure of total value of agricultural output has 
changed considerably: the value of grain production has steadily declined and all 
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other components have gradually increased, especially sideline production which has 
more than trebled in 30 years. This is, of course, mainly due to economic reform; the 
township (commune) owned light industries and private enterprises in rural China 
have mushroomed since the later 1970s. The rural development of Anhui has not 
followed the national pattern: the values of all components of agricultural output 
have not changed much, and no clear trends could be observed. When the actual 
conditions of Anhui are considered, some drawbacks of Anhui rural development can 
be seen: for example, forest areas occupy one fourth of Anhui' s total area, but the 
total value of forestry products has accounted for less than 2.5 per cent of total 
agricultural output since 1952. Anhui has the second biggest fishing area in China, 
but the value of fishing in 1983 was only the 13th in China. This suggests that other 
agricultural productions in Anhui have yet to be developed. The grain yield per mu 
and per capita in Anhui have been close to the national average level since 1952. 
There was a jump from 1980 to 1983 and in terms of grain yields per mu and per 
capita, Anhui was ahead of China: 37 .5 per cent increase of grain yields per mu 
compared with 26 per cent increase in China. This may suggest that though Anhui 
was the pioneer of the 'responsibility system' and benefited from the earlier start of 
the new system, there is no guarantee that Anhui will continue to lead rural 
development in China. In fact, considering the present situation in Anhui, such as the 
higher illiteracy rates of the labour force, lack of science and technology 
development and very low per capita fiscal revenue, etc., it is more likely that it will 
slow down in future rural development. For the light industry products, it can be seen 
that the number of bicycles and sewing machines per household in Anhui has been 
considerably lower than in China since 1978. The lack of development of Anhui's 
light industry, as mentioned before, is mainly responsible for the lower level of 
possessions. It also reflects the lack of purchasing power of light industry output in 
rural Anhui (Luo, 1985: 135). 
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Anhui as a whole stands at the lower middle level of socioeconomic development in 
China. Anhui's rural development is in a state of imbalance, although grain 
production has been close to the national average, especially since the later 1970s; 
however the development of other agricultural products (forestry, animal husbandry, 
sidelines and fishing) lags behind the national trends. 
2.4 Levels and Trends of Rural Fertility in Anhui 
Figure 2.4 gives the TFR (total fertility rate) of rural China and Anhui, 1950-1982. 
The TFRs of Anhui were lower than the national level before 1960. From 1950 to 
1955, on average, Anhui's TFR was 6.5 per cent lower, which may partly reflect 
poor reporting in Anhui. During the economic crisis and three years of famine (1959-
1961), the TFR of Anhui on average was about 45 per cent lower than that of China; 
the lowest fertility in Anhui was 1.7 in 1960, which was only half of the national 
minimum (3.35). During the baby-boom period (1962-1972), Anhui's fertility was 
higher than that of China; the average for that period was 6. 7 4 in Anhui and 6.4 in 
China: Anhui was about 5.3 per cent higher. From 1973 to 1977, the TFRs of Anhui 
were close to the national pattern, but during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
TFRs of Anhui were about 12.5 per cent higher than the national average. This may 
suggest the stronger resistance of Anhui' s farmers to the One-child Family policy 
after the 'responsibility system' in rural areas. Generally speaking, Anhui's fertility 
was not only sensitive to the economic crisis and famine, but also sensitive to the 
economic reform and population policy; fertility was below the national level during 
the economic crisis and famine, above the national level during the baby-boom, back 
to the national level during the rigid implementation of population policy and again 
above the national level in the recent economic reform. 
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Figure 2.5 provides the rural fertility changes of China and Anhui by age groups 
from 1950 to 1982. Age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) in rural China varied in a 
synchronized way until the late 1960s, after which fertility at all ages except perhaps 
ages 45-49 underwent a large sustained decline. The synchronism of the variation 
until the late 1960s, as pointed out by Coale and Chen (1987: 7) 
suggests that th~ variations from year to year had a quasi-biological source, since 
voluntary control by means of contraception or induced abortion normally affects 
fertility at higher durations more than at lower durations, as is evident in the 
downward trend after 1969. Possible quasi-biological factors were disruptions of 
married life caused by a change in living arrangements due to collectivization and 
disruptions of married life or even reduced fecundability caused by an economic 
crisis, including widespread famine. 
Because of the very high proportion of married women even at ages 20-24, rural 
fertility rates at ages 20-24 and 25-29 in China were virtually identical from 1950 to 
1957. In the late 1950s, fertility at ages 20-24 began to fall below fertility at ages 25-
29 as later marriage reduced the proportion married among women in their early 
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Figure 2.5 Age Specific Fertility Rates of Rural China and Anhui, 1950-1982 
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twenties. The proportion ever married at 20-24 declined from 87.4 per cent to 75.2 
per cent in 1969, 59 per cent in 1979 and 44 per cent in 1979. 
During the period of the Great Leap Forward, followed by three years of famine 
(1958-1961), fertility at all reproductive ages experienced a tremendous decline, 
reaching its lowest point in the entire post-1950 period, mainly because of the 
economic crisis and three years of famine (1959-1961). Fertility at ages 20-34 
declined no less than 35 per cent from 1958 to 1961. Shortly after the famine, 
fertility at all ages peaked in 1963 and the rates were more than doubled in less than 
three years. The exceptionally high fertility of 1963 was partly due to the 
compensation effects after the famine. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, 
fertility remained at a high and unstable level, which might reflect the effects of 
social turmoil (Cultural Revolution) and lack of population policy in rural China. 
Since the early 1970s, fertility at all ages has undergone a substantial decline, 
especially for women aged 30+. This coincided with the gradual implementation of a 
rigid population policy in China. 
The greater oscillations are the first impression of Anhui' s fertility changes in 
comparison with China. In the early 1950s, this feature had already been revealed. 
During the economic crisis and three years of famine, Anhui's fertility at all ages 
underwent a dramatic decline; the lowest fertility in Anhui was in 1960, one year 
earlier than the national fertility decline. Fertility of Anhui in 1961 was no less than 
45 per cent lower than national fertility in the same year. Even in 1961, Anhui's 
fertility recovered somewhat from its level in 1960, but it was still considerably 
lower than the national level. This suggests that Anhui was hit by the economic crisis 
and famine earlier, more seriously and probably for longer than other provinces of 
China. 
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Fertility soon swung back and peaked in 1963; Anhui's fertility at ages 20-24 and 
25-29 exceeded the national average level. During the baby-boom (1962-1972), there 
were two fertility fluctuations in Anhui just as in China, in 1967 and 1969, which 
probably reflected the impacts of marriage concentration soon after three years of 
famine. Fertility changes in Anhui in both fluctuations exceeded the national level, 
especially for women of age groups 20-34. Since 1972, the fertility decline for 
women aged 30+ in Anhui has more or less followed the national pattern; fertility at 
ages 20-29 declined at a slower speed than in China as a whole. 
2.S Summary 
In summary, Anhui is mainly an agricultural province with rich natural resources and 
an abundant labour force. Geographically, moving from north to south of Anhui it 
features plain, hilly and mountain areas whose main products are wheat and coal; 
wheat, rice, fishing and light industrial products; forest products and tea respectively. 
Anhui province, on average, stands at the lower middle range of socioeconomic 
development. Before 1980, the rate of socioeconomic development was rather slow, 
but in the late 1970s, Anhui was a pioneer of the 'responsibility system' and since 
then its rate of development has exceeded the national average. Population growth 
rates in Anhui were. higher than the national average during the 1950s, and much 
lower than the national average during the three years of famine, suggesting more 
serious effects of famine. From the early 1960s to 1975, its growth rates were higher 
than the national average, and they have been closer to the national pattern 
afterwards. Basically the same pattern was observed with regard to rural fertility 
changes in Anhui. 
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Chapter 3 
Planned Societal Changes in Rural Anhui 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the major events of planned societal change in rural Anhui are 
examined in historical order, providing a basis for understanding the social system, 
and also for understanding the circumstances in which the family planning program 
is carried out in rural Anhui. 
3.2. Land Reform and Agricultural Co-operation Movement, 1949-1957 
On 30 January, 1950, shortly after the national liberation (1949), the Central 
Government of China announced the 'Regulations of Land Reform in China', and 
the first agricultural reform was started. Land has been the essential issue in rural 
China: the peasants have lived on their land for thousands of years and it is their 
lifeblood. Before the liberation (1949), most of the land was possessed and 
controlled by a small number of landlords and leased to the poor peasants. The main 
purpose of land reform in early 1950s was to redistribute the land to the majority of 
poor peasants and to realize their dream of many years, 'Land to the Tiller'. 
In rural Anhui, the land reform started in late 1950. Every county government sent 
land reform teams to the rural areas, and the first stage was to mobilize the masses 
and to stress the significance of land reform; meanwhile the teams investigated the 
socioeconomic conditions of the villages. Then followed a key step in land reform: 
the classification of classes. In April 1950, the Central Government released several 
documents about how to classify the classes in rural China. On the basis of 
possession of land and degree of exploitation, the peasants were classified into five 
major classes: 1. Landlord. 2. Rich peasant. 3. Middle peasant. 4. Poor-lower middle 
peasant. 5. Fann hand. The general line of land reform was to rely on the poor-lower 
middle peasants and farm hands, united with the middle peasants, to neutralize the 
rich peasants and gradually eliminate the exploitation system controlled by the 
landlords and some rich peasants. Before the land reform, about 40 per cent of the 
cultivated land in rural Anhui was owned by 409,400 landlords and rich peasants 
who constituted only 6.5 per cent of the total rural population. Table 3.1 shows the 
land distribution by different classes in rural Anhui before and after land reform. 
Table 3.1 Land Redistribution by Different Classes in Rural Anhui Before and After 
Land Reform, 1950- 1951 
Classes Households % of Total Land % of Total Land per 
(1,000) Households (1,000) Land HH (mu)* 
Before Land Reform (1950) 
Landlords 240.5 3.8 25,257 30.9 105.1 
Rich Peasants 169.0 2.7 6,477 7.9 38.4 
Middle Peasants 2,288.0 35.2 29,358 37.0 12.8 
Poor Peasants 3,088.4 48.9 15,382 18.8 5.0 
Fann Hands 366.0 5.8 480.0 o.6 1.3 
others 162.0 2.6 455.1 0.6 2.8 
After Land Reform (1951) 
Landlords 24.0 3.8 3,225 3.9 13.5 
Rich Peasants 168.9 2.7 4,567 5.6 27.1 
Middle Peasants 2,287.0 35.2 37,347 45.6 16.3 
Poor Peasants 3,095.2 48.9 31,789 38.9 10.3 
Fann Hands 366.8 5.8 2,978 3.6 8.1 
Others 162.5 2.6 579 .7 3.6 
Source: Anhui Statistic Bureau, 1984. *HH=Household. 
After land reform, 87 per cent of landlords' and 26 per cent of rich peasants' land 
was redistributed to other classes. Poor-lower middle peasants and farm hands 
gained, on average, 6 mu of land per family, middle peasants also slightly gained 
some land, about 3.5 mu per family. Landlords and rich peasants respectively lost 
91.6 and 11.3 mu of land per family. The land reform was a fundamental change in 
economic structure in rural areas: it eliminated the ancient feudal land system and set 
the scene for increased rural productivity. After the land reform, the Central 
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Government also launched a series of rural economic policies in favour of rural 
development, such as taxation and finance policies, and the state monopoly for 
purchase and marketing of grain. The total value of agricultural production of rural 
Anhui increased at a speed of 6.2 per cent annually from 1950 to 1957, while per 
capita grain of peasants increased from 220kg to 330kg and income· from 25 yuan to 
75 yuan (Anhui Statistical Bureau, 1985; State Statistical Bureau, 1985). There was a 
sense of prosperity in rural Anhui. After the land reform, although 25.3 million 
middle and poor-lower middle peasants accounting for 93 per cent of Anhui's rural 
population gained 27 million mu land and 200,000 cattle, the means of production 
per family were still very limited. Land was one of the basic means of production; 
given the lack of other means of production, such as farm animals, tools and farm 
machinery, the prosperous peasants mainly depended on the size of the labour force 
and the labour skills the family had. There were basically four different kinds of 
-families: 1. Among the big families with more labour and skills, although they had a 
poor foundation to start with, the living standard steadily increased; their main fears 
were unexpected disasters. 2. Among small families with a smaller labour force, but 
some labour skills, as long as the main labour force was healthy, the living standard 
could be expected to increase gradually. 3. Small families with few workers and few 
skills could rarely improve their living standard. 4. Big families with few workers 
and few skills were in difficulty and could not expect to improve their standard of 
living. Traditionally, only adult males were regarded as the labour force and the 
labour skills also passed to them. So the peasants realized that the more workers and 
skills they had, the more the family could prosper; these were the major determinants 
of family prosperity during the early 1950s. In fact, the land reform strengthened the 
traditional culture of son preference and provided incentives to the peasants to have 
bigger families. That was the fundamental driving force in the demand for more 
children in rural areas during the early 1950s. Meanwhile, the Chinese government 
also encouraged people to have more children, as Chairman Mao Zedong stated, 
'People are the most valuable resources in the world ... the more people, the easier for 
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economic development in China' (Mao, 1957: 387). With the end of the turmoils of 
war, people had a peaceful life and the public health services were improved, so 
naturally fertility steadily increased in rural Anhui from the early 1950s. 
After land reform, the individual families became the basic production units, but 
owing to the poor economic conditions and uneven distribution of labour forces 
among the families, some families naturally organized their production together into 
what were called 'mutual benefit production groups', which indicated that the 
peasants had in themselves the seeds of co-operation. More and more families 
gradually realized the strength of getting organized, and more of them joined the 
'mutual benefit groups'. That was the origin of the second rural reform in China: the 
'Agricultural Co-operation' campaign. In the first stage, there were the 'mutual 
benefit groups', which were gradually extended to the 'elementary agricultural 
producer's cooperatives'. At that stage, the land still belonged to the individual 
families; the distribution of the product was according to the amount of work each 
member did and the amount of land he contributed as a shareholder. In July 1955, 
Mao Zedong gave a speech about agricultural co-operation which led to a sharp 
intensification of the agricultural co-operation campaign in rural China. In that 
campaign, the Anhui government revealed its capacity for manipulating people: for 
example, before August 1955, only 13.6 per cent of families in rural Anhui had 
joined the advanced Co-operative, by the end of that year 85 per cent of families had 
joined, there were 92,686 advanced co-ops including 5.8 million families, and a 
considerable percentage of families were forced to join (Provincial Government of 
Anhui, 1985: 264). At the beginning of 1956, the transformation of elementary to 
advanced agricultural producer's cooperatives iil rural Anhui was finished; Anhui 
was one of the fastest provinces completing that campaign in China. The 
fundamental difference between the elementary and advanced Co-op was land 
ownership: in the advanced Co-ops the land and other chief means of production 
belonged to the Co-ops and the distribution system was based on the principle of 
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'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work'. By the end of 
1956 the transformation of the agricultural system into a socialist system was 
completed. The peasants actually owned the land from 1951 to 1956, and although 
during that time rural socioeconomic conditions were poor, possessing the land 
mobilized the enthusiasm of the peasants, and agricultural production increased 
steadily. In 1956, the land was taken back by the government which gradually 
eliminated peasants' incentives to production; since then the government has planned 
a series of social structure and ideological changes, and one political campaign after 
another has brought about national disasters. Fertility also fluctuated wildly with 
these campaigns and man-made disasters. The driving force behind these changes is 
the Communist Party and its bureaucratic system which served as a tool to carry out 
these campaigns. 
3.3 Changes in Social Structure in Rural Anhui 
The process of agricultural co-operation or socialism was accompanied by another 
fundamental social structure change: the establishment of the centrally controlled 
bureaucratic system. This system greatly emphasized the role of ideological changes 
in socioeconomic development, especially the role of Marxism-Leninism-Mao's 
thoughts, and carried out a series of political campaigns and different socioeconomic 
policies, including population policies. Analysis of the changes and functions of 
social structure in rural areas helps to understand the implementation of population 
policies and the dramatic fertility decline since the early 1970s. 
Historically, the county was the lowest level of local government in charge of the 
affairs of towns and villages. Above the county was the highest level of local 
government, the province. By the 1954 Constitution of China, one level of local 
government in rural areas, xiang (commune after 1958) under the county 
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administration was added. On average, a county has 40 to 50 xiangs and a xiang has 
5 to 10 production brigades. In 1955, there were 9,593 xiangs in rural Anhui; in 
1956, they merged into 3,577 xiangs with 29.4 million total rural population. 
At each level of local government, there were the corresponding party committees. 
The main functions of the xiang government were supposed to be economic 
management and public welfare in the villages. The party committee was in charge 
of ideological education and remodelling, and the party members were supposed to 
set 'revolutionary examples' in the villages to lead the way to socioeconomic 
development. During the early 1950s, the functions of the xiang government and the 
party committee were more or less separated; the xiang government played a major 
role in socioeconomic development. After the transformation of agricultural co-
operation in 1956, the economic structure of rural China changed from individual 
family to collective ownership. Land and other chief means of production were 
collectively owned and the products were collectively distributed. It did not make 
much difference whether or not one worked hard. The peasants' direct interest in 
production gradually weakened; from the economic point of view, the system no 
longer produced any internal incentive for peasants to work hard. Under these 
circumstances, motivation for production could only come from the moral 
encouragement which is the main job of the party committee. The party believes that 
the correctness or incorrectness of the political line decides everything; once the 
correct political line is decided, the party cadres become the decisive factor in 
carrying out the corresponding policies and campaigns. In the mid 1950s, the central 
party's general line shifted in terms of ideology and class struggles which led to the 
party committees taking an enhanced leadership role at local government levels. The 
campaign of the people's communes in the later 1950s actually started the 
centralized party leadership in rural China. 
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3.4 Great Leap Forward and Three Years of Famine (1958-1965) 
The origin of the people's commune was in Xinxiang county, Henan province in 
1956. Mao Zedong visited the first commune in 1957. At the 6th Plenary section of 
the 8th Party Congress of 1958, the central committee, on the basis of Mao Zedong's 
suggestion, released 'A resolution for the problems of the people's commune' which 
set off a high tide of the people's commune campaign. The campaign started in . 
Anhui in September, 1958, and in about three months, there were established 1,010 
people's communes which included 9,590 production brigades and 7.2 million 
families. By the end of that year, the provincial government announced that the 
people's communes were organized throughout rural Anhui. Anhui was again one of 
the fastest provinces to complete the people's commune campaign. The people's 
commune was usually based on the xiang administrative region: a few xiangs 
combined into a commune or a bigger xiang might itself become a commune. 
Officially, the people's commune was an organization which integrated government 
administration and economic management, but the Party committees actually took all 
the leadership and monopolized everything; the local government administration 
existed in name only. The centrally controlled Party leadership was realized through 
the people's commune campaign. On the management side, the people's commune 
was the basic accounting unit and the production teams under the production 
brigades were the basic labour production units; actually the people's commune 
planned all production. For the distribution system, the commune applied jointly the 
wage and supply system; the supply system was a system of payment in kind which 
was supposed to have some elements of communist society. In fact, it was an 
egalitarian system: grain, private plots and household land were distributed 
according to the number of people in each family; bigger families with fewer 
workers and more children could get more grain, other food and private land than 
families with more workers and fewer children. Although the bigger families with 
more children used to be worse off, the people's commune distribution system 
brought them to about the same level as the others. This provided some incentives 
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for the peasants to have more children, not for direct economic considerations as 
after the land reform, but as a result of the egalitarian distribution system. 
The people's commune campaign soon led to the 'Great Leap Forward' (1958). The 
general line of the Party that guided the Great Leap Forward was 'Going all out, 
aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better, and more economic results in 
building socialism' (Chen, 1958: 77). That was a period during which production 
figures and improvements in peasant living conditions were exaggerated greatly. In 
Anhui, the communes set up common dining rooms and dormitories and tried to 
apply the communist system of distribution according to needs. The communes 
reported higher and higher and impossible production yields per mu and rushed into 
the communist society. Unfortunately, nothing worked as expected, and rural 
development was soon destroyed by the Great Leap Forward, which was followed by 
three years of famine (Peng, 1987). Rural Anhui was one of the provinces worst 
affected by the famine: some villages were completely empty, as many people were 
dead of hunger and some wandered away in search of food; in some counties two 
thirds of 'the population died of hunger and famine-related diseases. The crude birth 
rate dropped from 20 per thousand in 1959 to 2.3 per thousand ih 1961 and the crude 
death rate increased from 16.7 per thousand in 1959 to 68.6 per thousand in 1960; 
both figures set national records. The result of the famine was to provide firm 
evidence of the faults in economic planning and management of the people's 
commune campaign. Unfortunately, the Party headed by Mao Zedong turned the 
blame onto the Soviet Union for its pressure on China to repay the foreign debt. It 
also blamed the local leaders for their proneness to boasting and exaggeration in 
production during the years of natural disaster (1959-1961). 
Nevertheless, the Party tested the strength of mobilizing the masses by emphasizing 
the ideological changes in economic development through the centralized 
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bureaucratic system. This line of manipulating the people and society continued to 
develop in later years. 
Shortly after the famine, there was a period of reform (1962-1965). In rural Anhui in 
order to recover from the famine, the peasants spontaneously carried out some kind 
of 'responsibility system' known as San Zi Yi Bao (More plots for private use, more 
free markets, more enterprise with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss, and 
fixing output quotas on a household base). From late 1961 to early 1962, that system 
was adopted by more than 85 per cent of production brigades in Anhui. The reform 
brought about rural development in Anhui: the total value of agricultural production 
increased by 52.4 per cent from 1962 to 1965 and per capita grain increased from 
214kg to 294kg. Since the economic development was contradictory to the Party's 
general line, the 'responsibility system' was soon prohibited as attempting to follow 
the capitalist road. In 1963, rural Anhui started the 'Four-clean-ups' campaign: a 
nation-wide movement to clean things up in the fields of politics, economy, 
organization and ideology. 1963-1966. At the beginning, the campaign was aimed at 
the peasants who favoured San Zi Yi Bao, many of whom were forced to do self-
criticism and to confess that they attempted to follow the capitalist road. The attack 
was then directed at the leaders of communes and production brigades who 
supported San Zi Yi Bao and rural economic development, and they were criticized 
as against the Party's general line and socialist system. The 'responsibility system' 
was strangled at birth and the focal point of the work was again changed to 
ideological remodelling and class struggles. 
However, the people's commune campaign was the beginning of the centrally 
controlled bureaucratic system in rural areas. The Great Leap Forward tested and 
verified the strength of the system to manipulate the people, and the three years of 
famine showed what serious mistakes the Party could make if actual economic 
conditions were not considered properly in development planning. But the Party 
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ignored these warnings, and continued further on the wrong line; the 'Four-clean-
ups' campaign in 1963 was only a prelude to another national disaster: the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). Population growth and fertility behaviour inevitably 
fluctuated with these planned changes. 
3.5 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Power struggles among the top leaders resulted in the Cultural Revolution, which the 
people, especially the Red Guards, were fooled into thinking was a life-and-death 
struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, socialism and capitalism. Though 
the main battlefields were in urban areas, the rural areas were affected. In rural 
Anhui, the campaign 'Learn from Dazhai and catch up with Guozhuang' ran through 
the Cultural Revolution: Dazhai, a village in Shanxi province, was the national 
example of agricultural success; Guozhuang, a village in northern Anhui, was the 
provincial example. The basic principle of these examples was that poor conditions 
led to revolution and revolution made wealth. In order to have the revolution, the 
peasants must have the revolutionary spirit which could only come from learning 
Mao's thoughts and fully criticizing and cleaning up the capitalist thoughts that the 
peasants spontaneously had. It was believed that the main manifestation of 
capitalism was private ownership; in order to block the way of capitalism and move 
along the socialist road, the communes put undue emphasis on large size and having 
a higher degree of public ownership, which in fact further disconnected the peasants' 
interest from production. 
The communes planned and managed production and the peasants worked 
collectively and did not have any rights to decide what to do. Only grain production 
was emphasized, other production was regarded as not following the socialist road. 
The distribution of grain and other food was still according to the number of people 
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in each family. The working points of each family were accumulated to the middle 
and end of the year's distribution to cover the cost. The working points of the labour 
force were fixed on a daily basis, ranging from 5 points for a half and IO for a full 
unit of labour; one point was worth from 2 to 20 cents (Chinese renminbi) depending 
on the prosperity of the production brigades. A full labour unit might earn 20 to 50 
cents daily. The families whose working points were not sufficient usually received 
subsidies; they were often the families which had more children and a smaller labour 
force. The families with more labour were only slightly better off than others after 
payment of the extremely low income. For most families, cash for buying salt, food 
oil and cloth came from selling eggs, pigs and other family products which were 
strictly limited to prevent the restoration of capitalism. 
As a result, rural development in Anhui stagnated during the Cultural Revolution. 
Although only grain production was emphasized, per capita grain production of 
Anhui in 1978 was 314 kg, only 6 kg more than in 1957. Per capita income in 1978 
was 66 yuan, only 6 _yuan higher than in 1950; taking into account inflation, the 
living standard of the peasants actually declined. The provincial government 
announced a 30 per cent decline in standard of living in 1978 from 1955. During that 
time, a bigger labour force did not seem to promise a family future prosperity 
because the system restrained them from becoming rich, but bigger families with 
more labour did provide more security in case of any kind of emergency or disaster 
and also potentially more security for the aged. Also the cost of raising children was 
very low: there was a saying that 'One additional mouth in the family is not more 
difficult than adding one more pair of chopsticks', and the families with more 
children were likely to get more shares from the collectives. So it is not likely that a 
series of planned campaigns altered the peasants' demand for more children very 
much, although the underlying determinants were shifted around with these 
campaigns. 
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3.6 Responsibility System (1978-) 
The overthrow of the 'Gang of Four' in October, 1976 ended Mao's 27 years of 
dictatorship, and opened a possible way of reform in China. The rural reform of 
China actually started in Anhui in the middle of 1978. In that year, Anhui was hit by 
the biggest drought in a century; about 60 million mu of cultivated land, accounting 
for 90 per cent of total cultivated land, was affected by the drought and 4 million 
people even ran short of drinking water. Many communes could not continue the 
autumn sowing; instead of letting the land lie fallow, some production teams in Feixi 
county decided to apply the method of 'fixing of farm output quotas for each 
household', which was the method adopted in 1962 after the three years of famine. It 
had helped the peasants to recover from the famine, although the method was 
criticized as following the capitalist road; since then, the effectiveness of the method 
for rural development could hardly have been forgotten by the peasants. At the 
beginning, the cadres at all levels were afraid to support it, but fortunately, at the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee in December 1978, the 
reformers headed by Deng Xiaoping scored a decisive victory, and the path was 
cleared for a subsequent program of reform. The meeting also passed the modified 
'Regulations Regarding the Work of Communes'; first released in 1962, the 
modified 'Regulations' emphasized the importance of rural economic development. 
After that, the provincial government of Anhui investigated the production teams 
where the 'responsibility system' was adopted and decided to extend the system to 
all rural Anhui; by the end of 1979, there were 37,900 production teams. Ten per 
cent of total teams adopted some kind of responsibility system; this increased to 95 
per cent of production teams in 1982 and in the following year, the system was 
adopted by all production teams in rural Anhui. 
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Initially, there were basically two kinds of responsibility systems. In the 
responsibility system without direct connection with production outputs, production 
teams owned all means of production and planned all production, but they assigned 
the basic working points to the labour force of each family. The number of basic 
working points each family had was used as a criterion to distribute an amount of 
land to each family, then the outputs of the crops were calculated according to the 
different land and crops and then fixed for the households who agreed with the 
quotas .. If the households produced more than the fixed quotas, they got a material 
bonus, usually fertilizer, farm chemicals or grain; if they failed to achieve the fixed 
quotas, basic working points were deducted. The pre-fixed outputs had to be 
submitted to their production teams for unified distribution among all the peasants 
according to the working points. 
The second kind of responsibility system had a direct connection with production 
outputs. In that system, the means of production were still owned by the production 
teams, but all land and outputs of crops were distributed and assigned to each family. 
Each family signed the contract about how much grain or other products they should 
submit, and how much they should pay for the accumulation fund and funds for 
public welfare of production teams; the family received whatever remained. This 
system is called Da Bao Gan (comprehensive contract) and gradually became the 
dominant form of responsibility system. 
Linking the peasants' interests directly to the production outputs is the essential point 
of the responsibility system; instead of lacking interest in the production as before 
the reform, the peasants not only pay great attention to production, but also to 
production management because to a large extent the quality of the management 
determines the production yield. Second, the responsibility system fundamentally 
changed labour force management from collectively planned to individual family 
management; the families sign contracts with production teams and plan their own 
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production, and have the right to decide what to do and when it shall be done. As a 
result, production and the peasants' standard of living have substantially improved, 
while peasants feel that they have more free time than before. Third, as the families 
are in charge of the whole process of production under the responsibility system, it 
provides great incentive for the peasants to learn some agricultural technology in 
order to achieve better management and higher production. Table 3.2 shows some 
indices of peasants' living standards in rural Anhui in 1978 and 1983. 
Table 3.2 Some Indices of Peasants' Living Standard in Rural Anhui, 1978 and 1983 
Items Unit 1978 1983 % Change 
83n8 
Per capita income Yuan 113.1 305.0 169.0 
Per capita living exp. Yuan 102.5 258.4 152.2 
Per capita grain Kg 273.2 284.1 4.1 
Per capita food oil Kg 2.3 4.3 83.4 
Per capita meat Kg 4.3 8.0 85.5 
Per capita clothes cons. M 5.2 6.0 14 
Per capita living space Sq2 8.4 12.4 47.6 
Bikes per 100 people 10.5 39.4 274.4 
Radios per 100 people Set 14.0 70.8 404.5 
TV per 100 People Set 0 1.1 
Doctors per 1,000 people 1.3 1.4 7.1 
Total Savings 1,000 Yuan 97,860 825,360 743.4 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, 1985b. 
In 1983 the average living expenses of peasants were 258 yuan, 1.5 times more than 
in 1978 and 2.6 times more than in 1957. In five years from 1978 to 1983, living 
expenses increased by 156 yuan, whereas from 1957 to 1978, they had only 
increased by about 30 yuan in 21 years. 
The responsibility system soon led to the development of 'specialized households' 
and rural light industries. The 'specialized households' specialized in certain 
activities, such as pig, chicken and other livestock raising, rice and wheat ploughing 
and household sideline productions, etc., and they got rich first; sometimes they were 
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called '10,000 yuan households' which means they earned more than 10,000 yuan 
annually. There were about 1.4 million of these households in 1983 in Anhui and 
they led the way in rural reform. Rural light industries have also been springing up 
vigorously during the rural reform, and the rural economic structure has developed 
towards a united agriculture-industry-commerce system; in 1983 the total value of 
rural light industry in Anhui had increased by 91 per cent from 1978. The peasants 
also went to the towns or cities to set up small shops, to undertake civil engineering 
projects and to provide other services; in 1983 in Anhui more than half a million 
peasants were involved in Anhui province, and the numbers seem to be rapidly 
increasing. 
As expected, rural reform has also brought some problems: 
1. Effects on the fixed assets and public welfare of the production teams. In many 
production teams, not only had the land been redistributed to the peasants, but the 
public buildings, agricultural machinery, accumulated funds and other fixed assets of 
the production teams were also removed, dismantled and redistributed by the 
peasants. The production teams practically existed in name only. Consequently, there 
was a serious effect on public works, such as repair of old school buildings, building 
of irrigation systems, and caring for the 'five guaranteed' households. 
2. Effects on families. The land was distributed according to the number of persons 
in each family and similar problems occurred as after the land reform in the early 
1950s. There are basically three kinds of families with difficulties. The bigger 
families with a small labour force and few labour skills have more land than they can 
handle. In some families, the head of the household, usually the husband, works in 
the towns or cities as a cadre or worker, as they do not have enough workers to 
plough the land. These two kinds of families have to pay 20 to 50 yuan per mu to 
hire help to work on their land during the ploughing and harvesting seasons. There 
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are also other families with sufficient workers, but lacking labour skills, mainly as a 
result of laziness under the commune system. Some of their members are cadres and 
their main objectives used to be ideological remodelling and class struggle: they did 
not know what to do about production management. 
3. Effects on the leadership and cadres. The change in fundamental economic 
structure towards individual family-centred production resulted in a substantial 
weakening of leadership in most of the production teams and some of them 
completely broke down, and the cadres resigned. The peasants complained of the 
heavy burden of paying subsidies to the cadres; the production brigade usually had 
20 or more subsidized cadres, four of whom (Party branch secretary, production 
brigade leader, head of militia and accountant) received fixed subsidies of 300 to 600 
yuan a year while the others received subsidies for losing working time. The head 
and accountant of the production team usually got 100 or mo~ yuan a year. Apart 
from the subsidies, these cadres also got land and they spent most of the time on their 
own land instead of managing the village work, so their incomes were higher than 
the average level. This also affects barefoot doctors and some villages stopped 
having them or reduced their numbers, which indirectly affected the family planning 
implementation in rural areas. 
The responsibility system also has some demographic consequences: 
1. Effects on marriage. According to the reports of the Women's Federation, 
.Maternity and Child Care Institute and Youth League of Anhui province in 1988, 
illegal marriages occurred in most of the rural areas in Anhui. For some 
administrative regions, illegal marriages were as high as 80 per cent; in some 
villages legal marriages were less than 10 per cent. An illegal marriage is one in 
which the couple married below the minimum marriage age (22 years for males and 
20 for females) and did not have marriage certificates (People's Daily, July 5, 1988). 
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The main reasons for the high incidence of illegal marriages are as follows. First, 
under the land distribution system of the rural reform, the land was distributed 
according to the number of persons in each family and in the middle of the 1980s, 
most production teams adjusted the land distribution according to the change of 
numbers in each family, which provided considerable incentives for the peasants to 
have more children. The peasants said that early marriage and paternity of sons 
brings three great benefits to the family: a daughter-in-law as a labourer, a grandson 
as a gift and more land. Second, the ideas of more children and more happiness for 
the older generation were strengthened during the reform, and the open policies have 
brought new views about the relationship between male and female through 
television, films and publications which stimulated the curiosity of the younger 
people about the opposite sex; these have coincided to push early marriage and 
childbearing. Third, although illegal marriages are against the marriage law, there is 
no official punishment for those marriages. Each department goes its ·own way and 
there is a lack of co-ordination: for example, judicial departments care more about 
propagation of the law than execution of the law; departments of civil administration 
investigate mainly the couples who come for the marriage registration; the offices of 
family planning care mainly about the use of contraception and childbearing quotas. 
It makes no difference whether or not the couple is married legally, the Women's 
Federations safeguard all women's and children's legitimate rights and interests. 
Under these circumstances, the cadres of village committees have no intention of 
asking about illegal marriage and enjoy attending the marriage ceremonies; because 
in the eyes of the community, 'illegal' marriages carry no stigma, the couple has 
been married according to traditional custom (People's Daily, July 10, 1988). 
2. The responsibility system brings wealth to the peasants and this renders ineffective 
some punishments for the couples who have more children. Some peasants, 
especially those from specialized households, said that it is well worthwhile to have 
a son and pay a fine of 2,000 yuan. 
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3. In 1988, there were about 1.6 million people who came to the towns and cities in 
Anhui to work in small business and other jobs; many couples settled in the cities 
and did not use any contraception, and some of them have more than six children. 
This 'floating population' seems to be increasing rapidly (People's Daily, July 12, 
1988). They become the 'blind spot' of the family planning programs. 
3. 7 Change in Social Structure 
Changes in the fundamental economic structure require corresponding changes in the 
superstructure: the centralized bureaucratic system. Rural Anhui is the pioneer of the 
responsibility system and is also one of the earliest provinces to adjust the rural 
bureaucratic system. In August of 1981, the provincial government started a pilot 
project of reforming the commune system at Kaocheng commune, Fengyang county. 
The main purpose of the commune reform was to separate the functions of the Party 
Committee and government administration, and to eliminate the centralized party 
leadership which had dominated the communes for the last 25 years. Meanwhile, a 
new committee for economic development was established, which was mainly in 
charge of the development of rural light industries and agricultural technology. In 
early 1983, the commune reform was extended to all rural Anhui and by the end of 
that year, there were established 3,410 townships and 31,305 village committees 
instead of communes and production brigades. The functions of party committee, 
government administration and economic committee are clearly defined and it is 
emphasized that the party committee should not monopolize everything. 
The commune reform ended the centralized party leadership at the township 
(commune) level. Since the centralized system was geared to carry out ideological 
reform, class struggles and campaigns, the separation of the functions of different 
departments has brought some difficulties for the implementation of the family 
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planning policy. Previously the policies were carried out through the centralized 
bureaucratic system, but now different departments could shift responsibility onto 
others. Some cadres of family planning complained that 'everyone says that the 
family planning program is a very important work; in fact, no one really wants to do 
this work because they know that they will be cursed as wicked for stopping others 
from having more sons'. Also these changes affected the collection of statistics, so 
that in 1988 it was admitted that there had been large-scale under-reporting of births 
in recent years. Early in 1989, the State Family Planning Commission introduced the 
'contract system' and tried to improve the implementation of family planning 
policies during the reform; the development of the family planning program and the 
contract system is analysed in detail in the next chapter. 
3.8 Summary 
Apart from the family planning program, there have been four major planned 
socioeconomic changes in rural Anhui since 1949: Land Reform and agricultural co-
operation movement, 1949-1957; Great Leap Forward followed by three years of 
famine, 1958-1965; Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976 and Economic Reform, 1979-
1989. 
After the Land Reform in rural Anhui, the individual families became the basic 
production units with their own land, owing to the poor economic conditions and 
lack of other production materials, such as cattle, machinery and fertilizers, the size 
of the labour force became the key factor in families' future prosperity. The land 
reform provided some mcentives for the peasants to have more children. During the 
agricultural co-operation movement, the mode of production in rural Anhui was 
gradually transformed into collective ownership (socialism), and land no longer 
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belonged to individual families. Meanwhile the bureaucratic system was gradually 
taking its form in rural Anhui. 
The commune system was regarded by the Party as the socialist solution in rural 
China. The establishment of the commune system (1957) soon led to the Great Leap 
Forward (1958), the failure of which resulted in three years of famine, a national 
disaster. Nevertheless, during the period of these campaigns the centrally controlled 
bureaucratic system was firmly established in rural Anhui. The Central Party 
Committee gradually directed the nation towards ideological reform and class 
struggle. Although the commune system further disconnected the peasants direct 
interest in production, the egalitarian distribution system provided some incentives 
for some peasants to have more children. 
During the Cultural Revolution, ideological reform and the class struggle were 
emphasized in rural Anhui. Preventing the restoration of capitalism and following 
the socialist road were the overwhelming task of the Party. The rural development in 
Anhui stagnated during the period of Cultural Revolution, but the bureaucratic 
system was further developed and ready to carry out any central planned policies. 
During the economic reform (1979-1989), the production responsibility system was 
introduced to rural Anhui, and land was redistributed to individual families. The 
individual families became the basic production units again, which gave great 
production incentives to the peasants. The rural economic reform soon led to the 
changes in social structures and the commune was replaced by the xiang (township). 
The main purpose of the commune reform was to separate the functions of Party and 
government, and to weaken the monopoly power of the Party. 
Since late 1989, the Central Party Committee has issued urgent calls to strengthen 
ideological reform, and tighten Party leadership at all levels. It is unclear to what 
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extent the Party will re-establish central planning and tight social control after the 
impact of a decade-long economic reform. 
61 
Chapter 4 
The Development of the Family Planning Program 
in Anhui, 1963-1989 
4.1 Introduction 
The family planning program has been mainly responsible for the dramatic fertility 
decline since the early 1970s in China. However, it should be pointed out that family 
planning developed along with many other planned socioeconomic changes. In this 
chapter, the development of family planning in Anhui is examined as one of the 
planned socioeconomic changes. 
There are many studies about the development of population policy and family 
planning in China. For reviews of the early phases of the family planning program 
see Aird, 1972, 1982; Orleans, 1981; Chen and Kols, 1982; Qian, 1983; State Family 
Planning Commission, 1985; Li, 1986; Kane, 1987; Banister, 1987; for a review of 
more recent changes in the family planning program see Greenhalgh, 1986; Aird, 
1988; Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988. These studies provide excellent 
analyses of the development, structure and functions of China's family planning 
program. The present study focuses only on Anhui province, especially on the 
development of the program in rural areas. The development of family planning 
work, its structure and the basic ways of policy implementation are analysed in turn. 
4.2 The Development of the Family Planning Program in Anhui 
The development of the family planning program in Anhui can be divided into four 
stages: 
1963-1966. Initial stage 
1971-1978. The stage of gradual development 
1979-1983. The stage of rapid development 
1984- The stage of adjusunent 
4.2.1. The initial stage, 1963-1966 
Although there were some national family planning propaganda and usage 
campaigns during the 1950s and early 1960s in China, Anhui province did not start 
the family planning project until 1963. After receiving the Central Committee and 
State Council's document 'Instructions about Advocating the Family Planning 
Work' in December 1962, the Anhui government established its first provincial 
family planning office, consisting of seven officials. The office was under the joint 
leadership of the provincial Public Health Bureau and the Women's Federal 
Association. The main task of the office was to stress the necessity of family 
planning, to provide advice for couples about contraception and to distribute 
contraceptives to those who needed them. During this time, family planning work 
was con!med to urban areas; couples were encouraged to have two or three children, 
and to space the births four or five years apart. 
During the initial stage, there was no family planning in rural Anhui. After the three 
years of famine, the population growth of Anhui rapidly increased, especially in rural 
areas: the crude birth rate was as high as 45 per thousand during the period 1962 to 
1966. In. July 1965, the Anhui government issued a document: 'A Notice About 
Strengthening Family Planning Work', which proposed the idea of extending family 
planning to rural areas, but unfortunately, the Cultural Revolution started in 1966 
and the family planning program in Anhui was completely disrupted. 
In fact during the initial stage, the family planning work had hardly any significant 
influence on people's reproductive behaviour in urban areas, and no effect in rural 
areas. It may, however, have introduced the idea of family planning, especially in 
urban areas and thus made later family planning campaigns a little easier. 
63 
4.2.2. The stage of gradual development, 1971-1978 
In July 1971, the State Council issued the Document 'Report on Family Planning 
Work', prepared jointly by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Fuel Chemistry Industry. In the Report all provincial governments were 
asked to re-establish their family planning offices and to make family planning part 
of their socioeconomic planning. Shortly afterwards, the Public Health Bureau of 
Anhui called more than 20 party and government leaders from administrative regions 
and cities and organized a trip to visit the Y antai region, Shandong province, a 
national example of family planning work. At the end of 1971, the Anhui 
government held its first family planning seminar in Maanshan city and decided to 
re-start family planning in Anhui. In the following year, the provincial Family 
Planning Office was re-established, including 25 full-time staff. 'the head of the 
provincial party committee concurrently held the leadership of the Family Planning 
Office. 
Some new developments in family planning work followed. First of all, Family 
Planning Offices were also established in all cities and counties under the leadership 
of local Bureaux of Public Health; at the commune level, the director of the 
Women's Federation and the head of the local hospital were responsible for family 
planning. Secondly, the provincial Office with the support of local offices organized 
396 training courses and trained a total of 8,769 barefoot doctors, family planning 
workers and midwives between 1972 and 1974. Finally and more importantly, the 
provincial Office made it clear that 'In family planning, emphasis must be put on 
rural areas .. .' (China Population Information Centre, 1986a: 126). In 1972, the 
provincial Office issued 'Trial Regulations of Family Planning Work', which 
specifically pointed out that in rural areas, marriages should be carried out at later 
ages and married couples should be encouraged to use contraception. Those who 
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complied with the family planning program or underwent sterilization should be 
rewarded. 
During this period, the family planning program was mainly carried out by 
propaganda and campaigns, in essentially the same style as many other planned 
behavioural changes. This was basically a period of tightening central control, the 
Party emphasized ideological reform and class struggles, and successfully made 
people submit their interests to the collective' s and state's interests. The Party made 
it clear that implementation of family planning program was for the nation's 
interests, people had to sacrifice their own interests (in this case desire for more 
children) and follow the central population policy. 
4.2.3. The stage of rapid development, 1979-1983 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
issued a series of documents about family planning in China. The One-child Family 
policy started in 1979. Apart from the One-child Family policy, another very 
important document is the 'Open Letter of the CPC Central Committee regarding 
control of China's population growth to all members of the Communist Party and 
Communist Youth League' (1980), in which the Central Committee urged all party 
and youth league members to understand clearly the serious population problems in 
China and urgently appealed to them to set an example in following the One-child 
Family policy (Tian., 1985: 27). In the Constitution of China as revised in 1980, the 
family planning policy is defined as a basic State policy. Late in 1980, the Anhui 
provincial Party Committee held a meeting and discussed how to strengthen family 
planning work in Anhui. The Committee decided to separate the Family Planning 
Office from the Bureau of Public Health, and the new office is under the direct 
leadership of the provincial Party Committee. 
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In late 1980, the new office held the first provincial family planning congress, which 
commended 232 advanced collectives and 314 advanced individuals on their family 
planning work and urgently appealed to all participants to learn from them. In May 
1981, the Family Planning Office and the Bureau of Employment and Personnel of 
Anhui employed 3,000 family planning workers, most of them working for 
communes in rural areas and street committees in cities. In the same year, the 'Trial 
Regulations for Family Planning Work' were modified, and four articles were added; 
the modified version emphasized the rewards for those who complied with, and 
punishments for those who violated, the family planning regulations (China 
Population Information Centre, 1986a: 127). 
In January 1982, the provincial Family Planning Office became the Family Planning 
Committee functioning as one of the provincial bureau; the offices in cities and 
counties were also changed into independent committees. The Trial Regulations 
were modified again, to allow only three kinds of couple to have a second child: the 
couple whose first child could not become a normal member of the labour force, for 
example through congenital malfunction; in cases where a couple remarried, one of 
whom must be marrying for the first time; and the couple whose first child is a 
daughter, but where the husband is the only son in the last two generations. No 
couple is allowed to have a third child (China Population Information Centre, 1986a: 
128). 
The provincial Family Planning Committee also urged all governments at different 
levels to make family planning one of the most important aspects of their 
socioeconomic planning, and also to make carrying out this planning part of the 
cadres' work responsibility. Then there was a provincial campaign to study the 
'Open Letter', particularly in rural areas. 
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In Anhui as elsewhere, the economic reform in rural areas brought about 
contradictions between government population policy and the people's desire for 
children: on the one hand, the government was determined to bring down population 
growth at any cost, on the other hand, the family planning policy, particularly the 
One-child Family policy, was by no means acceptable to most farmers. The 
economic reforms also made some of the family planning punishments ineffective, 
and resistance to the program grew stronger and stronger (Whyte and Gu, 1987; Hull 
and Yang, 1987; Wang, 1988). Most couples in rural areas have two children, some 
even have more. Under those circumstances, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party issued Document No.7 in 1984, which provided adjustments in 
family planning to meet the realities of the situation. 
4.2.4. Adjustment in family planning work, 1984-
The basic idea of Document No.7 was to relax the family planning policy. The 
essential point was to extend the criteria under which couples, especially in rural 
areas, might have a second child. The policy is called 'opening a small hole to close 
a big hole'. Opening a small hole means to extend the categories of couples eligible 
to have a second child, and closing a big hole is aimed at stopping large numbers of 
couples from having more children. In Anhui, the categories for permitting a second 
child were extended from three to 13; there are also some recommendations for 
improvements in the management and working style of family planning work. For a 
detailed discussion of Document No. 7 and the new categories for having a second 
child see Greenhalgh, 1986. 
The relaxation of the family planning policy soon had a response from all family 
planning offices, and was enthusiastically supported by most couples. On the one 
hand, the work eased for the family planning workers and cadres, and complaints 
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about them were considerably reduced; on the other hand, in some rural areas family 
planning was already out of action, with most couples having a second, or even 
more, children. 
Because of this problem another correcting, but basically tightening, adjustment 
process was introduced. In early 1986, the Central Committee issued Document 
No.13 concerning family planning work. The document affirmed the achievements 
in family planning during 1981-1985, the sixth Five-year Plan, pointed out the 
persistent problems, and set the agenda for the seventh Five-year Plan (1986-1990). 
Wang Wei, the director of the State Family Planning Commission, pointed out that 
population control remained critically important, and that, because of changes in age 
structure, and the pressure of the third babyboom, family planning work would 
become even more difficult during the next five years. Thus, family size guidelines 
were to be strictly implemented. 
In March 1987, the Governor of Anhui province, Wang Yuzhao, stressed at the 
Family Planning Congress of Anhui that the adjustments in family planning work 
over the last few years were not designed to relax the policy, as some people had 
thought; in fact, they were issued to grasp family planning more firmly. He also 
emphasized that family planning work in Anhui should: 
1. ... strictly restrict the second births. 2. continue to carry out the slogan 'First child 
IUD, second child sterilization and unplanned pregnancy abortion'. 3. Apply firmly 
the economic sanctions for those who have unplanned births. 4. Fulfil the family 
planning policy down to every grass-roots organization and carry out family 
planning responsibility system ... (Wang, 1987: 3) 
In January 1988, Wang Wei, associated with the softening of the work-style in 
China's population program between 1984 and 1986, was replaced by Peng Peiyun. 
Generally, such a move signals a shift towards tightening population policy (Hardee-
Cleaveland and Banister, 1988). At the meeting of the directors of family planning 
committees in China, held in February, 1989 in Beijing, Peng Peiyun pointed out that 
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'the year of 1988 was the third year of the new baby-boom and also a year when 
family planning work was further tightly grasped by seeking unity of thinking and 
stabilizing the policy'. Although the family planning work in 1988 achieved some 
successes, ' ... the progress of family planning throughout the country is very uneven' 
(Peng, 1989: 1). Peng emphasized that: 
The central task of family planning for 1989 is, in the spirit of the 13th Party 
Congress and its Third Plenary Session, to take family planning work and the 
control of population growth as important activities which should be grasped firmly 
in improving economic circumstances. re-establishing economic order, and 
deepening the reform in an all-round way. Great efforts should be made for the 
continued advocacy of late marriage and late childbearing, fewer but healthy births, 
and one child for one couple (Peng, 1989: 2). 
In February 1989, the spokesman of the State Family Planning Commission 
announced the guiding principles of present family planning work. The most 
important feature is the introduction of the 'Contract system of family planning 
target fulfilment'. According to the system, the contracts of responsibility for 
fulfilling family planning targets are signed between governments at different levels, 
such as between province and county, and between county and xiang governments. 
The contracts are also signed between family planning committees and offices at 
different levels. Furthermore, the performance of family planning work is included 
as one criterion to evaluate the achievements of local cadres, especially the cadres 
who are in charge of family planning (People's Daily, February 16, 1988). 
In mid-1989, the Anhui government and Family Planning Committee held a meeting 
to discuss how to carry out the new family planning guidelines. It is likely that the 
family planning program in Anhui will be tightened in the near future, but it may not 
be possible to return to the policy of the 1979-1984 period, and what eventuates may 
be a compromise program between the tightening period (1979-1984) and the 
softening period (1984-1986) in terms of family planning implementation. It is too 
early to be able to assess, in terms of family size, the impact of these recent 
developments. 
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4.3 Family Planning Organization Hierarchy 
One of the most important features in family planning in China since the early 1970s 
has been the establishment of an elaborate family planning organization hierarchy. 
This system has played a fundamental role in the dramatic fertility change in China. 
The structure of the family planning organization is essentially an extension of the 
existing bureaucratic system. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two parallel 
bureaucratic systems in China: the Party and Government systems. The family 
planning organization is extended on the basis of the government system which is 
monitored and ultimately controlled by the Party system. Figure 4.1 shows in 
simplified form, the structures of the family planning organization in Anhui. The 
executive offices are under government leadership. The family planning groups at 
different levels of the P~y system are intended to show that the Party pays great 
attention to family planning work, and to ensure that the population policy is carried 
out at different levels. 
In 1988, the Anhui provincial Family Planning Committee had 28 full-time staff. 
There were three divisions under the Committee: the Family Planning Propaganda 
and Education Centre, with 30 full-time staff; the Institute of Family Planning 
Technology Research, with 50 full-time staff, and the Managing Office of Family-
Planning Devices, with 10 full-time staff. The major function of the provincial 
committee is to make family planning an integral part of the provincial 
socioeconomic plan, and to pass on and interpret the central government's 
population policy to cities and counties. In family planning propaganda, the 
provincial committee is responsible for organizing the Party and government leaders 
at different levels to study population policy, and through their understanding to 
publicize it to the masses. 
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Figure 4.1 Simplified Structure of Bureaucratic System and Family Planning 
Organization Hierarchy, Rural Anhui 
Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial 
Party Committee FP Leading Group Govenunent FP Committee 
Collllty County County County 
- -Party Committee - FP Leading Group Govenunent - FP Committee 
Township Township Township Township 
- -
- -Party Committee FPGroup Govenunent FP Office 
1 ,. 1 1' 
Village Village Village Village 
- -Party Branch - FPGroup Committee - FPGroup 
In policy implementation, the provincial Family Planning Committee is responsible 
for monitoring the process of policy implementation in all cities and ~ounties. 
Although the provincial committee has little right to change the centrally made 
policy, it can approve or disapprove the modifications of policy implementation 
made by the local committees; these modifications also serve to modify the 
provincial Family Planning Regulations. The provincial committee is also 
responsible for introducing local successful experiences in policy implementation to 
other places; in other words, for the identification of successful initiatives and for 
seeing that such initiatives are adopted elsewhere. In family planning organization, 
the provincial committee is responsible for establishing family planning committees 
and offices at different levels. By the end of 1986, apart from the family planning 
committees, all cities and counties had established Family Planning Propaganda and 
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. Technical Service Stations. More than 60 per cent of xiang governments (communes 
before 1983) also established service stations. The provincial committee also has the 
right to employ family planning workers. 
The next level of the family planning hierarchy is the city or county Family Planning 
Committee: the major functions of this committee are similar to those of the 
provincial committee. The present analysis focuses on county committees only 
because the study deals with rural areas. There are some differences between 
provincial and county committees in family planning work: first, once the county 
committee receives guidelines on population policy from the provincial committee, it 
is responsible for reporting this to the county Party committee and government for 
their approval and support. Then it has to investigate the local situation with 
reference to policy implementation. For example, the provincial guidelines may state 
that where couples have an unplanned birth, economic sanctions must be applied: it 
is the county committee which decides the amount of the fine. Secondly, the county 
committee has to decide what type of family planning propaganda it should use, and 
how often it should hold family planning campaigns. 
Of course, there is no universal formula for policy implementation among different 
counties. Generally speaking, the richer counties have found it relatively easy to 
follow the policy guidelines, while the poorer counties may find it hard to fulfil the 
family planning target. In 1985, of 72 counties in rural Anhui, 15 were classified as 
lagging behind the others in family planning work (China Population Information 
Centre, 1986a). 
The xiang Family Planning Office, as the lowest level of government, deals with 
every concrete matter of policy implementation. Usually the xiang office keeps all 
family planning records of married women of reproductive age; it contains 
information about the marriage, birth history and contraceptive use of women, and 
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serves as a reference point for the family planning program. The xiang family 
planning work can be divided into two broad categories: daily work and work during 
campaigns. 
In daily work, the xiang office is responsible for distribution of contraceptive 
methods to family planning workers in different villages, and for monitoring the 
contraceptive use of all women. It is also responsible for identifying the primary 
targets of the family planning program: this usually refers to the women pregnant 
with an 'unplanned child'. The office will organize the local family planning workers 
to visit these women repeatedly and to persuade them to have abortions. In many 
cases, it is not possible to avoid having an abortion unless the women escape from 
the village (personal experience). For the planned births, the xiang office issues the 
certificate for Hu Kou (household card) registration with the xiang government 
which legalizes the status of the child. It also issues the single child certificate for 
those who have signed the one-child contract. The couples who want a second child 
have to apply to the xiang office. All unplanned births are classified as 'black 
children', and the xiang office is responsible for collecting fines from their families. 
At the time of family planning campaigns, which may happen a few times a year 
depending on the plans of family planning committees at the higher level, the xiang 
office usually holds a joint meeting with all family planning workers, people from 
the Party committee, government and Women's Federation, etc. to discuss the plan 
of campaign. Usually the head of the xiang Family Planning Office explains the 
family planning situation and emphasizes the problems in various places. In most 
cases, the goal of the campaign is simple: how many abortions and sterilizations are 
necessary to fulfil the family planning target, and how many women have to have 
IUDs and other types of contraception. The list of women who should have abortion, 
sterilization and IUD is prepared according to family planning records. Many xiang 
hospitals can perform the family planning operations including abortion and 
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sterilization; if the hospital cannot, the xiang office contacts the nearest county 
hospital or asks for a family planning operations team from the county (personal 
experiences). 
4.4 Basic Methods of Family Planning Implementation 
The basic methods of family planning policy implementation are essentially the same 
as with other planned changes introduced by the government. For planned or 
purposive social changes, there are indirect and direct attempts to achieve the desired 
changes, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Indirect attempts involve changes in social 
structure, and the direct attempts can be divided into administrative sanctions and the 
mobilization of normative influences for the desired changes. For family planning 
work, the organization hierarchy was derived from the existing bureaucratic system, 
and people have no opportunity to change it but must adjust their reproductive 
behaviour accordingly. The roles of administrative or economic sanctions, and the 
mobilization of normative influences, in family planning program implementation 
are analysed as follows. 
4.4.1. Propaganda and campaigns 
Family planning propaganda and campaigns are basically the techniques used to 
prepare and mobilize normative influences for the desired social change. The idea 
came from the thoughts of Mao Zedong, former chairman of China (1949-1976), 
who believed that in order to achieve certain revolutionary goals, it is essential to use 
mass media to prepare public opinion, and then to mobilize the masses to participate 
in the movement; the cadres and Party members should play a key role in mass 
movements. As mentioned before, the family planning propaganda in Anhui started 
in 1963 and was ended by the Cultural Revolution in 1966. During that time the 
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propaganda was confined to urban areas only; from the early 1970s, it was extended 
to rural areas. 
From the early 1970s to 1978, the main method of family planning work was 
propaganda and campaigns, as is evident in the 'Trial Regulations of Family 
Planning Work of Anhui' issued in 1974. The 'Trial Regulations' stated that later 
marriage and family planning should be carried out in rural areas, and it encouraged 
men married to women whose families had no sons to settle down in the women's 
families. The feudal idea of regarding men as superior to women should be 
completely eliminated. It also stated that the women who had family planning 
operations should be rewarded (China Population Information Centre, 1986a: 125). 
Up to the mid 1970s, the government family planning propaganda tried to convince 
the masses by the method of persuasion and education. 
Apart from propaganda, the family planning campaigns also played a major role in 
bringing down population growth. For example, Bo county, in the northeastern part 
of Anhui, had a total population of 1.2 million in 1987, more than 80 per cent of 
whom lived in rural areas. Table 4.1 shows the family planning campaigns of Bo 
county since 1972. 
First, it is apparent that the family planning campaigns aim at abortion and 
sterilization. The main targets of the campaigns are the women who had more 
children than those approved under whichever guidelines were currently in 
operation. In many cases, the abortions are followed by sterilization. The main 
reason for aiming the campaigns at abortion and ste~ization is simple: the local 
family planning workers feel that once the women were sterilized, they would cease 
to be a concern to the program (Yang, 1987: 341). From the table, it can also be seen 
that the frequency of campaigns increased yearly. During the early 1970s, there was 
about one a year; from 1975, this increased to twice a year, spring and autumn 
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Table 4.1 Family Planning Campaigns of Bo County, 1972-1981 
Year Campaigns Changes in Crude Birth Rate 
1972-1973 Campaign of IUD insertion, 
sterilization and induced abortion 39.0 to 26.4per1000 
1974 Campaign of sterilization 
and induced abortion 26.4 to 19.0per1000 
1975-1976 Spring and Autumn 
campaigns yearly 19.0 to 14.3 per 1000 
1977-1978 Unstable policy and 
family planning at a low ebb 14.3 to 18.8 per 1000 
1979-1980 Campaign of vasectomy 18.8 to 14.3 per 1000 
1981 Campaign of vasectomy 
and induced abortions 14.3 to 11.1per1000 
Source: Liang and Li, 1982 
campaigns. The table also shows how much the crude birth rates were reduced 
through the family planning campaigns, reflecting the main purpose of family 
planning work. 
Propaganda and campaigns were effective ways to control population growth in 
China principally during the period of tight central control. People, especially 
farmers, became used to the idea of submitting their individual interests to the 
collective's and state's interests. When the State stressed the importance of family 
planning in the interests of people and country, it was not very difficult to carry out 
the rigid population policy through its tightly controlled system. Since the economic 
reform of the late 1970s, the tight central controls had a diminishing impact at the 
grass-roots level. The farmers were given more economic freedom as the land was 
redistributed to them, and the resistance to the rigid family planning program also 
grew stronger. Under those circumstances, administrative or economic sanctions 
played a greater role than normative influences in family planning campaigns. 
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4.4.2. Economic sanctions 
After the economic reform, family planning propaganda and campaigns gradually 
lost their effectiveness in reducing population growth; complaints about the family 
' 
planning workers increased and conflicts between family planning workers and some 
couples became increasingly serious. In October 1980, I went to Bo county for the 
population sample survey and heard a number of cases of those conflicts. In some 
villages the family planning workers confiscated, during harvesting seasons, the 
cattle and some production materials of the farmers who had 'unplanned 
pregnancies'; unless they agreed to have an abortion or sterilization, the cattle and 
production materials would not be returned to them. On the other hand, some couples 
went to the family planning worker's house and smashed everything they could find 
after they found that their aborted baby was a male. 
The 'Report of Bo County Family Planning Work of 1981' stated that: 
... in rural areas, since the economic reform and New Marriage Law, farmers' 
income and standard of living were considerably increased, the idea of early 
marriage and having more children is rising again. The proportion of women who 
have unplanned births substantially increased. The main reason is the failure to 
apply the settled economic sanctions. Furthermore, with the increasing of income, 
the purely economic fine has considerably reduced its effectiveness ... (Liang and Li, 
1982: 5) 
The Family Planning Committee of Bo county made some suggestions for improving 
the family planning work. It emphasized that in the following year 
... we must: 1. Strengthen party leadership in family planning work. 2. Continue to 
have a few abortion and sterilization campaigns each year. 3. Finnly carry out the 
economic sanctions. 4. Carry out administrative sanctions for the cadres who do not 
comply with family planning program ... (Liang and Li, 1982: 6) 
It is clear that the importance of administrative and economic sanctions is 
emphasized in their family planning work. In 1981, the 'Trial Regulations of Family 
Planning Work of Anhui' were modified again: the new version emphasized the 
punishment of those couples who had unplanned births. Apart from the economic 
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fine, it adopted some additional sanctions, such as reducing the responsibility land 
and private plots. The most common practice in land redistribution in rural Anhui is 
according to the size of family; if couples have 'unplanned births', their land and 
private plots will be reduced accordingly. 
In the policies discussed so far, all methods of family planning implementation are 
designed to manipulate the people, and they do not take into account whether or not 
the farmers accept them. This is the most apparent feature of family planning 
implementation before and during the early stage of economic reform. Not until the 
early 1980s was the contract system introduced in family planning work 
4.4.3. Contract system 
There are basically two kinds of contracts about family planning work in rural 
Anhui. One is the family planning contract signed between household and cadres 
(household contract), and the other, which came much later, is the contract signed 
between cadres at different levels (cadres contract). 
Household contract 
Initially, the contract system was introduced during the economic reform for 
production purposes (as part of production responsibility system). In the late 1970s, 
the contract system was extended to family planning work in some rural areas of 
Anhui, particularly in the southeast. The Chu Xian region in the southeastern part of 
Anhui consists of six counties and three cities; in 1987 it had a total population of 8.7 
million of whom 79 per cent lived in rural areas. In 1980 this region started the 
'Double Contract' which consists of production and reproduction responsibilities 
elements. Regardless of production achievements, if the household did not fulfil the 
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agreed reproduction goal, which in most cases meant they had an 'unplanned birth', 
they were subject to certain economic sanctions, including fines and reduction of 
land and private plots. In 1981, the 'Double Contract' system was introduced to all 
rural areas in Anhui by the provincial Family Planning Committee. 
Cadres contract system 
The 'Cadres' Work Responsibility System' was introduced in rural Anhui in 1981, at 
first in some counties of Chu Xian region. At the beginning, this system was 
designed for production management, later it was extended to family planning work. 
Fulfilling the family planning target became one of the cadres' responsibilities, and 
in some areas the family planning work was used as one criterion to judge the 
cadres' job performance. Usually, the contract of cadres' work responsibility is 
signed between the cadres at the xiang government and village committee. The xiang 
government monitors and evaluates their job performance. There are some problems 
with the Cadre Work Responsibility System. Some cadres complained that if they 
fulfilled the contract, it was difficult to get the agreed rewards, such as a certain 
amount of money. If someone did not fulfil the contract, especially the family 
planning part, most of them could avoid the problems, so some cadres regard the 
family planning part of the contract as a soft task. 
In the late 1980s, the cadre work system has been extended further. The contract is 
not only signed between cadres and family planning workers at the lower level 
(below xiang government), it is also signed at the higher government level and 
between different levels of government. Sichuan province is one of the pioneers of 
the extended cadres' responsibility system. In 1987, more than 20 prefectural 
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commissioners, mayors and chiefs of autonomous Zhou2 had signed the 'Family 
Planning Responsibility Contract'. It is stipulated in the contract that these 
commissioners, mayors and chiefs of Zhou should set targets for the number of births 
and the proportion of planned births, of unplanned pregnancies and of permitted 
second births. The contract specifies the total numbers of population for 1990 and 
2000 respectively. Money awards will not be given to those who fail to fulfil their 
tasks and demotion or dismissal will occur in serious cases (China Population 
Information and Research Centre, 1989: 4). In early 1989, a modified version of this 
system was adopted by the State Family Planning Commission as the 'Contract 
System of Family Planning Target Fulfilment', mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
There is not much evidence to analyse how the cadres and family planning workers 
at different levels follow the new State guidelines in family planning work. Since the 
new guidelines made it clear that family planning work is one of the criteria for their 
job performance, the cadres and family planning workers must, in their own interest, 
make efforts for the new tighter population policy. 
4.S Summary 
Family planning propaganda in Anhui started in 1963. From 1963 to 1966, it was 
restricted to urban areas and mainly remained at the stage of empty propaganda. It 
had hardly any noticeable influence on people's reproductive behaviour. 
From the early 1970s, the family planning work put stress on the rural areas. The 
family planning hierarchy was gradually introduced, derived from the existing 
bureaucratic system. During the 1970s, propaganda and campaigns were the main 
methods for family planning program implementation which was incorporated into 
2 Autonomous Zhou in Sichuan province is similar to the Region, e.g. Chu Xian region, in Anhui. 
But an autonomous Zhou usually has a minority population. 
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the tight central controls exercised at that period in China. Couples and households 
were in a passive position, and they were told to sacrifice their own interest for those 
of the nation. 
Economic reform in the rural areas changed the social structure at the grass-roots 
level. The individual family became the production unit responsible for their own 
land; the idea of subordinating one's own interest to that of the state was largely 
dropped. Meanwhile resistance to an intensified family planning policy increased. 
There was a contradictory period between the late 1970s and 1984. Although 
economic sanctions and some kind of contract system were introduced in family 
planning work, the majority of couples in rural areas could hardly be persuaded to 
accept the idea of the one-child family. 
From 1984 to 1986, the State family planning commission adjusted its policy to suit 
the changed conditions, particularly in rural areas. However, any liberalization was 
soon denied as Pen Peiyun replaced Wang Wei as the head of the State Family 
Planning Commission in 1988. The most important feature of the present population 
policy is that it involves the cadres and family planning workers at different levels in 
signing the family planning contracts: family planning work became one of the 
criteria for their job performance. Previously, the cadres and family planning 
workers only executed the family planning program, spasmodically; they knew their 
careers would not be in jeopardy if they could not fulfil the family planning work. 
The new family planning guidelines have made it clear that their career and future 
are tied to the family planning program. Of course, this is not a new invention in 
planned socioeconomic changes in China: it is essentially merely an extension of 
techniques to strengthen the leadership's commitment to the planned changes, in this 
case family planning work. 
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Chapter 5 
Age at First Marriage and Fertility 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the history of communist China (since 1949) 
consists of a series of planned socioeconomic changes. Fertility behaviour is 
influenced by these planned changes, particularly by the family planning program 
(since the early 1970s). China's National One-per-Thousand-Population Fertility 
Sampling Survey (1/1000 Fertility Survey) in 1982 and 1984 collected information 
about marriage and birth history of women aged 15 to 67. The data provide an 
opportunity to analyse the marriage and fertility changes since the 1940s in China. 
By using the 1/1000 Fertility Surveys data, the present and next chapter examine the 
changing marriage pattern, its impact on fertility, and fertility changes by birth order 
in the context of planned socioeconomic changes in rural China, especially in rural 
Anhui. 
In the conceptual framework of Chapter 1, marriage is one variable of the family 
system, and there are three institutions at the primary level next to the 'proximate 
determinants' of fertility: family system, economic system and technology. Marriage 
is also one of the four major proximate determinants of fertility. In this chapter, the 
changing age-pattern of first marriage in rural China and Anhui is examined by using 
the program NUPTIAL (Rodriguez and Trussell, 1984), and its change is used as an 
indicator to signal the planned societal changes in rural Anhui since 1949; then the 
impact of age at marriage on fertility is analysed for rural Anhui. 
5.2 The Changing Age-pattern of First Marriage 
Studies on the age at first marriage in China since the 1940s have shown that the 
nuptiality pattern has changed from early and universal marriage to late and 
universal marriage. Age at first marriage has increased gradually since the 1950s and 
the postponement accelerated after 1972, when implementation of the family 
planning policy started. There are distinct differences in changing nuptiality patterns 
and increasing age at first marriage between urban and rural China; rural China lags 
a few years behind the urban areas in terms of changing nuptiality pattern and there 
is about a two year difference in age at first marriage. The age at first marriage in 
urban areas increased from 18.5 years in the 1950s to 24.5 years in the early 1980s 
and in rural areas from 18.1 to 22.6 years. The changing age at first marriage is 
closely related to socioeconomic development, especially to population policies 
(Zhao and Yu, 1984; Zhang, 1986; Yang, 1987). However, the studies which reached 
the above conclusions are based on the direct examination of data about the age at 
first marriage. Although this is useful and indeed essential, the present study 
supplements it with a more refined analysis using Coale's model nuptiality schedule 
(Coale, 1971; Coale and McNeil, 1972). The results are transformed into two and 
· three dimension contour maps in order to relate the changing age at first marriage to 
the planned societal changes and to reveal the trend in age-pattern of first marriage. 
Table 5.1 shows the direct calculation of mean age at first marriage for ever-married 
women aged 25 to 60+, in rural China and Anhui. It is apparent that the proportion of 
women married by age 30 is close to unity, and women currently aged 25-29 are 
most likely to follow the same pattern eventually. For rural China the ages at first 
marriage for the age groups above 45 show no significant difference but at younger 
age groups the age at first marriage has steadily increased over recent time. The same 
pattern is true for the women of rural Anhui. These direct examinations clearly show 
that the nuptiality pattern in rural China and Anhui changed from earlier and 
universal marriage to late and universal marriage and the increasing age at first 
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Table 5.1 Reported Mean Age at First Marriage of Ever-married Women for 
Cohorts Aged 25-60+, Rural China and Rural Anhui Province 
Rural China Rural Anhui 
Cohort Mean SD Pr N Mean SD Pr N 
25-29 21.1 2.76 96.5 36,838 20.9 2.54 96.1 1,739 
30-34 19.9 2.95 99.5 29,978 19.7 2.66 99.7 1,562 
35-39 19.0 2.78 99.7 22,220 18.8 2.30 99.8 1,132 
40-44 18.6 2.71 99.6 18,384 18.8 2.44 99.8 958 
45-49 18.0 2.88 99.6 18,271 18.1 2.56 99.7 956 
50-54 17.9 2.85 99.6 16,397 18.3 2.57 100.0 763 
55-59 18.0 3.16 99.5 14,284 18.4 2.88 100.0 803 
60+ 17.9 3.34 99.5 18,038 18.2 2.90 99.6 962 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. Note: Pr proportion ever married in the age group. 
marriage has accelerated for the younger age groups. The analysis assumes that 
women reported their age at birth and marriage accurately, indeed studies of the age 
reporting of Chinese women all show a high degree of accuracy (Chen, 1984; Coale, 
1984). This is mainly due to the Chinese use of animal years: there are 12 calendar 
animals, and each year is the year of one of the them; for example 1990 is the year of 
the horse and 12 years hence it will be the year of the horse again. People may not 
remember in which solar year they were born but most of them remember in which 
animal year they were born; the animal years can then be easily converted into the 
solar years. But animal years are generally not significant for marriage dates, and 
there is no guarantee that women would correctly remember in which animal or solar 
year they got married, especially the older women. To check the quality of the data, I 
have examined the data sets for rural China and Anhui using Coale' s nuptiality 
model to estimate the mean age at first marriage. 
Coale' s nuptiality model is a function of three parameters: a, the age at which a 
substantial number of first marriages began to occur; k, the speed at which marriage 
takes place; and c, the proportion who ever (eventually) marry (Coale and McNeil, 
1972). Considerable experience has been accumulated to show that it adequately 
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represents the age-specific schedule of first marriage rates in a wide variety of 
populations. Rodriguez and Trussell (1980) have modified the first two parameters 
so that they are more readily interpretable (the mean and the standard deviation) and 
have written a computer package (NUPTIAL) for finding maximum likelihood 
estimates of the three parameters. The package NUPTIAL uses three types of input 
data: household data, individual data, or both, or all-women data. The present study 
uses individual data only. The NUPTIAL program is written for the WFS standard 
data file (for women aged 15-49 or similar range); the respondents of the 1/1000 
fertility survey of China are 15 to 67 years of age, so the program has been modified 
to read the Chinese data3. 
Table 5.2 shows the estimates of mean, standard deviation and standard errors of age 
at marriage for ever-married women of rural China and Anhui. It is apparent that the 
estimated means of the NUPTIAL program are all higher than the direct calculations, 
especially for rural China. The statistical tests show that the differences between the 
two sets of means for rural China are all significant, but for rural Anhui only the 
differences at the first age group are significant. On average for rural China the 
differences between directly calculated and indirectly estimated means are about two 
years except for the frrst age group, and for rural Anhui about one year except for the 
first age group. The outputs of the NUPTIAL program for ever-married women 
include the observed proportions of women marrying at each age, the pooled 
proportions and the fitted proportions, the differences between pooled and fitted 
proportions are also calculated. In order to check the quality of the data, the 
differences of proportions married between pooled and fitted of rural China are 
plotted in Figure 5.1. 
3 I wish to thank Mrs Ros. Goodwin, Australian National University, for her help to modify the 
NUPTIAL program to read Chinese data. 
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Table 5.2 Coale-McNeil Estimates of the Mean, SD and SE of Age at Marriage for 
Ever-married Women, Rural China and Anhui 1982 
Goodness of Homogen 
Cohort Mean SD St Errors St Errors FitP p 
Rural China 
25-29 25.8 6.20 .069 .052 .012 .000 
30-34 21.8 3.77 .024 .020 .080 .000 
35-39 20.7 3.21 .022 .018 .004 .000 
40-44 20.3 3.19 .023 .019 .017 .000 
45-49 20.3 3.20 .023 .019 .023 .000 
50-54 19.6 3.22 .025 .020 .019 .002 
55-59 19.6 3.39 .028 .023 .159 .641 
60-64 19.5 3.36 .029 .024 .151 .739 
Rural Anhui 
25-29 22.9 4.50 .161 .133 .047 .000 
30-34 20.3 3.10 .080 .067 .059 .000 
35-39 19.5 2.57 .068 .057 .004 .834 
40-44 19.4 2.88 .092 .073 .009 .435 
45-49 18.7 2.68 .083 .063 .361 .996 
50-54 18.9 2.80 .099 .080 .011 .291 
55-59 18.9 3.05 .010 .088 .008 .817 
60-64 18.8 2.75 .105 .086 .284 .998 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
When the distributions of those differences are looked at in detail, it is clear that the 
observed proportions marrying at younger (before 17) and older (after 22) ages are 
below the fitted proportions and the pooled proportions tend to be higher than fitted 
at age 19 to 20. The positive differences concentrate on 19-20 years of age, and the 
maximum likelihood estimates smooth the observed data mainly along the 19-20 
years of age, which also explains why the estimated means are higher than observed 
ones. For all age groups there are only a few points where the difference between 
observed and fitted exceeds 3 per cent (positive or negative) which is considered 
significant (Trussell, 1980). The same pattern is true for the rural Anhui results, but 
there is much less difference between observed and fitted proportions for each age 
group. There is no way to decide unambiguously whether the true nuptiality pattern 
conforms more to the observed data or to the model. If the marriage-age reporting of 
Chinese women is as accurate as the age reporting, the observed data are close to the 
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true nuptiality pattern. However, as animal years are of little help to women in 
remembering their marriage dates, the possibility of misreporting of age at marriage 
of Chinese women cannot be denied. There is also no reason why the 'excess' 
marriages should concentrate on age 19-20, and it may be that women, especially the 
older women, who married just before or after age 19-20 have tended to report a 
marriage age of 19 or 20. It is more likely that the true nuptiality pattern lies 
somewhere between the observed and fitted patterns. But no firm conclusions can be 
drawn without further field research. 
In Table 5.2, in general the results show that age at marriage has been rising both in 
rural China and Anhui; the differences across cohorts in Anhui are smaller. In rural 
China ages at marriage for the last three age cohorts (50-64) are almost identical, 
which may indicate that no changes in age at marriage occurred for those cohorts; 
the higher p-value of homogeneity for the last two age groups also confirms that 
there are no significant differences among those women. For rural Anhui the same 
trend is true but it extends to a further age-group (women aged 45-49) suggesting 
that changes in marriage age occurred later in Anhui. The higher p-values of 
homogeneity confirm that these women are homogeneous in terms of age at 
marriage. The age at marriage started rising steadily for women aged less than 50 in 
rural China and the rise accelerated at the age groups below 35. The estimated mean 
for the first age group (25-29) may not be very accurate because of the large standard 
deviation and errors. For rural Anhui the rising age at marriage lags behind the 
national average and rises at a slower pace. In general, the model does not seem to fit 
well: there are many very low p-values, especially for rural China. In fact when one 
examines the data closely, as presented in Figure 5.2, the observed proportions 
marrying for each cohort generally have two low peaks at younger and older ages of 
marriage and one high peak around age 19. It is clear that no model of a smooth 
pattern of first marriage rates with a single peak could possibly fit these data well, so 
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the model must be viewed as a smoothing device which is intended to reveal the 
underlying nuptiality pattern once distortions in the data have been removed. 
Since the differences in mean age at marriage for rural Anhui underlying both direct 
and model estimations are not significant except for. the first age group (25-29), both 
results may be fairly close to the true nuptiality pattern. The estimates from the 
model have been transformed into contour maps in order to see the over-time trend 
in the nuptiality pattern and to relate it to the planned societal changes in rural 
Anhui Figure 5.2 gives the observed proportions marrying at each age for the cohort 
aged 20-60: the X axis is the age of women at interview in single years, the Y axis 
represents the single year of age at marriage and the Z axis is the proportion married 
at each single year from 14 to 30. 
There are a number of interesting features from the figure; first of all, with regard to 
the over-time trend of age at marriage, it is clear that from age 60 to about age 30 at 
interview the age at marriage tended to increase slightly and most of the women 
married between age 16 and 21. The number of women who married at ages less than 
16 gradually declined over time and few women married after age 22. For women 
aged 30 or less at interview, there is an apparent increase in age at marriage and a 
period of discontinuance of marriage between age 30 and 28 (the lighter shading 
areas across all age at marriage) which suggests a sudden increase in age at marriage. 
Presumably this is due to the introduction of the family planning program, the 'Wan 
Xi Shiao' (later-longer-fewer) campaign, in rural Anhui (1972) and since then the 
nuptiality pattern of Anhui has changed into the later and universal marriage pattern. 
For women aged 20 to 24 the dark concentration area is due to the truncation of the 
data. Secondly, among the women aged 30 to 60, there are a few marriage 
concentration areas (darker areas). Between ages 45 and 48 at interview the marriage 
concentration occurred at age 16 to 17 and between ages 36 and 40 the concentration 
was around 17 to 19. The first earlier age at marriage concentration ( 46-48) can be 
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traced back to the early 1950s when, after land reform, the number of labourers in 
each family became the major determinant of future family prosperity, which 
probably encouraged earlier marriage. The second marriage concentration (among 
women aged 36-40 at interview) happened during the middle 1960s after the three 
years of famine (1959-1961), and it may reflect the effects of famine on marriage. 
From this map, there are three age groups of women where marriage irregularity can 
be identified: 45-48 at interview, where there is the early marriage concentration, 36-
40 at interview there is a heavy marriage concentration due to the effects of the three 
years of famine, and for women aged 30 or less at interview who enter a new era of 
nuptiality pattern. The present study is not interested in marriage concentration 
which happened for women aged 55+; presumably most of them were married before 
Liberation (1949). 
In order to link the changing nuptiality pattern to the year when the changes took 
place, the same data are recalculated in Figure 5.3 on an annual basis, giving the 
proportions of women married at each age from 1948 to 1984; the data of the 1984 
follow-up 1/1000 fertility survey of 1982 are added to this figure. Early marriages 
were concentrated during the early 1950s, the period of land reform. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, this was also a period of separation of functions between the 
Party and Government and the centrally controlled bureaucratic system had not yet 
fully developed, so the fundamental economic structure change (land reform) turned 
the individual families into production units with their own land, which indirectly 
encouraged earlier marriage in order to quickly gain more labourers for the family. 
In late 1956, the land was taken back by the government, the Party and Government 
became dominant economic actors and the Party directed the nation towards the 
ideological and class struggles which led to the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 
centrally controlled bureaucratic system was further developed through this 
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campaign. The failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' resulted in the three years of 
famine and its impact on age at marriage is clearly shown in the map as the marriage 
gap (lighter shaded areas between 1960 and 1963). After the famine, there was a 
short period of economic reform (1963-1965), and the age at marriage also 
responded to the reform: there is a marriage concentration from 1963 to 1968 around 
marriage age 18. 
Before 1972, there was no systematic family planning program in rural Anhui, but 
between 1949 and 1972 the Party successfully established a centrally controlled 
bureaucratic system ready to carry out any centrally planned policies. So it is not 
surprising that in 1972 when the family planning program 'Wan Xi Shiao' (later-
longer-fewer) was introduced in the region, its impact on age at marriage was 
immediately apparent, and the rise in age at marriage accelerated after 1972. It 
probably reached its highest point in the late 1970s when the One-child Family 
policy was introduced (1979). 
From the figure, it can been seen that since the early 1980s, age at marriage has 
declined. More recently, as mentioned in the previous chapter, reports from the 
Women's Federation, Maternity and Child Institute and Youth League of Anhui 
province stated that a substantial proportion of marriages below the minimum 
marriage age have occurred in most of rural areas of Anhui (People's Daily, July 5, 
1988), thus presumably, the age at marriage has continued to decline after 1984. This 
is one of the demographic consequences of rural economic reform as analysed in 
Chapter 3. It indicates that the substantial increase in age at marriage between 1972 
and the early 1980s was a temporary planned change resulting from pressures of the 
family planning program on women, while on the other hand, it implies that 
socioeconomic structure in rural Anhui had not yet developed to a stage where most 
women would spontaneously accept the later age at marriage. Once the basic 
economic conditions were changed, such as land redistributed to farmers, more 
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freedom in terms of production, a loosened bureaucratic system and separation of the 
functions of Party and Government, farmers have been more likely to respond to 
what they really think is good for them, rather than what the government says is good 
for them. Earlier age at marriage is but one example of such changes in behaviour. 
As long as economic reform continues, the age at marriage in rural Anhui is not 
likely to return to the level of the late 1970s, but rather may continue to decline to 
the levels which prevailed before 1972. 
5.3 The Impact of Age at Marriage on Fertility 
The analysis of age at marriage is an important demographic research topic in its 
own right; however demographers' primary interest in this topic is to assess the 
ultimate impact of changes in age at marriage upon fertility. As mentioned before, 
the changes in the nuptiality pattern of rural Anhui can be divided into three periods: 
before 1972 a smooth and slow increase in age at marriage except for the disruptions 
of three years of famine; from 1972 to the early 1980s, a period of substantial 
increase in age at marriage; and more recently a tendency for age at marriage to 
decline. At present, there are no data available to examine the change in age at 
marriage of the last period, so the following study is confined to examining the 
impact of the first two periods of Anhui's nuptiality changes on fertility. The mean 
length of interval between marriage and first birth, mean number of children ever 
borne in the first five years of marriage and accumulated fertility of all ever-married 
women by age at marriage are examined in this section. 
Table 5.3 shows the mean length of interval between marriage and first live birth, for 
ever-married women by age and age at marriage. For each age cohort, the length 
between marriage and first birth is greater for women who married earlier than for 
women who married later. The biggest differences are found between age at 
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marriage of 15 or less and 16-18 years of age, and the differences become less for the 
subsequent age at marriage groups. This may indicate that among women who 
married very early (15 or less) some may not have been mature enough to give birth 
soon and among those who married later, there may have been a 'catching up' effect. 
Looking at the age at marriage across age cohorts reveals that the intervals between 
Table 5.3 Mean Length of Interval Between Marriage and First Live Birth (in 
Months) by Age and Age at First Marriage, Rural Anhui 
Age at First Marriage 
Age at Interview <15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25+ 
25-29 25.7* 24.4 20.5 16.3 15.2 
30-34 34.1 24.9 22.0 19.1 15.7 
35-39 42.9 30.6 24.7 21.2 16.9 
40-44 46.5 41.5 33.2 24.6 19.9* 
45-49 44.7 32.5 32.6 31.4 24.7* 
50-54 43.8 33.3 29.9 28.6 39.7* 
55-59 52.7 36.6 33.8 28.3 37.7* 
60+ 40.7 36.7 37.6 34.0 26.8* 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Less than 30 cases. 
Table 5.4 Mean Length of Interval Between Marriage and First Birth (in Months) 
by Year of Marriage and Age at First Marriage, Rural Anhui 
Age at First Marriage 
Year Marriage <15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25+ 
50-54 45.7 31.5 30.0 27.4 38.0* 
55-59 51.8 42.1 42.1 32.2 26.4* 
60-64 37.8 31.3 26.8 26.1 27.7* 
65-69 27.7 25.2 23.5 19.6 21.0* 
70-74 34.0* 23.9 21.4 19.9 17.0 
75-79 22.8 19.1 17.4 16.3 
80-82 14.0 12.6 12.4 13.6 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Less than 30 cases. 
marriage and first birth constantly declined for successive age cohorts for each 
marriage age group. In general, the intervals between marriage and first birth are 
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shortened towards the top-right hand corner of the table, which implies that the 
younger women who married later have the shortest intervals and the older women 
who married earlier have the longest intervals between marriage and first birth. 
When the same data are recalculated by year of marriage for ever-married women in 
Table 5.4, the same trend is observed: women who married later and more recently, 
have shorter intervals between marriage and first birth. Moreover, the impacts of 
planned societal changes on nuptiality and fertility are clearly revealed in this table: 
for women who married during 1955 to 1959, the intervals are exceptionally long, 
which indicates the effects of the Great Leap Forward (1958) and the three years of 
famine (1959-1961). During the Great Leap Forward many couples were separated 
by the communes' common dormitories or being sent away from home to work on 
major construction projects, and during the three years of famine the serious shortage 
of food may have led to higher rates of miscarriages (Coale and Chen, 1987; Kane, 
1988). A substantial shortening of the intervals occurred among the women married 
after 1980: all had their first child after just over one year of marriage no matter at 
what age they got married. These are the women married after the One-child Family 
policy (1979). Under the policy pressures women may be anxious to have their first 
child soon; some couples said: ' ... since only one child is allowed, the sooner the 
better to have a baby, if it is a son every one is happy ... ' (personal interview, 
Huaibei, Anhui province, October, 1980). It seems that most couples expect their 
first child to be a son. If it is a daughter, they may feel that they still have time to 
arrange to have a second birth. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the mean number of children ever born in the first five years 
of marriage to ever-married women who married over five years before the survey. 
These tables provide the information to examine the fertility behaviour of women in 
their early marriage period according to age at marriage. Table 5.5 shows that among 
all women, those with later ages at marriage have a higher mean number of children 
ever born in the first five years of marriage while younger cohorts also have a higher 
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Table 5.5 Mean Number of Children Ever Born in the First Five Years of 
Marriage to Women Married Over Five Years before the Survey 
by Age and Age at First Marriage, Rural Anhui 
Age at First Marriage 
Cohort <15 16-18 19-21 22-24 
25-29 1.61* 1.72 1.84 1.95 
30-34 1.40 1.83 1.82 1.95 
35-39 1.19 1.62 1.81 1.83 
40-44 1.02 1.04 1.54 1.83 
45-49 1.18 1.44 1.23 1.44 
50-54 1.15 1.43 1.55 1.48 
55-59 1.02 1.39 1.52 1.68 
60+ 1.32 1.43 1.36 1.49 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Less than 30 cases. 
25+ 
1.91 
1.84 
1.75* 
1.78* 
1.20* 
1.25* 
1.31 * 
Table 5.6 Mean Number of Children Ever Born in the First Five Years of 
Marriage to Women Married Five Years before the Survey by Year of 
Marriage and Age at First Marriage, Rural Anhui 
Age at First Marriage 
Year Marriage <15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25+ 
1950-54 1.19 1.47 1.49 1.67 1.36* 
1955-59 .74 .98 1.04 1.29 1.56* 
1960-64 1.36 1.64 1.71 1.74 1.46* 
1965-69 1.58* 1.80 1.87 1.88 1.81 * 
1970-74 1.50* 1.75 1.82 1.94 1.84 
1975-77 1.75 1.88 1.93 2.08* 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Less than 30 cases. 
mean number of children ever born in the first five years of marriage. The results are 
consistent with Table 5.3, the same top-right hand corner trend being found. The 
younger cohorts who married later tend to have a shorter interval between marriage 
and first birth and higher fertility level in the first five years of marriage while for the 
older cohorts the opposite seems to be true. It is interesting to note that for women 
aged 45+ and married between ages 16 and 24 (accounting for more than 80 per cent 
of total marriages), the mean numbers of children ever born between marriage age 
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groups are not significantly different except for one figure (l.68). Compared with 
Table 5.3, women who married earlier had longer intervals between marriage and 
first birth, while from Table 5.5 in about five years all women aged 45+ and married 
between ages 16 and 24 ended up with about the same fertility level. This suggests 
that those women who married earlier probably had shorter intervals between first 
and subsequent births than those who married later and they caught up with the 
others within about five years. The remaining difference is that those who married 
earlier would have a longer exposure time to possible pregnancy. Obviously, in the 
absence of modern contraception, age at marriage is one of the major determinants of 
completed fertility. 
For younger cohorts, although the age at marriage is substantially increased, the 
intervals between marriage and first birth are also considerably shortened and the 
-fertility level in the first five years of marriage is actually increased in comparison 
with older cohorts. This may suggest that the family planning program successfully 
achieved the goal of later age at marriage (1972 to early 1980s), but once the women 
were allowed to get married, they tended to catch up with the time they had to wait, 
so the increasing age at marriage did not play a role in the reduction of the completed 
fertility of the younger cohorts although it would reduce the number of generations 
in the long term. Consequently, the fertility decline among these women must have 
taken place after five years of marriage. Table 5.6 gives the results of the same data 
but recalculated by the year of marriage. Exceptionally low figures are found for 
women who married during 1955-1959, whose fertility behaviour was presumably 
affected by the Great Leap Forward and the famine. On average, the figures for 
1955-1959 are .56 lower than those for the women who married in the next five years 
(1960-1964). If data were available for women married after 1977, one would expect 
a lower mean number of children ever born in the first five years of marriage due to 
the influence of the One-child Family policy. 
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Table 5.7 shows the relationship between age at marriage and cumulative fertility. It 
is clear that age at marriage played an important role in determining the completed 
family size for women aged 40+. With increasing age at marriage, there is a 
significant decline in mean number of children ever born for women of each age 
group. For the younger women (aged less than 40), the same trend is true but those 
Table 5.7 Mean Number of Children Ever Born to Ever-married Women Aged 25-
60+ by Age at First Marriage, Rural Anhui 
Age at Marriage 
<15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25+ Mean 
Age Cohort 
25-29 2.94 2.73 2.21 1.48 .80 1.96 
30-34 3.89 3.58 3.10 2.56 1.76 3.12 
35-39 4.64 4.38 3.96 3.29 2.67 4.09 
40-44 5.45 5.06 4.49 4.47 3.00 4.76 
45-49 5.75 5.89 5.06 4.40 ·4.10 5.50 
50-54 6.03 5.73 5.30 5.15 2.17 5.50 
55-59 6.07 5.62 5.04 4.81 3.40 5.35 
60+ 5.73 5.75 4.73 3.79 3.30 5.28 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
women are subject to the truncation problem, and were also affected by the 
population policy, especially the One-child Family policy. The age at marriage 
remains as a determinant of completed family size, but it will not be as significant as 
for the older cohorts. 
In summary, it is clear that for the women aged 40+, age at first marriage was higher 
with age group, and the intervals between marriage and first birth among these 
women are longer for the ones who married earlier, but in about five years the 
women (aged 40+) who married between ages 16 and 24, on average, have about the 
same number of children ever born. In other words, although the women aged 40+ 
who married earlier had longer intervals between marriage and first birth, they 
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caught up with the others in the first five years of marriage in terms of fertility and 
remained to have a longer exposure to potential pregnancy than others. If 
contraception is absent, the age at marriage is a major determinant of completed 
fertility. For the younger cohorts, especially those aged less than 30, age at first 
marriage is considerably increased under the influence of the population policy; it 
seems that women are 'squeezed' to certain later ages to get married, and after the 
marriage, most of them soon have the first birth. In the first five years of marriage, 
their fertility level is substantially higher than that of the older women (aged 40+). 
Although the increase of age at marriage shortened the total exposure time of women 
to birth, it also increased, at least partly, the fertility level of younger women in the 
early period of marriage, so the completed fertility of younger women would not 
have been affected if there. were no contraception. In other words, the overall low 
level of fertility of younger women could not have been achieved without the 
massive use of contraception. 
5.4 Age at Marriage and Completed Fertility 
Table 5.8 shows the Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) of the relations between 
completed fertility, age at first marriage and education of ever-married women aged 
40+. The grand mean is 5.27 for all women. After the adjustment with other 
variables, the differences between the age groups are not significant except for the 
women aged 40-44, and this aberration may be due to the truncation problem. The 
slightly lower figures for women in the oldest two age groups may reflect under-
reporting of children ever born, especially if the child died at an early age. It is clear 
that age at marriage played an important role in the determination of completed 
fertility; the adjusted mean number of children ever born dropped considerably with 
the increasing age at marriage. About 88 per cent of women married between ages 16 
and 24; the differences between those who married at age 16-18 and 22-24 are more 
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Table 5.8 Relation Between Mean Number of CEB, Age at First Marriage and 
Education for Ever-married Women Aged 40-60+, Rural Anhui 
Mean Parity 
Variable Number of Cases Unadjusted Adjusted 
Age Groups 
40-44 959 4.76 4.87 
45-49 957 5.51 5.47 
50-54 763 5.50 5.48 
55-59 804 5.36 5.36 
60+ 965 5.29 5.31 
Eta=.12 
Beta=.10 
Age at Marriage 
< 15 390 5.84 5.79 
16-18 2,190 5.63 5.61 
19-21 1,438 4.89 4.86 
22-24 317 4.52 4.59 
25+ 113 3.24 3.25 
Eta=.23 
Beta=.22 
Education 
No Schooling 4,139 5.32 5.30 
Some School 309 4.60 4.90 
Eta=.08 
Beta=.04 
Grand Mean =5.27 
Multiple R2=.257 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
than one child and the differences between youngest age at marriage (<15) and 
married at 25 or over are more than 2.5. Women's education also played a role in 
completed fertility. After adjustment by age at marriage and age groups, the 
difference in means between women with and without education is apparent. It may 
be true that women with some education also tended to marry later, since the 
adjusted mean for women with some education is considerably higher than the 
unadjusted mean. In general, it seems true that women who had some education and 
married later tended to have fewer children than others, while women who had no 
education and married earlier were likely to have the most children of all. 
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5.5 Summary 
In the conceptual framework, the family system (marriage is one of the variables) is 
one of three institutions at primary level, influenced by the structure of governance 
and pattern of socialization. This chapter has examined the changing nuptiality 
pattern of rural China, particularly rural Anhui, in relation to the planned societal 
changes in rural China since 1949 and their impact on fertility. It is found that the 
changing nuptiality pattern of rural Anhui can be divided into three periods: 1949 to 
1972; 1972 to early 1980s and middle to late 1980s. 1949 to 1972 represents a period 
of gradually increasing age at marriage, and two impacts of planned societal changes 
on nuptiality can be identified. During the early 1950s after the land reform, the land 
was redistributed to farmers and the individual family became the production unit; 
under those circumstances the number of labourers in a family was the major 
d~terminant of the future family prosperity. Also with the end of war, there appeared 
a concentration upon earlier ages at marriage. The second impact is the Great Leap 
Forward and three years of famine. There appeared to be an earlier age at marriage 
concentration during the Great Leap Forward (1959) and a period of three years 
reductions in all marriages (1960-1963) due to the effects of the famine and 
afterwards a period of compensating marriage concentration. 
During this period, there was no family planning program in rural Anhui, but age at 
marriage was indirectly affected by other planned societal changes, and the society 
was ready to carry out effectively any centrally planned policies. The family 
planning program was introduced to rural Anhui in 1972, and the nuptiality pattern 
of rural Anhui also entered a new era, with rapid increase in age at marriage under 
the influence of the program. More recently, after the rural economic reform (1978) 
and the implementation of a new marriage law in 1981, the nuptiality pattern seems 
to have swung towards earlier marriage and probably joined the trend since 1972. 
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The substantial rise in age at marriage between 1972 and the early 1980s may be 
only a temporary planned change achieved through the centrally controlled 
bureaucratic system. It seems that rural Anhui has not yet developed to a stage where 
most of the women would spontaneously accept later age at marriage. Taking into 
account the more recent downwards trend in age at marriage, the time-trend of age at 
marriage in rural Anhui may appear as a smooth and gradual upwards line in the long 
term. Unless the underlying socioeconomic conditions have been changed, the 
planned societal changes could influence the age at marriages at the margin, but 
probably not the underlying nuptiality pattern. 
The impact of age at marriage on fertility was then examined. For women married 
before 1972, particularly the cohorts aged 40+ at the time of survey, age at marriage 
played an important role in determining the fertility level. Generally, women who 
married earlier had longer intervals between marriage and first birth, but in the first 
five years of marriage, most women had about the same fertility level in terms of 
mean number of children ever borne regardless of age at marriage; consequently, in 
the absence of modern contraception, women who married earlier would have more 
children than others. For women married after 1972, particularly women aged less 
than 35, the age at marriage has substantially increased, but the intervals between 
marriage and first birth are also considerably shortened compared with older women 
and their fertility in the five years of marriage was higher than that of the older 
women. This is partly due to the influence of the family planning policy which 
prevented women from getting married earlier; once they were allowed to get 
married at certain 'later' ages, they tended to catch up with the time they had to wait. 
Obviously the completed fertility of those women would not be affected by the 
increasing age at marriage if there were no family planning program, and the overall 
low fertility of those women must be achieved through massive use of contraception. 
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More recently, the nuptiality pattern may be changing back to join the trend from 
1972, but the shortened intervals between marriage and first birth, and higher fertility 
level in the early post-marriage period may still remain. Earlier marriage would leave 
women with longer exposure time to pregnancy and require more efforts by the 
family planning program to bring down fertility; at the same time, it would increase 
the number of generations in the long term. Both trends will tend to result in higher 
population growth rates. 
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Chapter 6 
Life Table Analysis of Fertility Change by 
Birth Order in Rural Anhui, 1948-1982 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the technique of life table analysis is used to examine the fertility 
change by birth order in rural China, particularly in rural Anhui. These changes are 
also examined in the context of the planned socioeconomic changes, including the 
·family planning program in rural Anhui since 1949. The computer program BIRTHS 
written by Rodriguez and Menken (1984) for the World Fertility Survey is used and 
modified to analyse the Chinese data. 
There have been a number of studies about birth intervals in China. Feeney (1985) 
developed the Period Parity Progression Ratio (PPPR) to study the fertility changes 
in different periods; the method is particularly useful for evaluating the effects of the 
family planning program on fertility. Feeney and Yu (1987) analysed fertility change 
in China using the PPPR method; they found that the recent dramatic fertility decline 
is mainly due to the decline in second or higher-order births and that the family 
planning program is responsible for this. Zou (1987) studied the relationship between 
the family planning policies and the changing fertility by parities since 1970. The 
study concluded that the Chinese government made its family planning policies 
based on its socioeconomic conditions. By focusing the policies on birth order, it not 
only effectively reduced fertility, but also changed people's attitudes towards 
children, from wanting a large family to wanting a small one. 
Coale, Li and Han (1988) analysed the distribution of inter-birth intervals in rural 
. China, revealing that the monthly probability of conception before the first and 
second birth increased from the 1940s to the 1970s. The intervals from the second to 
the third birth were always longer than from the first to the second and birth intervals 
were longer following a male birth. The study also linked the mortality status of the 
birth to the birth intervals. 
This chapter mainly focuses on the relationship between fertility change by birth 
order and the planned socioeconomic changes. The change in fertility by birth order 
in the last few decades in rural Anhui is used as a signal of the effects of planned 
socioeconomic changes on the process of family building. Some light is shed on the 
extent to which the fertility changes caused by the planned changes affected women 
at different stages of their reproductive career. 
6.2 Life Table Analysis 
Life table analysis of birth intervals views the process of family building as 
consisting of the stages where women moved from marriage to first birth, first to 
second birth and so on. For those processes, there are two aspects of interest to 
demographers. One is the proportion of women at each parity who eventually move 
to the next higher parity, or the parity progression ratio, which is related to the 
quantity or quantum of fertility. The other aspect is the time from one birth to the 
next for those women who continue reproduction, which is related to the timing or 
tempo of fertility. It would be simple to study these two aspects if one had the 
completed birth histories of the women who had completed the reproductive period. 
The parity progression ratio can be derived directly from the data, from which also 
the birth intervals can be calculated. But most of the fertility surveys collect cross-
sectional types of data. Except for the older cohorts (aged 45 or more), many women 
are surveyed while they are still in their reproductive period. The incomplete 
information on reproductive experiences involved two problems in the study of 
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fertility change by birth order: selectivity and censoring. Selectivity relates to the fact 
that transition from parity i to i+ 1 can only be studied for women who have reached 
parity i or more at the time of the survey. Censoring relates to the fact that some 
women have reached parity i at the time of the survey, but they may stay at parity i 
or move to parity i+ 1 some time after the survey; these problems will affect the 
calculation of the birth intervals. The technique of life table analysis is designed to 
solve the above problems, especially the censoring problem in the analysis. Detailed 
discussions about the life table analysis of birth intervals can be seen in Hobcraft and 
Rodriguez, 1980; Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980; Ryder, 1980; Smith, 1980; 
Srinivasan, 1980. 
The program BIRTHS (Rodriguez and Menken, 1984) is used for the analysis; it was 
written for birth interval analysis using the WFS standard data file. The 1/1000 
Fertility Survey of China is not in the WFS standard record form, so the program was 
modified to read the Chinese data file-The basic information required to construct a 
life table is a cross tabulation of all ever-married women by duration of exposure and 
termination status. For example, for the newly married women, duration of exposure 
is the interval from marriage to either first birth or interview, whichever comes first. 
The termination is a variable indicating whether the exposure was terminated by first 
birth or interview. The computational formulas in the BIRTHS program are briefly 
explained as follows: 
Duration and Exposure 
Let j indicate duration categories and define; 
w(j]: width of duration category j; 
wm : upper bound of duration category j; 
The calculation of events of exposure for subgroup i and duration category j is done 
as follows: let 
e[ij] : events (births) in subgroup i at duration j (including cases with both events 
and interview at duration j) 
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c[ij] : cases censored (interviewed) in subgroup i at duration j 
N[ij] : number exposed in subgroup i at start of duration j 
P[ij] : person-months of exposure in subgroup i at duration j. 
The quantities e[ij] and c[ij] are obtained from a tabulation of data. The BIRTHS 
program has approximate and exact calculation of exposure. In the approximate 
calculation, women having a birth or interviewed in a given duration interval 
contribute to exposure half the width of the duration interval. In exact calculation, 
the actual number of completed months of exposure minus 0.5 is used. In the 
approximate calculation, the N[ij] and P[ij] are calculated as: 
N[ij]=N[ij-1]- {e[ij-1]-+<:[ij-l]}, with 
N[ij] =sum (e[ij]-+<:[ij]) 
P[ij] = w[j]*(N[ij]-(e[ij] + c[ij] I 2.0) 
In the exact calculation, P[ij] is calculated as: 
P[ij] = P[ij] + w[j], for all j such that Wfj] < t; and 
P[ij] = P[ij] + (t-W[j-1]+0.5) for j such that W[j-1] < t < W[j] 
Life Table Functions 
For subgroup i and durationj, the calculation of life table function defines: 
h[ij] : hazard in subgroup i and duration j. 
H[ij] : cumulative hazard. 
b[ij] : birth density. 
B [ij] : birth function, Where 
h[ij] = e[ij] I P[ij], and 
H[ij] = H[ij-1] + h[ij]*w[J1, with H[iO]=O, 
B[ij] = 1.0- exp (-H[ij]), and 
b[ij] = B[ij] - B[ij-1], with B[i0]=0 
if duration k corresponds to 60 months the quantum is B[ik] and the conditional 
mean is calculated as 
a[i] =sum ((W[j]-w[j]/2)*b[ij]) /B[ik] where the sum is for j=l to k. 
The present study uses the exact calculation of exposure. The quantum of fertility is 
defined as 60 months, or within five years from the previous event. The conditional 
mean is calculated based on the 60 months quantum, and used to represent the tempo 
of fertility. These are the summary measures of the life table analysis of birth 
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intervals. The quantum of fertility provides a natural analogue to the parity 
progression ratio, which indicates the proportion of women having a subsequent birth 
in a reasonably long period (five years). The conditional mean shows the mean time 
of women moving from one to the next birth which also contains some information 
about the distribution of the birth intervals (Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980; 
Rodriguez and Menken, 1982). The analysis follows the methodological principles 
and analysis structure outlined by Rodriguez and Hobcraft (1980). Over 400 life 
tables are calculated for the analysis. The quantum, conditional means and birth 
functions of those life tables controlled by the age, cohort and period are presented in 
the study. 
Table 6.1 Summary Measures for Birth Intervals, Rural China and Anhui 
Summary 
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Rural China 
Q* .905 .913 .842 .775 .713 .662 
M* 23.5 31.0 32.9 33.2 33.2 33.0 
No.Cases 94,526 88,704 76,550 61,657 47,082 34,121 
Rural Anhui 
Q .919 .911 .850 .777 .691 .618 
M 23.9 30.2 32.5 33.0 33.1 32.5 
No. Cases 9,016 8,704 7,789 6,438 4,909 3,456 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Q =Quantum. M =Conditional mean. 
Table 6.1 gives the summary measures of birth interval analysis in rural China and 
Anhui. Figure 6.1 shows the birth functions of the life tables. It can be seen from the 
figure that the proportion of women having a subsequent birth by each duration 
declines with parity; most of the differences are captured by the quantum of fertility, 
which ranges from over 90 per cent for the first birth to about 66 per cent in rural 
China and 62 percent in rural Anhui for the sixth birth. It is interesting to find that 
for the rrrst and second birth, the quantum of fertility is almost identical by the end of 
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Figure 6.1 Life Table Birth Function by Birth Order, Rural China and Anhui 
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5 years, and the only differences between ~e first and second birth are the timing of 
the fertility. This suggests that most of the married women tend to have their first 
child soon after marriage, then slow down considerably from the first to the second 
birth, which is consistent with the findings of Coale, Li and Han (1988). On average, 
the first birth intetval is just under two years for both rural China and Anhui and for 
higher order birth it is about two and a half years. The table and figure also indicate 
that most married women have two births, and after their second child the family size 
clearly affects the probability of having a subsequent birth, but not the timing of the 
next birth. The conditional means from third to sixth birth are surprisingly identical, 
all around 33 months. The pattern of birth intexvals in rural Anhui is similar to the 
national average; probably the quantum of lower birth orders (first to third birth) in 
rural Anhui is slightly higher than the national average, while the higher-order births 
are slightly lower. The rest of the analysis mainly concentrates on rural Anhui. The 
birth intetvals are examined by order in relation to age, cohon and period effects. 
The period effects are emphasized in order to relate the effects of planned 
socioeconomic changes to birth intetvals in rural Anhui. 
6.3 Age Effects on Birth Intervals 
Age is defined as age of women at start of the intetvals. Four age categories 
determined by the quartile distributions of the age at the stan of intexvals are used. 
Table 6.2 gives the quartiles of age at stan of birth intetvals. The quantum and 
conditional means from marriage to sixth birth are presented in Table 6.3. The 
quantum and conditional means are classified by the quartiles of each birth order. 
For example, the age at which 25, 50 and 75 per cent of women married are 17, 19 
and 21 respectively, the quantum and means from marriage to first birth are divided 
into four categories corresponding to each quartile of number of marriages; women 
who married at less than 17 years of age, 17-18, 19-20 and 21 or more years of age. 
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Table 6.2 Quartiles of Age at Start of Birth Intervals, Rural Anhui 
Previous Event 
Quartile Marriage 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Ql 17 20 22 25 27 30 
Q2 19 22 24 27 30 132 
Q3 21 24 26 29 32 35 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China. 1982. 
Considering first the intervals from marriage to first birth, it seems that age at first 
marriage has a clear effect on the proportion of women who have their first child by 
the end of five years. Women who married younger (before 19) have a lower 
quantum of fertility than women who married later. The difference in the quantum of 
fertility between ages at marriage less than 17, and 21 or more, is about 15 per cent. 
However, it should be pointed out that the results of this table are calculated on the 
basis of whole samples, and do not take into account any differences between the age 
cohorts in terms of age at marriage. The results from Chapter 5 show that under the 
influence of the family planning program since 1972, age at first marriage has 
increased considerably since the early 1970s, and the intervals from marriage to first 
birth of younger women are considerably shorter than among older women. The 
fertility level in the first five years of marriage of younger women is also 
considerably higher than that of older cohorts. Presumably, in Table 6.3 for the first 
birth, the majority of women who married earlier are the older cohorts, and a large 
percentage of those who married late are younger cohorts. This results in the trend 
that the women who married younger have a lower fertility quantum in the first five 
years of marriage. 
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Table 6.3 Birth Intervals by Age at Start of Intervals, Rural Anhui 
Birth Summary 
Order Measures Age At Start of Intervals 
1 Age <17 17-18 19-20 21+ 
Q .780 .879 .897 .934 
M 28.0 25.5 23.5 20.7 
2 Age <20 20-21 22-23 24+ 
Q .872 .879 .875 .823 
M 30.2 30.4 29.7 30.2 
3 Age <22 22-23 24-25 26+ 
Q .836 .831 .805 .723 
M 31.0 32.3 32.8 33.7 
4 Age <24 25-26 27-28 29+ 
Q .799 .738 .714 .650 
M 31.3 32.5 33.7 34.8 
5 Age <27 27-29 30-31 32+ 
Q .726 .678 .648 .551 
M 30.8 33.4 34.0 34.0 
6 Age <30 30-31 32-34 35+ 
Q .706 .632 .573 .439 
M 30.8 33.0 32.9 34.1 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
It is interesting to note that the age effect on the birth interval disappears from the 
first to the second birth. The quantum and timing of the second birth interval by age 
at marriage are very similar. If it is true that the younger cohorts married late and had 
shorter intervals between marriage and first birth, one would expect them, ceteris 
paribus, to progress to the second birth sooner than the older cohorts. In other words, 
the higher quantum and timing of fertility for second births are expected for the 
younger cohorts. The similarity of quantum and timing of fertility for the second 
birth may reflect the influence of the family planning program on the younger 
women. This point becomes clearer in the next section once the cohort effect is 
analysed by controlling the relative ages. 
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As we move to the higher parities, the age effects on the quantum and timing of 
fertility become much clearer. Consider for example the interval from second to third 
birth. The categories of age correspond to women having their second birth at ages 
under 21, 22-23, 24-25 and 26+. It is found that the quantum of fertility ranges from 
84 per cent for women who had their second birth at less than 21 years of age to 72 
percent for the women who had their second child after their 26 birthday. The age 
effect on timing of fertility is less pronounced, ranging from 31 months for women 
having their second birth relatively younger to 34 months for those who had their 
second child late. Consider now the interval from fourth to fifth birth. The categories 
of relative age correspond to ages at fourth birth under 26, 27-29, 30-31 and 32+. 
The quantum of fertility ranges from 73 per cent for women who had their fourth 
birth at less than 26 years of age to 55 per cent for those who had their fourth birth 
after their 32nd birthday: The conditional means vary from 31 months among those 
who had their fourth birth younger to 34 months among those who had it relatively 
old. Generally speaking, from third birth onwards, women who had their previous 
birth relatively young have a higher probability of progressing to the next parity and 
also have shorter inter-birth intervals. 
Figure 6.2 shows the plots of birth functions of all births by age at start of intervals. 
For the first birth, the women who married younger tend to have a lower quantum of 
fertility in the first five years of marriage as well as longer intervals from marriage to 
first birth. The quantum and timing of fertility are almost identical for the second 
birth for all ages at the start of the intervals. From third to sixth birth, the age effects 
on the birth intervals become very clear. Presumably, most of the women who had 
three or more children are the older cohorts, so they are less likely to have been 
affected by the family planning program, particularly by the One-child Family policy 
since 1979, during their reproductive periods. 
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Figure 6.2 Life Tables by Birth Order and Age at Start of Intervals, Rural Anhui 
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For the analysis of age effects, it may be concluded that before the family planning 
program, the relative age at each birth played an important role in determining the 
completed family size. The women who married early or had subsequent births at 
relatively young ages tend to have larger families. The opposite is probably true for 
women who married later or had the subsequent birth at an older age; they tend to 
have smaller completed families. This is consistent with the findings of Chapter 5, 
which shows that for the older women (aged 35+) the mean length of interval from 
marriage to first birth is longer for those who married earlier. But within the first five 
years of marriage, the majority of women regardless of age at marriage have about 
the same level of fertility, which suggests that those women who married earlier 
catch up with others in the first few years of marriage. The analysis of Table 6.3 
further suggests that the catching-up effects for women who married earlier or had 
the subsequent births relatively young may be continued to the higher parities. 
Clearly, the turning point of the trend in quantum and timing of fertility is from the 
second birth. The age effects on birth intervals change the direction from the second 
birth; as explained before, this may reflect the influence of the family planning 
program on younger women. 
6.4 Cohort Effects on Birth Interval 
Cohort is defined as the age of women at the time of survey. For cohort effects on 
birth interval, it is necessary to compare the childbearing experience of different 
generations of women. Six age groups are used, 15-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-49 
and 50-59. The results of life table analysis are presented in Table 6.4 and the 
associated Figure 6.3. Considering first the intervals from marriage to first birth 
among the different cohorts, it is apparent that among the younger women, the larger 
proportion progress from marriage to first birth within five years; also the younger 
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cohorts have shorter intervals between marriage and first birth. The distinctive 
difference in terms of quantum of fertility is found between the women aged less 
than 40 and 40+. The quantum of fertility is more than 90 per cent for the younger 
cohorts (less than 40) and about 82 per cent for the older cohorts ( 40+ ). It partly 
explains the results in Table 6.3, which shows the lower quantum and longer birth 
intervals from marriage to first birth within five years for the women who married 
earlier. It is likely that the older women ( 40+) tend to have married earlier and a 
considerable percentage of them had their first birth after five years. 
Table 6.4 Birth Intervals by Age Cohort, Rural Anhui 
Birth Sum 
Order Measure 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 
1 Q .966 .966 .948 .909 .818 .825 
M 19.8 20.6 21.8 24.6 26.5 26.5 
2 Q .826 .937 .940 .947 .803 .802 
M 27.1 28.7 29.3 29.6 31.6 31.7 
3 Q .685 .794 .901 .834 .741 
M 32.2 32.5 31.1 32.6 32.9 
4 Q .533 .520 .735 .843 .700 
M 33.7 32.7 31.7 33.2 33.3 
5 Q .334 .374 .480 .732 .667 
M 36.8 33.0 31.3 32.6 33.5 
6 Q .365 .353 .600 .617 
M 33.3 31.0 32.1 33.4 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
Moving from the first to the second birth, it can be seen that the proportion of 
women progressing to the next parity is gradually declining from the 35-39 age 
cohort to the youngest cohort. This indicates the effects of the family planning 
program on the early stage of family building of the younger cohorts. The 
differences in quantum and timing of fertility are less pronounced among the women 
aged 25 to 39, and this may reflect the impacts of 'Wan Xi Shao' (Later-longer-
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fewer) family planning campaign on delaying the second child during the 
1970s. 
For the higher parities the decline of quantum of fertility is much clearer and very 
pronounced. Consider the inteival from third to fourth birth: among women aged 40-
49 about 84 per cent progress from third to fourth birth within five years, and this 
proportion is reduced to about 74 per cent for women aged 35-39. In the next two 
age groups (25-29 and 30-34), only half of them did so. For those two age groups 
(25-29 and 30-34), it is also evident that the dramatic fertility decline happened after 
their second child was born. On average, about 94 per cent of them (25-29 and 30-
34) moved from first to second birth within five years. For the next birth, the 
percentage was reduced to 68 and 79 for women aged 25-29 and 30-34 respectively. 
Furthermore, only one third of them progress from fourth to fifth birth within five 
years. For women aged 35-39, the dramatic fertility decline happened after the birth 
of their third child, from 90 per cent to about 74 per cent in five years. For the two 
oldest cohorts ( 40-49 and 50-59) the quantum of fertility gradually declined from 
parity to parity, and except for the first birth the timing of each parity is remarkably 
close, all slightly over two and a half years. 
The plots of the birth functions in Figure 6.3 show the same trends for different 
cohorts. Those results suggest that in rural Anhui under the influence of the family 
planning program, most of the women aged 25-29 and 30-34 in 1982 had two 
children. Fewer and fewer of them progress to the higher parities. Presumably, for 
those women after their second child was born, more and more of them have to use 
some kind of contraceptive methods. For women aged 35-39, the dramatic decline in 
quantum of fertility occurred after they had their third child. Presumably, most of 
women aged 35-39 at interview were married in the mid-1960s. The introduction of 
the family planning program in 1972 seems to have had an almost immediate impact 
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on them. A similar situation may be true for women aged 30-34 who were married in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Table 6.5 shows the second, third and fourth birth intervals by controlling the 
relative age. Because the age at first marriage and first birth is analysed in Chapter 5, 
the present analysis begins with second, third and fourth births. Considering the 
progression from first to second birth, it is clear that for each age cohort (except for 
women aged 40-49) the proportion of women having a second child within five years 
declines as the age when they had the first birth increases. The opposite trend for 
women aged 40-49 is most certainly due to the effects of three years of famine 
(1959-1961). Many of them might have had their first birth just before or around the 
famine period and the progress to the next birth was seriously affected by the famine. 
Within each category of age at first birth, it can be seen that the youngest cohort for 
which data is available shows the lowest proportion having a second child within 
five years and shorter birth interval. Generally speaking, for women aged less than 
50, the quantum of fertility for younger cohorts is lower than for the older cohorts, 
and in many cases the younger cohorts tend to have shorter intervals. The trend of 
quantum of fertility becomes clearer for the higher orders of birth. Considering the 
third birth interval, within each category of age at second birth, the quantum of 
fertility considerably declined among women less than 40 years of age. The 
differences in proportions of women having a third birth within five years between 
age group 35-39 and 25-29 are no less than 25 per cent for each age category. This 
indicates the strong influence of the 'Wan Xi Shao' family planning campaign (later-
longer-fewer) on birth interval regardless of the age at previous birth. But the 
change in the timing of fertility is less clear; no systematic trend is found for the 
different cohorts. The similar trend in quantum and timing of fertility is true for the 
higher order of births. 
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Table 6.5 Second, Third and Fourth Birth Intervals by Cohort C<imtrolling Relative 
Age, Rural Anhui 
Ageat Sum 
Birth Measure 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-49 50-59 
Age at First Birth 
<20 Q .854 .958 .973 .967 .765 .833 
M 27.7 30.1 28.7 28.9 32.0 31.1 
20-21 Q .946 .948 .961 .780 .832 
M 29.2 29.8 29.6 31.9 31.4 
22-23 Q .902 .939 .944 .827 .821 
M 27.5 29.2 29.0 30.8 32.7 
24+ Q .898 .876 .881 .866 .676 
M 27.2 28.8 31.6 31.6 31.9 
Age at Second Birth 
<22 Q .723 .885 .972 .743 .860 
M 32.3 30.3 29.0 33.1 31.3 
22-23 Q .729 .820 .962 .803 .801 
M 31.6 33.5 31.2 32.0 32.1 
24-25 Q .595 .761 .895 .883 .766 
M 31.3 32.7 31.2 32.5 33.7 
26+ Q .658 .722 .864 .594 
M 32.1 33.8 32.9 34.5 
Age at Third Birth 
<25 Q .601 .650 .891 .812 .841 
M 31.7 32.0 30.0 33.3 31.1 
25-26 Q .371 .485 .778 .9-31 .719 
M 31.8 31.5 32.2 31.6 32.9 
27-28 Q .432 .626 .888 .638 
M 35.0 33.2 32.6 34.1 
29+ Q .216 .460 .778 .621 
M 27.4 32.9 34.8 35.1 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China. 1982. 
6.5 Period Effects on Birth Interval 
In order to make use of the most recent data, the period is defined as 5, 10, 15, and so 
on years before the Survey. Seven calendar periods have been classified: 1948-52, 
1953-57, 1958-62, 1963-67, 1968-72, 1973-77 and 1978-82. Those periods are 
roughly incorporated with the major events of planned socioeconomic changes in 
rural Anhui. 1948 to 1952 represents the early period of liberation and Land Reform; 
1953-1957 was the period of the agriculture co-operation movement; 1958 to 1962 
was the 'Great Leap Forward' and three years of famine, then followed a short 
period of economic reform from 1963 to 1965. The Cultural Revolution started in 
1966; from 1972, the government introduced the family planning program to rural 
Anhui; 1973 to 1977 represents the period of gradual development of family 
planning program in Anhui. The last period of classification (1978-1982) represents 
the early period of economic reform and the One-child Family policy (1979). The 
following analysis attempts to link the changes of quantum and tempo of fertility to 
the planned changes in rural Anhui. 
Table 6.6 shows the birth intervals by calendar periods. It is interesting to note that 
during the early period of liberation and Land Reform in rural Anhui (1948-52), the 
quantum of fertility is no less than 80 per cent within five years from the first to sixth 
birth. The lower than expected figures of quantum for the lower parities (first and 
second birth) may be due to the fact that a· considerable percentage of women had 
their first or second child after longer than five years; it may also be due to 
misreporting of the childbirths, especially if the child died early. No matter what may 
be the cause, it is probably true that during this period, family size did not seem to 
affect the probability of having a subsequent child. Regardless of the number of 
children the family had, more than 80 per cent of women moved to the next parity 
within five years. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this may reflect the fact that during the 
Land Reform, the size of the labour force in each family was the most important fact 
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for family prosperity. Having more children seemed to be the only way to increase 
the labour force in the family. 
Table 6.6 Birth Intervals by Calendar Period, Rural Anhui 1948-1982 
Birth Summary 
Order Measure 82-78 77-73 72-68 67-63 62-58 57-53 52-48 
1 Q .990 .951 .943 .910 .752 .849 .863 
M 19.0 21.8 22.1 24.5 30.7 24.0 26.5 
2 Q .901 .931 .945 .937 .618 .769 .807 
M 28.0 29.8 29.1 30.0 37.7 30.5 32.1 
3 Q .656 .768 .912 .913 .593 .710 .811 
M 32.2 33.3 31.2 31.1 37.3 32.3 33.4 
4 Q .397 .576 .850 .882 .586 .703 .804 
M 32.1 32.4 32.5 32.8 36.9 32.2 32.6 
5 Q .289 .431 .744 .804 .549 .664 .862 
M 32.9 32.9 31.5 32.8 38.5 32.4 32.1 
6 Q .245 .350 .638 .746 .538 .648 .821 
M 31.8 33.1 31.4 33.2 35.0 31.7 32.2 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
Figure 6.4 also shows that the birth functions of 1948-52 are about the same from the 
first to the sixth birth. 
Noticeable changes occurred during the next five years when the Agricultural Co-
operative Movement started in 1955, and land was gradually taken back by the 
government. The quantum of fertility declined gradually with the increasing number 
of children in the family, but little change occurred to the tempo of fertility, 
especially from the second to the sixth birth. 
The most astonishing figures are found during the 1958 to 1962 period, which shows 
how seriously the famine could affect fertility. Only 75 per cent of women had their 
first birth within five years and the mean interval increased to about two and half 
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years. The dramatic decline in the quantum of fertility is evident for all orders of 
births and the timing of fertility increased to about three years from the second to the 
sixth birth. 
Shortly after the famine, there was the period of Economic Reform (1963-1965). 
Fertility substantially increased for each order of birth and the tempo of fertility was 
shortened, which might reflect the 'catching up' effect after the famine. During the 
Cultural Revolution, fertility within the early years of marriage (first and second 
birth) continued to increase and the average length of the birth interval was 
shortened. However, there is some evidence of fertility decline from the higher order 
of births during 1968-1972, especially from the fourth to the sixth birth. For 
example, during 1963-67, about 88 per cent of women moved from third to fourth 
births within five years, and this was reduced to about 85 per cent in 1968-72; but the 
tempo of fertility remained little changed. 
Since the introduction of the family planning program in 1972, its impact on fertility 
by birth order is apparent. During 1973-1977, not much change occurred to the first 
and second birth in terms of quantum and tempo of fertility compared to the figures 
of 1968-1972. The substantial decline occurred from the second to the third birth, for 
example, only about 77 per cent of women moved from second to third birth within 
five years compared with 91 per cent in the previous five years. The largest decline 
in the quantum of fertility occurred from the third to the fourth birth which dropped 
to about 58 per cent. Again there was little change in the tempo of fertility. 
For the most recent period (1978-1982), the quantum of fertility reached its 
maximum point for the first birth, about 99 per cent of women having their first birth 
within five years, and the average length being shortest (19 months) between 
marriage and birth of any group studied. The quantum fell to about 90 per cent from 
first to second birth. The largest decline was from second to third birth, on average 
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only 66 per cent of women moving from second to third birth within five years. The 
substantial decline in the quantum of fertility continues for the higher order of births. 
Again, the tempo of fertility remains little changed. 
Figure 6.4 gives the birth functions by calendar period and birth order. If one takes 
the 1958-1962 birth function curve as the base line of comparison, it is clear that for 
the first three births, the 1958-1962 curve remains at the lowest position. This 
suggests that no planned socioeconomic changes, including the family planning 
program, had a more serious effect on fertility than the three years of famine. From 
the fourth birth onwards, the birth function cmves of 1973-1977 and 1978-1982 
gradually moved below the 1958-1962 cmve, which demonstrates that the family 
planning program is more powerful in bringing down the higher-order births than the 
effects off amine. 
Table 6. 7 gives the second, third and fourth birth intervals by calendar period 
controlling relative age. The purpose of controlling relative age is to avoid the 
possible effect of selectivity on retrospective period data. As the analysis goes back 
in time it is forced to deal with a progressively younger group of women. The birth 
intervals of the past period are based on the women, who on average started the 
intervals relativ~ly younger. It is shown in Table 6.3 that except for the first birth, the 
relatively younger women tend to have higher probability of having another child 
and slightly shorter intervals between birth. 
This possible bias is controlled in Table 6.7. Looking first at the early period of 
liberation (1948-1952), Table 6.6 shows that family size has no effect on the 
probability of having another child. Once the relative age is controlled, it can be seen 
that although on average, family size has no effect on the next birth, the relative age 
at previous birth did have an effect on the next birth. For example, about 91 per cent 
of women who had their first birth in their teens move to the second birth within five 
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Figure 6.4 Life Tables by Binh Order and Calendar Period, Rural Anhui 
1.0 1.0 
Q.8 O,I POORTHBDml 
82-78 
Q.6 
0.5 Tl-73 
72-sl 
Q.4 Q.4 67-63 
62-'8 
0.2 '7-53 
Q.2 
S2-18 
0.0 0.0 0 2 3 4 0 2 3 4 5 6 
1.0 1.0 
0.8 
i::: 
O,I l'JFl'H BlllTII 
0 
·a 82-78 (,,) 0.5 
Tl-73 Q.6 i::: 
= i:i.. 72-611 
'5 0.4 67-63 Q.4 
.... 
..... 62-'8 ~ 
0.2 '7-S3 Q.2 
S2-48 
0.0 0.0 0 2 3 4 5 6 0 2 3 4 
1.0 1.0 
O,I O,I SIX"lll BIRTII 
82-78 
0.5 o.5 
Tl-73 
72-611 
OA Q.4 
67~3 
52-'8 
0.2 '7-S3 Q.2 
S2-48 
0.0-1---.---=~----..------.-...... .---,..--.--~-...... --. 0.0 
0 2 3 4 5 6 0 2 3 4 
Years Since Previous Binh 
5 
... ---
5 
5 
126 
82-78 
Tl-73 
72-sl 
67-63 
62-'8 
'7-53 
S2-18 
6 
82-78 
Tl-73 
72-611 
67-63 
62-'8 
'7-S3 
S2-48 
6 
82-78 
Tl-73 
72~8 
67~3 
62-SI 
'7-S3 
S2-48 
6 
Table 6.7 Second, Third and Fourth Birth Intervals by Calendar Period Controlling 
Relative Age, Rural Anhui 1948-1982 
Ageat Sum 
Birth Measure 82-78 77-73 72-68 67-63 62-58 57-53 52-48 
Age at First Birth 
<19 Q .914 .963 .970 .971 .651 .818 .811 
M 29.8 29.8 28.7 28.7 38.5 30.1 30.4 
20-21 Q .934 .952 .948 .965 .630 .730 .843 
M 29.0 30.1 29.0 29.8 39.0 31.0 32.5 
22-23 Q .905 .913 .958 .925 .566 .791 .836 
M 27.4 29.0 29.0 29.5 38.2 31.7 33.2 
24+ Q .872 .882 .860 .883 .587 .691 .707 
M 27.5 30.3 31.1 31.7 33.5 29.1 33.1 
Age at Second Birth 
<21 Q .740 .769 .937 .960 .601 .814 .855 
M 30.4 31.8 30.3 28.4 36.2 31.7 31.9 
22-23 Q .657 .804 .953 .961 .652 .726 .842 
M 30.7 33.8 31.4 30.3 36.2 32.0 32.5 
24-25 Q .669 .782 .933 .927 .629 .771 .832 
M 33.4 32.7 30.4 31.0 39.7 33.6 33.0 
26+ Q .626 .686 .819 .865 .504 .553 .720 
M 32.2 34.7 32.6 32.8 37.4 32.3 36.4 
Age at Third Birth 
<24 Q .582 .633 .901 .946 .680 .800 .891 
M 32.1 31.6 30.3 30.8 38.6 30.8 30.1 
25-26 Q .37.4 .573 .902 .960 .683 .751 .804 
M 30.1 31.8 32.0 30.8 34.7 32.7 33.0 
27-28 Q .398 .555 .851 .906 .532 .707 .818 
M 33.9 34.0 33.0 32.4 35.2 32.8 34.5 
29+ Q .261 .504 .763 .818 .459 .565 .664 
M 31.0 33.3 34.6 34.6 37.8 33.4 34.4 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China. 1982. 
years, but only about 75 per cent of women did so if they had their first child after 
their 24th birthday. The birth intervals are also slightly shorter for the relatively 
young women. The same trend is true for the third and fourth birth. 
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For the next period (1953-1957), the differences in terms of the quantum of fertility 
may exist only between the youngest and oldest age categories. For example, 
consider that from second to third birth, about 85 per cent of women who had their 
second child at less than 21 years of age move to the third birth within five years, but 
only 59 per cent of women did so if they had the second child after age 26. For 
women who had their second birth between age 22 and 25, it probably makes no 
difference in the progress to the next birth. 
After the three years of famine among the women who had their first child before 
age 22 the proportion and timing of having a second child within five years remained 
unchanged until the late 1970s. For women who had their first child at age 22-23, the 
quantum declined gradually from early 1970. For women who had their first child at 
age 24 or later, there does not appear to be any significant change in the quantum of 
fertility. From second to third birth, the change in the quantum of fertility became 
clearer. For all women, the decline in the quantum of fertility clearly started in the 
early 1970s. For women who had their second child at a later age the margin of the 
decline in the quantum is greater. From third to fourth birth the quantum declined 
substantially from the early 1970s; for women who had their third child before age 
27, it declined from about 92 per cent to 61-67 per cent. A similar change seems to 
be true for women who had their third child after age 27. These findings suggest that 
the women who accepted the 'Wan Xi Shao' family planning program accepted both 
parts of the program --- 'longer' and 'fewer' children. 
Finally, in order to put all findings together and relate them to the planned 
socioeconomic changes in rural Anhui since 1949, the summary measures of the life 
table analysis, the quantum and conditional means are transformed into the three-
dimensional contour maps. Figure 6.5 gives the quantum of fertility by birth order 
and Figure 6.6 shows the conditional means by birth order from 1948 to 1978. 
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In Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the life tables by birth order are calculated on the yearly basis 
where the interval started. Talcing 1948 as the example, life table analysis first cross-
tabulates all women who married, having first birth, second birth and so on in 1948, 
and then calculates all the birth functions. The quantum and conditional means are 
calculated within five years from 1948 for each birth order. The calculations are the 
same for the subsequent years. So the last year at which the quantum and conditional 
means are available is 1978. The X axis of the figures is the year, Y axis is the birth 
order from one to six and Z axis represents the quantum or the conditional means. 
Each figure contains in total the quantum and conditional means from 180 life tables. 
Looking first at Figure 6.5, it can be seen that during the early 1950s the quantum of 
fertility was relatively high and stable from first to sixth birth. The quantum 
gradually declined from the mid 1950s from the higher order of births. The impact of 
three years of famine is most apparent since it forms a deep valley across all birth 
orders. Then comes a long period of high fertility, especially for the first to third 
births. From the late 1960s, there appear some signs of fertility decline in the higher 
birth orders. From the early 1970s, the dramatic fertility decline occurred. It started 
from the higher orders of birth and rapidly filtered down to lower parities. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Feeney and Yu (1987) who concluded that 
the dramatic fertility decline in China under the influence of family planning is 
mainly due to the decline in higher-order births. 
Figure 6.6 presents a very interesting finding about the tempo of fertility in rural 
Anhui. If we remove the disturbance of the three years of famine, the change in 
tempo of fertility by birth order is mainly concentrated along the first and second 
births. The timing of fertility has gradually shortened in the early stage of the family 
building process since 1948; but this is not the case for the third and higher-order 
births: the tempo of fertility has been remarkably stable in the last few decades. 
Although Coale, Li and Han (1988) find that the interval following i male birth is 
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generally longer than if the previous birth is female in rural China, the findings of the 
present analysis suggest that on average there is probably no significant change in 
the tempo of fertility for the higher order of births. It also indicates that although the 
family planning program since 1972 successfully prevented a substantial percentage 
of women from having more children, the women who did have more children would 
have them without significant delay. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, three measures of life table analysis are used to study fertility change 
by birth order: the quantum of fertility, or proportion having a subsequent birth 
within five years of previous birth; conditional mean, an estimate of the average birth 
interval for women who have a subsequent birth within five years; and the birth 
functions. The analysis is controlled by age, cohort and period effects on birth 
intervals and the fertility changes by birth order are analysed in the context of the 
planned socioeconomic changes in rural Anhui since 1949. 
It is found that age at the start of intervals played an important role in determining 
the quantum and tempo of fertility. Generally speaking, the women who had the 
previous birth (or marriage) at a relatively young age tended to have a higher 
probability of progressing to the next birth within five years. 
For the different age cohorts, the substantial fertility decline clearly took place 
among women aged less than 40. It starts for women aged 35-39 after most of them 
had their third child. For women aged 25-34, the substantial decline in the quantum 
of fertility occurred after the second child was born. For the youngest cohort (15-24), 
there is a sign of decline in the quantum from first to second child within fiye years. 
For the first and second birth, the younger cohorts tend to have shorter birth 
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intervals. Little change was observed for the higher-order births in terms of the 
tempo of fertility. 
The period effects can be broadly divided into two periods; before and after the 
introduction of the family planning program (1972). Before 1972, the fertility change 
was indirectly affected by the planned socioeconomic changes in rural Anhui. There 
are three noticeable periods; first of all during the early period of liberation (1949), 
Land Reform stimulated parents to have more children in order to gain more labour 
for the family. There appears to have been a period of relatively high and stable 
fertility. On average, more than 80 per cent of women moved to the next parity 
regardless of family size. Secondly, during the three years of famine for all orders of 
birth, the quantum of fertility was reduced drastically and the tempo of fertility 
reached the longest intervals. Then comes a compensation period of high fertility 
until the early 1970s; but during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the quantum of 
fertility probably started to decline from the higher orders of birth (fourth birth 
onwards). 
The introduction of the family planning program to rural Anhui in 1972 started a 
new era of fertility transition. During the early period of the family planning program 
(1973-1977), the substantial decline in quantum of fertility first occurred from the 
third and higher orders of birth. It quickly filtered down to the second birth in the 
next five years (1978-1982). This indicates that the program is clearly and rigorously 
focused on parity and birth order. It seems that women who had given birth to their 
second child became the primary target of the family planning program. The patterns 
of fertility decline imply that they used some kind of contraceptive method; the 
pattern of contraceptive use is analysed in Chapter 7. 
Finally, it is interesting to note how stable is the tempo of fertility for the third and 
higher order of births through the entire period of study (1948-1982), except during 
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the three years of famine (1959-1961). The family planning program successfully 
stopped many women from having more children, but those who did continue, did so 
without delay. 
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Chapter 7 
Patterns of Contraceptive Use in Rural Anhui, 1982 
7 .1 Introduction 
The 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China in 1982 collected information about current 
contraceptive use of currently married women aged 15-49. There are many studies, 
using the 1/1000 Fertility Survey data, about the patterns and incidence of 
contraceptive use, and the degree to which cultural and socioeconomic factors help 
to explain those patterns (Qiu, Wu and Wang, 1984; Tuan, Zhong and Li, 1986; Sun, 
1986; Poston, 1986; Yang, 1987). It is found that the percentage of contraception (69 
per cent) in China is as high as in many developed counties. The principal method of 
contraception is IUD (50 per cent), followed by male and female sterilization (35 per 
cent) which constituted 85 per cent of all users (Poston, 1986). In rural China, use of 
both IUD and sterilization is about 15 per cent higher than in urban areas. The 
differentials in contraception are found among women with different socioeconomic 
background and number of living children. There is also considerable variation in the 
patterns and methods of contraception among subregions in China. The percentage 
of contraceptive use ranges from 60 per cent in Northwestern areas to more than 70 
per cent along the coastal areas. The percentage of sterilization varies from 17 per 
cent in Northern areas to about 40 per cent along coastal areas. Less variation is 
observed for the IUD users (Qiu, Wu and Wang, 1984). Some studies also analyse 
abortion in China (Tuan, Zhong and Li, 1986; Hull and Yang, 1987), and conclude 
that though abortion was officially used as a back-up method in case of contraceptive 
failure, there is evidence of coercion in some cases of abortion. Further 
investigations are needed before any detailed conclusion can be drawn. 
There is no doubt that the family planning program, as one of the planned 
socioeconomic changes in China, played an important role in the dramatic fertility 
decline. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main focus of the family planning program 
in rural Anhui, as is probably true of all rural China, is to increase the use of fertility 
control methods (including abortion) to reduce population growth. Women have little 
choice in contraception, even the contraceptive methods are fixed for them 
depending on how many children they have (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988). 
The slogan mentioned in Chapter 4, 'first child IUD, second child sterilization and 
unplanned pregnancy abortion' is self-evident. So studying the patterns of 
contraception in rural Anhui, one may not assume that the existing pattern is based 
on people's choice, it is more likely that the pattern reflects how the family planning 
program affected women with different backgrounds. In other words, most women 
are not in a position to choose contraception, rather they have been chosen for certain 
contraceptive methods. This chapter examines how the family planning program 
affected all married women in terms of contraceptive use, including induced 
abortion. Chapters 5 and 6 in which time-series data were available, make it possible 
to analyse fertility changes in the context of planned socioeconomic changes since 
1949. For contraception analysis, the data are only available for 1982 (induced 
abortion goes back to 1979). So the contraceptive pattern of 1982 is examined to 
signal the influence of the family planning program on fertility. 
The year 1982 represents a contradictory period. It was about four and a half years 
after the economic reform known as Production Responsibility System in rural 
Anhui, and about four years after the One-child Family policy. On the one hand, 
resistance to the rigorous family planning program increased during Economic 
Reform in rural China; on the other hand, the State's ambitious target was to keep 
the population within 1.2 billion by the year 2000, and it urgently called for 
strengthening family planning at all levels. 
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7.2 Current Use of Specific Methods by Age 
Based on the degree of reversibility of the technique, the different contraceptive 
methods are divided into three broad categories: sterilization (male and female) ---
irreversible method; IUD --- semi-reversible method; and others (pill, condom, 
diaphragms, etc) --- easily reversible method. Of course, it is possible from the 
medical point of view to reverse sterilization; however, for family planning work, it 
is reasonable to assume that sterilization is irreversible. IUD insertion and removal 
requires medical assistance, and it is hard for the individual user to discontinue it, so 
it is classified as a semi-reversible method. The same applies to injections. Any other 
methods which can be easily discontinued by individual users at any time are 
classified as easily reversible methods. The present study does not attempt to 
sep~ate the women who are forced to use some kind of contraceptive methods, e.g. 
sterilization, from those who use them on a voluntary basis. 
Variations with age in the use of various specific methods are shown in Table 7.1 
and associated Figure 7 .1. 
The pattern of contraceptive use of specific methods by age in rural Anhui (Table 
7 .1) is similar to the national average, except that pill users are doubled in Anhui. 
The percentage of users in rural Anhui is about 6 per cent higher than the national 
figure. For all methods, it can be seen from Figure 7. IA that the percentage of users 
increases substantially with age, from less than one third of users among the young 
age group (20-24) to more than 90 per cent for women aged 30-39. The lower 
percentage of users for older women ( 40+) is mainly due to the fact that some of 
them are approaching menopause and reported themselves as infecund at the time of 
the survey. 
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Table 7.1. Current Use of Specific Contraceptive Methods by Age Groups (20-49), 
Rural Anhui 
Sterilization User as % of Exposed 
Age Female Male IUD Pill Others No. Users Women 
20-24 1.5 0.0 58.2 35.1 5.2 134 26.5 
25-29 10.5 5.8 60.8 19.7 3.3 1,195 68.9 
30-34 24.8 11.8 50.5 11.4 1.5 1,423 91.5 
35-39 38.2 10.8 41.1 8.8 1.0 1,051 93.7 
40-44 28.4 10.4 49.4 10.1 1.6 799 85.1 
45-49 21.6 11.0 56.8 7.3 3.3 454 49.7 
All Age 
Rural Anhui 23.9 9.6 51.6 12.9 2.1 5,056 74.7 
Rural China 27.1 8.1 54.3 6.7 3.9 68,255 68.3 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
Table 7.1 clearly shows that the IUD is the principal contraceptive method for all 
women. More than half of women who are currently using contraception depend on 
it. The percentage of IUD users does not seem to vary much among different age 
groups: except in the 35-39 age group, it varies between 50 and 60 per cent. 
The same cannot be said for the percentage of sterilization, which increases with age, 
especially female sterilization. Few women aged 20-24 are sterilized (1.5 per cent), 
but from age 25 to 39, the percentage of sterilization increases substantially, peaking 
at 38 per cent for women aged 35-39; then it declines to about 22 per cent for older 
women (45-49). The lower rate of sterilization among these older women probably 
reflects the lower impact of the program in earlier years. It is interesting to note that 
there is no male sterilization among the husbands of women aged 20-24; male 
sterilization is about 6 per cent for the next age group (25-29) and remains at about 
10 per cent for the rest of the age groups (30-49). There are some reasons for the 
relatively low percentage of vasectomy, one of them is that some couples are afraid 
of the man becoming a eunuch after vasectomy; it is well known in China that a 
eunuch was a castrated man who used to be employed in imperial courts. Also there 
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are generalized fears that men may be affected -- weakened --- by the operation: this 
is very important among peasants where the man is the main worker for the family. 
The percentage using easily reversible methods (pill and others) decreases steadily 
with age; more than 40 per cent of women aged 20-24 depend on the pill and other 
methods, while use declines to about 20 per cent for the next age group (25-29), and 
remains at about 10 per cent for the remaining age groups. 
Figure 7.lB shows current use of specific methods of all current users (20-49) by age 
group in rural Anhui. Reading from the bottom of the figure, the first two colours 
represent the changes in percentage using irreversible contraceptive methods, the 
next colour is the percentage changes of IUD users and last two colours stand for the 
users of easily reversible methods. The figure reflects the influence of family 
planning campaigns in rural Anhui, for example, the campaigns in Bo county since 
the early 1970s (as mentioned in Chapter 4), of which the main purpose was clearly 
_to increase the number of abortions, sterilizations and IUD users. From the family 
planning workers' point of view, the best solution in contraception is sterilization. 
Once the women had sterilization, the family planning workers did not need to worry 
about them any more. The more cases of sterilization, the easier their job. Since IUD 
is a very effective method and can last a reasonably long period, it is the second best 
method; in most cases, the IUD can be removed only in a family planning clinic or 
service station, and only if strong reasons are given. The use of easily reversible 
methods is concentrated among young women (under 30), of whom presumably a 
considerable percentage are childless or have only one child. It is very hard to 
persuade them to use more permanent methods, particularly sterilization. 
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Figure 7.1 A. Current Use of Specific Contraceptive Methods of 
Currently Married Women (20-49) By Age Group, Rural Anhui 
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7.3 Current Use of Specific Methods by Number of Living Children 
The population policy and family planning program in China are clearly and 
rigorously focused on birth order (Feeney and Yu, 1987); the birth interval analysis 
in Chapter 6 shows that the quantum of fertility by birth order has considerably 
declined since the early 1970s. At the most recent period (1978-1982), the dramatic 
decline in the quantum of fertility occurred from the second to the third birth and 
continued to decline for higher-order births (Table 6.6). The analysis of 
contraceptive use by number of living children provides an opportunity to observe 
how the family planning program affects women's reproductive behaviour by birth 
order. 
Table 7 .2 and the associated Figure 7 .2 show the current use of . specific 
contraceptive methods of current users (20-49) by number of living children in rural 
Anhui. Less than 3 per cent of married women with no child use any contraceptive 
methods, which suggests that most women in rural Anhui do not delay their first 
birth after marriage, consistent with the findings in Chapters 5 and 64. Among the 
women who have one child, the percentage of contraceptive use increases to about 
43 per cent. Although the One-child Family policy was announced in 1979, the 
majority of women in rural Anhui did not seem to follow the policy closely. Among 
those 43 per cent contraceptive users, 5 per cent have sterilization, slightly over half 
use the IUD, and about 42 per cent use other easily reversible methods (pill and 
others). It seems probable that only the 5 per cent of sterilized women have fully 
accepted the One-child Family policy. In other words, less than half of those with 
one child are using any contraceptive and only about 2 per cent of those with one 
child have decided to stop there. 
4 Among the 3 per cent (or 12) childless women, the use of IUD, especially sterilization, may be due 
to misreporting during the survey. 
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Table 7 .2. Current Use of Specific Contraceptive Methods of current users (20-49) 
by Number of Children ever Born, Rural Anhui 
No.of Sterilization User as % of Exposed 
Children Female Male IUD Pill Others No. Users Women 
0 8.3 0.0 75.0 8.4 8.3 12 2.9 
1 4.7 0.3 52.5 33.5 9.0 343 43.3 
2 7.4 2.4 68.8 18.7 2.6 985 80.9 
3 29.4 11.5 47.0 11.1 1.1 1,230 91.0 
4 32.9 12.6 44.4 8.7 1.4 1,085 90.8 
5 28.3 12.9 48.5 8.7 1.5 1,401 77.8 
All 
Rural Anhui 23.9 9.6 51.6 12.9 2.1 5,056 74.7 
Rural China 27 .1 8.1 54.3 6.7 3.9 68,254 68.3 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
The percentage of contraceptive users almost doubled among women who had two 
children compared with women who had one child, from 43 to 81 per cent, which 
clearly indicates the focus of the family planning program on birth orders. It is 
interesting to note the shift in contraceptive use by methods from one to two 
children. The percentage of users using easily reversible methods declined from 42 
to 21 per cent, and IUD users increased to about 69 per cent. The percentage 
sterilized increased to about 10 per cent of users. After having their second child, the 
majority of married women are programmed to take non-easily reversible 
contraceptive methods (IUD and sterilization). 
The most interesting findings in the pattern of contraceptive use are from the second 
to the third birth. After having their third child, the percentage of women sterilized 
rose from 10 to 41 per cent, while the percentage of IUD users declined by more than 
20 per cent; the percentage of pill and other methods users stabilized at around 10 
per cent. The pattern of specific contraceptive use remains similar among women 
with three or more children. 
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Figure 7 .2 A. Current use of Specific Contraceptive Methods of all Married 
Women (20-49) by Number of Children Ever Born, Rural Anhui 
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These findings suggest that the number of children is one of the. most important 
factors in determining the use of specific contraceptive methods. It seems that few 
newly married women use any kind of contraception; after having the first child, 
about half the women use contraception and concentrate on IUD and easily 
reversible methods. From the first to the second birth, the most important feature is 
the dramatic increase in contraceptive use: in fact, no less than 90 per cent of women 
are using contraception, and the majority of them have IUDs (69 per cent). The most 
distinctive shift in use of specific methods occurred from the second to the third 
birth: among the women with three or more children, more than 40 per cent have 
sterilization and just under half use IUD. Sterilization and IUD users make up no less 
than 85 per cent of total users. 
Of course, in the developed countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, a 
similar trend of contraceptive use by number of children ever-born is observed; 
young women are more likely to use the pill or condom, after having one or two 
children, many of them switch to the IUD, and then to sterilization once the family is 
completed. This is mainly because when children are being planned for, women do 
not mind too much if they forget a pill and get pregnant slightly before they meant 
to. But once the family is complete they want reliable, safe long-term protection 
(Kane, 1987). But the use of any contraceptive methods in developed countries is 
mainly determined by the individual couples, taking into account such factors as cost 
of children and women's employment. In rural China since the cost of raising 
children is relatively low and the expected returns of children are higher, it is 
unlikely that for most peasants the desired number of children is as low as two or 
three (Wang, 1988). So the observed contraceptive pattern by number of children in 
rural China has mainly resulted from the influence of the family planning program. 
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The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that in the recent period (1978-82), the dramatic 
fertility decline occurred from the second to the third birth. The analysis in the 
present chapter shows that the dramatic fertility decline was achieved by massive use 
of sterilization and IUD insertion (probably also many abortions) after the third 
child. These are the most important characteristics of the planned fertility decline. 
7.4 Current Use of Specific Methods by Educational Level 
Of the 5,056 current contraceptive users in rural Anhui, 77 per cent (3,883) have 
never attended any school, 17 per cent (839) have primary school education and only 
6 per cent (334) have secondary or higher education. These figures are well below 
the average educational levels of women for China as a whole; on average 43 per 
cent of women have no education, 33 per cent have primary school and 24 per cent 
have secondary or higher education in rural China. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Anhui as a whole stands at the lower middle level of socioeconomic development in 
China and one of the serious problems for its future socioeconomic development is 
the lower educational level of the labour force. So it is not surprise to find that the 
average education level of women at reproductive ages in rural Anhui is much lower 
than the national average. 
Table 7.3 and associated Figure 7.3 give the current use of specific contraceptive 
methods of all current users (20-49) by education level in rural Anhui. There is not 
much difference in percentage of contraceptive use between women with no 
schooling and those with primary school education. The women with some schooling 
have a slightly higher percentage of contraceptive use (78.6 per cent) than illiterate 
women (74.6). A lower percentage of contraceptive use (67.2 per cent) is found 
among women with higher education, which may be due to the fact that a larger 
percentage of women with higher education are younger and many of.them may be 
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just married or have only one child, so the overall percentage of contraceptive use 
appeared to be lower among them. 
Table 7.3. Current Use of Specific Contraceptive Methods of all current users (20-
49) by Education Level, Rural Anhui 
Sterilization User as % of Exposed 
Education Female Male IUD Pill Others No. Users Women 
No School 23.9 10.3 53.2 10.6 1.9 3,883 74.6 
Primary 26.6 7.3 45.3 18.8 2.0 839 78.6 
Secondary 17.1 6.6 47.9 24.0 4.5 334 67.2 
All 23.9 9.6 51.6 12.9 2.1 5,056 74.7 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. 
It is very interesting to observe the changes in percentage of users of specific 
methods among the different education groups. Of the women with no schooling, 34 
per cent are in couples that have been sterilized (24 per cent tubal-ligation and 10 per 
cent vasectomy), 53 per cent depend on IUD and about 12 per cent use easily 
reversible methods. For the next education group (primary school), the percentage 
sterilized remains unchanged (27 per cent tubal-ligation and 7 per cent vasectomy), 
the percentage of IUD users dropped to about 45 per cent and the percentage of easy 
methods users increased to about 21. Among the women with higher education, the 
percentage of sterilization dropped to about 24 per cent (17 per cent tubal-ligation 
and 6 per cent vasectomy) and the percentage of easily reversible methods users 
reached the highest point of 29 per cent; this trend can be seen clearly from Figure 
7.3. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that a large percentage of the higher 
education group are younger women. It is also related to the differences in 
contraceptive knowledge and desire for more children among different education 
groups. The local family planning workers may feel that it is unsafe to leave the 
uneducated women with easily reversible contraceptive methods. And the more 
educated women may be more confident about demanding real choice from the 
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family planning workers. The 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China has no information 
about contraceptive knowledge and desire for more children. 
7.5 Patterns of Induced Abortion in Rural Anhui, 1979-1982 
The Chinese government has stated clearly that family planning is the basic state 
policy; the implementation of the family planning program is based on the principle 
of integrating state guidance with massive voluntary effort. Contraception is the 
preventive measure and induced abortion serves only as a 'back-up' method in the 
family planning program (Wang, 1986). Many studies argue that the family planning 
program in China is coercive, especially the use of induced abortion (Mosher, 1983; 
Banister, 1987; Aird, 1988). The present study does not aim to clarify whether or not 
the family planning program is coercive, but to examine the patterns of abortions in 
rural Anhui since 1979. The existing pattern is regarded as the result of the family 
planning program and should reflect the influence of the program. 
In the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, all married and exposed women were asked about the 
dates of, and reasons for abortions since 1979. Among 6,770 exposed women in 
1982 in rural Anhui, 469 cases of abortions were recorded since 1979: 422 of them 
were first abortions, 42 were second abortions and five were third abortions. The 
present study examines only the first abortions. In 1979, 76 first abortions were 
recorded, 118 in 1980, 107 in 1981 and 121 up to September 1982. It is not possible 
to find out how accurate the abortion information is; it is probably true that many 
women tended to under-report their abortions, especially those who should have used 
contraception but did not. It is comparatively easy for women to get abortion outside 
their own area, many rural women go to a town for privacy. They were afraid that 
they might be classified as people who did not comply with the state population 
policy and become the primary target of the family planning program. 
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Table 7.4 Reasons for Induced Abortions for Women Aged 20-49 
in Rural Anhui, 1979-1982. 
Year 
Reasons 1979 1980 1981 1982* 
Sterilization Failure 1.3 2.5 3.7 3.3 
IUD Failure 39.5 34.7 33.6 25.6 
Others Failure 21.1 18.6 25.2 26.4 
Non-contraception 38.2 44.1 37.4 44.6 
Total 100 100 100 .100 
Total Abortions 76 118 107 121 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. * Number of abortions for 1982 
is only up to September 1982. 
Table 7.4 shows the reasons for reported induced abortions for women aged 20-49 in 
rural Anhui since 1979. Less than 4 per cent of abortions were due to the failure of 
sterilization. The failure or expulsion of IUD accounts for more than 30 per cent of 
abortions from 1979 to 1981 and decreased to about 26 per cent in 1982. It is 
interesting to note that the percentage of abortions due to failure of IUD is much 
higher than that of other contraceptive methods, except in 1982. Studies about 
contraceptive effectiveness suggest that in developing countries the effectiveness of 
IUD is about 96 per cent and for other methods (except sterilization) on average it is 
about 70 per cent (Laing, 1985: 146). One would expect the percentage of abortions 
due to IUD failure to be lower than those due to failure of other contraceptive 
methods because of the relatively higher effectiveness of IUD. The higher failure 
rate of IUD in rural Anhui suggests that some of the IUD users may have 
deliberately removed their IUD to get pregnant. The analysis of the Bo county 
population sUJVey in Anhui (Liang and Li, 1982) indicated that a considerable 
amount of 'unplanned pregnancy' resulted from self-removal of IUD, which suggests 
a strong desire for more children. Other possible explanations or partial explanations 
are that Chinese IUDs are different in design and do seem to have higher failure rates 
than those used elsewhere. Also, expulsion rates vary depending on the technique of 
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the person inserting them, it is possible that during the family planning campaigns, 
many IUD insertions were not well done (Kaufman, 1987). The highest percentage 
of abortions was due to non-contraceptive use; presumably, a large percentage want 
to have more children. 
Table 7 .5 shows the percentage distribution of abortions for women aged 20-49 by 
age groups, number of children ever-born and educational level. It is apparent that 
abortions are concentrated among women aged less than 40 years of age: more than 
90 per cent of abortions were performed on these age groups. The percentage of 
abortions among women aged 20-29 steadily increased from 1979, and by 1982 
women in those age groups accounted for about half of the induced abortions. For 
women aged 30-39, the percentage of abortions declined from 54 per cent in 1979 to 
about 45 per cent in 1982, which may suggest that since the early 1980s more and 
more younger women have 'unplanned pregnancies'. It may also indicate, as the 
previous discussion has shown, that increasingly these older women with more 
children were the effective target of the family planning program. 
It is not surprising to find that about 60 per cent of abortions were undergone by 
women who had two or three children, because they are the primary target of the 
family planning program. In many cases, the induced abortions were followed by 
sterilization or IUD insertion, especially for women who had two or more children. 
The majority of women who had abortions are illiterate. It seems that in rural Anhui 
the relatively young (under 40) and illiterate women who have two or more children 
are most likely to have abortions. They have a stronger desire for more children, are 
less likely to use contraception, and are more likely to become the primary target of 
the family planning program. 
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Table 7.5. Percentage of Induced Abortions to Women Aged 20-49 
by Age, Number of Children Ever-born and Educational 
Level in Rural Anhui, 1979-1982. 
Year 
Variables 1979 1980 1981 1982* 
Age 
20-29 35.5 39.0 45.8 49.6 
30-39 54.0 53.4 47.7 44.6 
40-49 10.5 7.6 6.5 5.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
No of Living Children 
1 10.5 10.2 19.6 13.2 
2 36.8 35.6 37.4 34.0 
3 22.4 20.3 19.6 26.4 
4 17.1 17.8 11.2 15.0 
5 13.2 16.1 12.1 11.6 
Tatol 100 100 100 100 
Education 
No School 63.2 66.0 58.0 72.7 
Primary 25.0 24.6 28.0 21.5 
Secondary 11.8 9.4 14.0 5.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Total Abortions 76 118 107 121 
Source: 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China, 1982. *Number of abortions for 1982 
is only up to September 1982. 
7.6 Summary 
The family planning program in China is mainly responsible for the dramatic fertility 
decline since the early 1970s. One of the most important aspects of the family 
planning program is contraceptive use, including induced abortion. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 shows a clear pattern of fertility decline by birth order 
since the early 1970s in rural Anhui. In the most recent period (1978-1982), the 
dramatic fertility decline occurred from the second to the third birth. The analysis of 
the contraceptive pattern shows that the family planning program is fcx;used not only 
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on the birth order, but also on specific contraceptive methods by birth order. More 
than 90 per cent of current users who have less than two children use IUD or other 
easily reversible contraceptive methods. After having a third child, no less than 40 
per cent of current users are sterilized, which suggests that with increasing number of 
children, more and more exposed women are pushed towards the use of irreversible 
methods (male or female sterilization) through the family planning program. 
There is no difference in contraceptive use between illiterate and primary school 
educated women; women with higher education are more likely to use easily 
reversible contraceptive methods. On the one hand, This may suggest that women 
with higher education are more likely to resist successfully pressures to make them 
use irreversible methods; on the other hand, it may also reflect the differences in 
desire for more children among different education groups. 
Illiterate women with two or three children are more likely to have abortions. 
Presumably, a considerable percentage of them may have ~unplanned pregnancies' 
and most probably these are women who want more children. A large percentage of 
abortions resulted from the failure or expulsion of IUD which suggests that some of 
the IUD users may deliberately remove their IUD in order to have a pregnancy. 
Around the mid 1980s, as mentioned in Chapter 4, more and more places in Anhui 
followed the slogan 'first child IUD, second child sterilization and unplanned 
pregnancy abortion' in family planning work. Table 7.6 shows the percentage of 
changes in use of specific contraceptive methods of all current users from 1981 to 
1986 in rural Anhui. It is clear that the pattern of contraceptive use changed towards 
the line of family planning specified in the slogan. The percentage of sterilization 
increased to about 60 per cent while the IUD users declined to about 33 per cent 
from 1984; the percentage of other contraceptive users has remained constant since 
- -
1981. This trend of contraceptive use suggests that in rural Anhui most couples 
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Table 7.6. Percentage Changes in Use of Specific Contraceptive Methods of All 
Current Users (15-49), Rural Anhui 1981-1986. 
Year 
Methods 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Female 23.4 24.3 33.6 39.1 39.4 40.4 
Male 9.4 11.4 15.4 19.7 19.9 18.3 
IUD 59.3 57.1 45.4 36.0 33.8 33.4 
Pill 6.9 6.3 4.7 4.5 5.7 6.6 
Others 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: China Population Information Centre, 1986a. 
would have two or more children before they agree to have sterilization. For some of 
them sterilization may be the price they paid for an additional child. 
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Chapters 
Conclusion 
This thesis has examined fertility decline in rural China, particularly in rural Anhui, 
in the context of planned socioeconomic changes since 1949. The development of 
the Chinese political system played a very important role in determining 
socioeconomic development and policy implementation (Greenhalgh, 1989c). From 
the political point of view, China's development from 1949 to 1989 can be divided 
into two broad periods in terms of tightening and loosening central control: from 
1949 to 1979 was basically a period of tightening central control; while from 1979 to 
1989 economic reform was accompanied by the loosening of central control. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there have been four major socioeconomic campaigns in 
rural China since 1949. These were: 
1. Land Reform and Agricultural Co-operative Movement (1949 to 1957). 
2. Great Leap Forward followed by three years of famine (1958-1961). 
3. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
4. Economic Reform (1979-1989). 
These planned changes formed the background for thoroughgoing institutional 
changes in the environment in which fertility decline has taken place. Essentially, the 
family planning program was a key part of the broad strategic directions adopted 
during each period of government action. It should be pointed out that the first eight 
years of implementation of a widespread effective family planning program (1972-
1979) were in a period of tight central control, while from 1979 to 1989 the One-
child Family policy was carried out during a period of economic reform and 
loosening central control (Chapter 4). Fertility behaviour in both periods was 
influenced by, and fluctuated with, these major chang~s in governmental style. 
The basic format of socioeconomic campaigns in China is as follows: 
The change process is initiated by Party policies outlining specific changes in policy 
themes. These can be translated into either indirect or direct attempts to change 
social life and people's behaviour. Indirect attempts are implemented through 
structural transformations. The government can use some or all of its resources to 
change economic or social structures. The assumption behind policies is that where a 
structure changes, people will adapt their behaviour to the new conditions. 
There are, however, two major types of direct change mechanisms frequently utilized 
by government: administrative sanctions and normative influences. The government 
identifies and announces the kinds of behaviour and attitudes to be favoured or 
forbidden, and then uses the party, public security apparatus, work units and 
community organizations to reward those who comply with the announced norms 
and punish those who do not. These general principles and methods for enacting 
social changes were the basis of implementation of the family planning program 
(Chapter 1). 
The general conceptual framework for the study of planned fertility decline assumes 
that fertility behaviour is the outcome of both institutions' and individuals' decision-
making processes, and that a large number of interrelating institutions in society 
shape the environment in which fertility decisions are made. This framework 
identified three types of institutions at the primary level influencing the 'proximate' 
fertility determinants: family organization, economic institutions, and the institution 
of birth control technology and distribution. These are shaped by the structure of 
governance and the system of socialization, which are in tum conditioned by the 
prevailing ideology. The logic of the framework is that changing ideology produces 
changes in structures of social control (government and socialization), which in tum 
lead to changes in the immediate environment in which people make fertility 
decisions. As this environment changes, so does the behaviour with regard to the 
- -
'proximate' variables and thus the fertility level itself. This framework is used as a 
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basis, and general guide, for study of planned fertility decline in rural China. The 
major findings are summarized as follows. 
8.1 Pre-Family Planning Program in Rural China, 1949-1972 
The period 1949 to 1972 was basically one of tightening central control but with a 
virtual absence of a family planning program in rural China. Fertility changes were 
indirectly affected by other planned socioeconomic changes. The analysis in Chapter 
5 showed a gradually increasing age at marriage in rural China over those years, 
particularly in rural Anhui. Two impacts of planned socioeconomic changes on 
nuptiality were identified. First, during the land reform of the early 1950s, land was 
redistributed to farmers and the individual farming family became the main ' 
production unit. Under these circumstances the number of labourers in a family was 
a major determinant of family prosperity. With the end of war and demobilization of 
armies, there was a marriage boom, with a large number of marriages at relatively 
young ages. 
The second impact was during the Great Leap Forward followed by three years of 
famine. There appeared to be an earlier age at marriage during the Great Leap 
Forward (1958) and a period of three years of discontinuity of marriage (1960-1963) 
due to the effects of the famine. These were followed by a period of compensating 
early marriage. For women married before 1972, particularly those aged 40 years 
and over at the time of interview in 1982, age at marriage played an important role in 
determining fertility levels. Generally, women who married earlier had longer 
intervals between marriage and first birth, but over the first five years of marriage 
women had about the same fertility level in terms of mean number of children ever 
born regardless of age at marriage. Consequently, in the absence of modern 
contraception, women who married earlier would have had_more childr~n than others 
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because of a longer total exposure to childbearing over their fertile life-span. In other 
words, age at first marriage was an important determinant of completed fertility in 
rural China 
The analysis of fertility change by birth order (Chapter 6) further confirms that age at 
the start of intervals (marriage or births) played an important role in determining the 
quantum and tempo of fertility. Women who had a previous birth (or initiated 
marriage) at a relatively young age had a higher probability of progressing to the 
next birth. Similar to the changing nuptiality pattern, from 1949 to 1972 there are 
three noticeable effects of planned socioeconomic changes on fertility by birth order: 
First of all, during the early period of Communist government (1949-1957), Land 
Reform stimulated parents to have more children in order to gain more labour for the 
family. This appears to have been a period of relatively high and stable fertility. On 
average, more than 80 per cent of women moved to the next higher parity regardless 
of family size. Secondly, during the famine years of 1959-1961 for all orders of 
birth, the quantum of fertility was reduced drastically and intervals lengthened. This 
was followed by a compensation period of high fertility extending through the early 
1970s; but during the late 1960s and early 1970s, fertility probably started to decline 
with reductions of fourth and higher order births. Although there was no systematic 
family planning program in rural China before 1972, the Communist Party 
successfully established a huge bureaucratic system to carry out all centrally planned 
policies and this provided the basic framework for family planning once the program 
was established. 
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8.2 Rapid Development of Family Planning Program, 1972-1979 
Since the early 1970s, the Chinese government has emphasized the importance of 
family planning in population control, particularly in rural China. The family 
planning program was introduced to rural Anhui in 1972. During the period 1972 to 
1979, the family planning program developed rapidly from the 'Wan Xi Shao' 
campaign in the early 1970s to the One-child Family policy adopted in 1979. A 
family planning organizational hierarchy was also established within the context of 
the government bureaucratic system. Under the influence of the family planning 
program, nuptiality and fertility in rural Anhui entered an era of rapid change. 
Age at first marriage increased rapidly, from about 18 years on average in the early 
19~0s to about 22 years towards the end of the 1970s. The intervals between 
marriage and first birth were considerably shortened. This suggests that some of the 
women may have been squeezed to later ages at marriage under the influence of the 
family planning program, but after marriage tended to compensate for the time they 
had to wait. Within the first five years of marriage, regardless of age at first marriage 
most women had about the same level of fertility. Although increasing the age at 
marriage would tend to increase the average length of generation, it would have had 
no specific effect on completed family size. 
The substantial decline in fertility beginning in the early 1970s occurred first at third 
and higher orders of birth. It quickly filtered down to the second birth by the end of 
the 1970s, which clearly reflected the focus of the Chinese family planning program 
on birth order. 
There is no doubt that the family planning program has contributed enormously to 
the fertility decline in rural China. The goal of the family planning program is 
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straightforward. To control population growth, later age at marriage is enforced for 
unmarried women, and for married women some method of birth control including 
induced abortion must be used. Over the decade from 1979 to 1989 the main 
methods of policy implementation were population propaganda and various 
campaigns carried out by family planning organizations. The hierarchy of the family 
planning organizations was supported, in tum, by the bureaucratic system which was 
centrally controlled. During the period of tightening control (1949-1979), ideological 
reform and class struggle were emphasized, and the central government successfully 
made people submit their interests to the collective's or state's interests. These 
background institutional changes help to explain why the Chinese family planning 
was successful in reducing population growth in a relatively short period of time, in 
advance of major change in socioeconomic development. 
8.3 Conflicts and Adjustment in Family Planning Program, 1979-1989 
The redistribution of land to the peasants is known as the 'production responsibility 
system': under this reform the individual family again became the basic production 
unit. Peasants had more economic freedom to decide on products, process, and 
labour inputs, instead of submitting their interests to the collective's or state's 
interests, the peasants gradually emphasized their own interests. These changes 
diminished the power of central planning and control, the structures of which were 
loosened at the grass-roots level. This policy shift on the economic side impeded 
successful enforcement of the rigid population policy (One-child Family policy), 
both by the decentralized nature of policy administration and by the inability of the 
enforcement mechanism to adjust to rapid changes in the economy. Resistance to 
rigid population policy grew stronger and stronger in rural China as a result of the 
reforms of 1978-1979, leading to an adjustment of population policy in the mid 
1980s. This reflected a softer style in policy implemen~tion. In fa_pt, before the 
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policy adjustment in the mid 1980s, many provinces had already modified their 
interpretations of central population policies to suit the changed local situations 
created by economic reform. 
The State Family Planning Commission was quick to recognize the implications of 
the trend of economic reform for family planning program implementation. Soon 
after the policy adjustment, population growth greatly increased in some rural areas, 
partly because the 1960s baby-boom cohorts reached the reproductive ages. In rural 
Anhui, there were considerable increases in the proportions marrying early (below 
the minimum legal age), commencing childbearing early and having 'unplanned 
births'. These changes suggest that the reduction in fertility levels recorded for rural 
China in the 1980s is by no means necessarily a permanent one, because peasants 
evidently want more children than the one-child policy requires. Also they indicate 
that socioeconomic development in rural China has not yet reached a stage where 
most of the peasants would spontaneously adopt very small family sizes. 
The economic reform has also reduced the effectiveness of the propaganda and 
family planning campaigns. Economic sanctions and the contract system were 
introduced into the family planning program during the 1980s. In early 1989, the 
State Family Planning Commission emphasized the importance of 'unified thinking 
in family planning and population control', and of 'grasping family planning firmly'. 
These phrases appear to signal a desire to tighten up the family planning program. 
Although it is obvious that social and economic structures changed significantly 
during economic reform, the Chinese government apparently still believes that the 
family planning program working through the structure of government can both 
achieve low fertility and modify people's attitudes towards bigger families. Data 
appear to contradict this notion. 
160 
During economic reform and the implementation of a new marriage law in 1981, the 
nuptiality pattern in rural Anhui moved towards earlier marriage. The substantial rise 
in age at marriage between 1972 and the early 1980s may have been a temporary 
change achieved through the centrally controlled bureaucratic system. All other 
trends indicate that rural Anhui has not yet developed to a stage where most women 
would spontaneously accept a later age at marriage. Taking into account the more 
recent downwards trend in age at marriage, the long term time-trend of age at 
marriage in rural Anhui appears as a smooth and gradual upwards line. Unless the 
underlying socioeconomic conditions change, government efforts can infll)ence age 
at marriage at the margin, but probably cannot greatly modify the underlying 
nuptiality pattern. 
There is insufficient data to analyse the fertility change by birth order for the period 
of economic reform (the 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China was conducted in 1982). 
The total fertility rate (TFR) in China declined from 2.6 in 1981 to 2.4 in 1983, 
reaching a low 2.2 in 1985. Since 1985, the TFR has increased to 2.4 in 1986 and 2.6 
in 1987. A similar trend is found in Anhui. The TFR declined from 3.2 in 1981to2.8 
in 1983, and reached the lowest fertility of 2.4 in 1985 before increasing to about 2.7 
in 1987 (China Population Information and Research Centre, 1989: 7). The increase 
in TFR since the mid-1980s in rural China and Anhui may reflect, at least partly, the 
relaxation of population policy during that period. But it also suggests that the 
present situation of fertility transition in China is unlikely to be stable until the 
changes in social and economic structure encourage people to internalize a small-
family norm. 
The analysis of the 1/1000 Fertility Survey of China shows a distinct pattern of 
contraceptive use in rural China and Anhui. Sterilization and IUD users constituted 
more than 80 per cent of total users. The use of specific methods is influenced by the 
- -
number of children women have. More than 90 per cent of current users who have 
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fewer than two children use IUD or other easily reversible contraceptive methods. 
After having a third child, no less than 40 per cent of current users are sterilized. 
Around the mid 1980s, the slogan 'first child IUD, second child sterilization and 
unplanned pregnancy abortion' became a guiding principle in family planning work. 
From the early 1980s to 1986, available data show that the pattern of contraceptive 
use in rural Anhui changed towards the line specified in this family planning slogan: 
sterilizations increased to about 60 per cent while IUD use declined to about 30 per 
cent by 1986. 
In summary, before 1979 from a political point of view China was basically 
characterized by tightening central control through its fully entrenched bureaucratic 
system. Ideological reform and class struggle were emphasized by the central 
government. People were told to ignore their own interests in favour of the primacy 
of collective and state interests. There were a series centrally planned socioeconomic 
changes. The family planning program was introduced to rural China and Anhui in 
the early 1970s. The central government was determined to bring down rates of 
population growth as these were assumed to place heavy burdens on socioeconomic 
planning. The established bureaucratic system was able to carry out centrally 
planned policy mainly through propaganda and administrative methods. Referring to 
the study framework (Chapter 1), the main channels of family planning program 
implementation in China before 1979 were the structure of governance (bureaucratic 
system) and the pattern of socialization (propaganda), through which the central 
government directly controlled the fertility behaviour of each family. Under these 
circumstances, the successful implementation of the program did not require major 
changes in the economic system. In other words the levels and trends in 
socioeconomic change were largely irrelevant to the overall success of the family 
planning program, although they may have played an important role in fertility 
variations among different socioeconomic settings. Planned fertility transition in this 
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period in rural China and Anhui has some distinct characteristics in relation to 
'proximate' fertility variables: 
1. The early period transition did not change the proportion married among females 
of reproductive age. The analysis in Chapter 5 shows that more than 95 per cent of 
Chinese women married before age 30 whatever their birth cohorts. 
2. The early period transition focused on massive use of contraception. The family 
planning program focus on the parity and the use of specific contraceptive methods 
are largely determined by the number of children women had (Chapter 6 and 7). 
3. There is not sufficient data to analyse the prevalence of induced abortion. A 
number of studies indicate that the Chinese family planning program involved 
substantial use of induced abortions. The analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that abortion 
is also parity related (most abortions taking place among women having two or more 
children) which is consistent with the focus of the program. 
4. The birth interval analysis in Chapter 6 indicates that birth intervals are getting 
shorter among the younger cohorts, especially the intervals between first and second 
birth, which may suggest change in the duration of post-partum infertility among the 
different cohorts. 
It is apparent that the dramatic fertility decline in rural China and Anhui in the 1970s 
and early 1980s has been achieved mainly through changes in two sets of proximate 
variables: proportion of fecund women using effective contraception and the 
prevalence of induced abortion. These changes were the main focus of the family 
planning program. 
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During the period 1979-1989, the economic system changed drastically. In rural 
China, land was re-distributed to peasants, and they were given more economic 
freedom in production. The structure of central control was loosened at grass-roots 
level. The economic reforms in turn suggested reforms in the social and political 
systems. Although the signals from the central government about population control 
remained strong, the changed economic situation in rural China encouraged peasants 
to resist the rigid population policy. This resulted in major conflicts and consequent 
adjustments of central population policies. It appears that induced fertility transition 
in rural China, using mainly administrative methods and propaganda in policy 
implementation, must now take account of unanticipated changes in economic 
structure: changes which have gradually assumed fundamental roles in determining 
fertility behaviour. 
Since the June 4th Incident of 1989, the Chinese Central Party Committee has issued 
urgent calls to strengthen ideological reform, and tighten Central Pa.rtY leadership at 
all levels. This signals another fundamental turning point in the history of communist 
China. After a decade of economic reform (1979-1989), the Central Party Committee 
is attempting to re-establish central planning and tight social controls. It is unclear to 
what extent the Party will be successful in the new policies since there are at least 
three important factors impeding the successful re-implementation of goals of 
centralism. First of all, the lack of an absolute, authoritarian leader, such as former 
chairman Mao Zedong, means that it is difficult to attain strong unity of thinking and 
action in the government itself. In other words it is not possible to formulate a single 
'correct political line' for the whole nation to follow. Second, the economic reform 
brought an increased emphasis on decentralization in decision-making and 
implementation of policies. Cadres at all levels are reluctant to revert to the 
centralized manner of policy implementation and give up the autonomy achieved in 
the decade to 1989. Mao Zedong (1938: 514) stated that:' ... once the correct political 
- -line is formulated, cadres will become the key instrument in carrying out the 
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policies ... '. Cadres no longer wish to be seen as mere functionaries, carrying out a 
party line. Third, during economic reforms, more than 80 million peasants became 
involved in collective or private light industries. They are no longer traditional 
peasants in isolated agrarian communities. It will not be easy to persuade them to 
'submit their own interests to those of a large collective or to the state's interests. The 
influence of new entrepreneurs on other peasants should also not be under-estimated. 
These factors, plus many others, suggest that the foundation of central control in 
China is shaky, and the restoration of the old system built from 1949 to 1979 is very 
unlikely. 
From the viewpoint of the conservatives in government, central control and central 
planning of population policy should be re-established, with reliance on strong 
administrative methods to achieve its goals. In other words, more coercive measures 
in family planning program implem~ntation may be expected. But peasants 
increasingly demand to make their own fertility decisions, consistent with their 
family's labour needs. It is more likely that population policy will end up as a 
compromise between these two extremes, the government's demand to control 
population and the peasants' demand for more children. Government population 
policy will need to take into account the peasants' interests if the changed economic 
conditions are to continue. Peasants will need to recognize that the total promotion of 
individual family size interests might lead to collective disaster. In the near future, 
fertility outcomes will largely depend on the relative strengths of the government in 
implementing population policy and the peasants' desire for more children. In the 
long-term, the fertility outcome in rural China will largely depend on social and 
economic policies and their outcomes, and not merely population policy or the 
family planning program. 
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APPENDIX 
"Questionaires for Women" 
( 15 - 67 years old ) 
---- county (city. district) ____ commune {neighbourhood 
committee) 
----
brigade (residents committee) 
Name of the householder: 
I. Name: 
2. Date of birth: Age: 
3. Nationality: 
4. Education: illiterate. primary school. junior middle school, seruor middle 
school. college and university. 
5. Occupation: peasant. worker, cadre. student, housework. waiting for job 
assigrunent and others. 
6. Marital status: unmarried. first marriage. remarriage, divorce. widowhoOd 
7. Date of first marriage: Age: 
8. Contraceptive methods: tubectomy. vasectomy, IUD. oral pills, injectables. 
condoms. spermicides, withdrawal. rhythm method. 
others. · 
9. Reason for not using contraception: planned birth. infertility, menopause, 
others. 
10. History of induced abortion since 1979: 
date: (reason ) {lengtn of pregnancy ) 
date: (reason ) (length of pregnancy ) 
date: (reason ) (length of .pregnancy ) 
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l J. History of childbearing 
babies died in 1980 & 1981 
order date of birth sex information 
of live B. on survival date of duratim of 
death saninl (llD1lhJ 
-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
' ' 
total nwnber of children male female 
nwnber of own ~ildren ---
12. Date of accepting one-child certifica~e: 
Age of the only child: 
date of interview: 
interviewer' a name: 
recorder's name: 
Source: Xiao, 1984. 
--- ---
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age of 
mother 
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